Mrazek v. Stafford Twp.
| Decision Date | 05 May 2017 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No.: 13-1091(FLW) |
| Parties | JOSEPH MRAZEK, Plaintiff, v. STAFFORD TOWNSHIP, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*
This Court previously rendered a partial decision on a summary judgment motion filed by Defendants, Stafford Township ("Stafford Township") and its Police Chief, Joseph Giberson ("Chief Giberson") (collectively, "Defendants"), dismissing two of the four counts in the Complaint — the procedural and substantive due process claims — brought by officer-plaintiff Joseph Mrazek ("Plaintiff" or "Mrazek") in connection with the Stafford Township Police Department promotion process.1 See Mrazek v. Stafford Twp., No. CV 13-1091(FLW), 2016 WL 5417197 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2016). While the Court denied summaryjudgment on Mrazek's First Amendment retaliation (Count IV) and Monell claims (Count III), I directed the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the issue of Chief Giberson's qualified immunity and Stafford Township's Monell lability.
Now that the issues are fully briefed, for the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. With respect to Count III, I find that Chief Giberson was not a "policymaker" for purposes of imposing liability on Stafford Township under Monell, and therefore, Stafford Township's motion for summary judgment on Count III is GRANTED. With respect to Count IV, I find that Plaintiff's Constitutional right to freedom of association based upon his union affiliation and activities had been "clearly established," such that Chief Giberson should have known that his alleged retaliatory conduct violated that right, and thus, Chief Giberson is not entitled to qualified immunity. Consequently, Chief Giberson's motion for summary judgment on Count IV is DENIED. Thus, the claim in Count IV against Chief Giberson, is the only remaining cause of action in this case that will proceed to trial.
The underlying facts of this suit were recounted in this Court's previous opinion issued on September 28, 2016. See Mrazek, 2016 WL 5417197. I will incorporate my previous opinion herein and reference it when necessary. As a brief background, Officer Mrazek participated as acandidate in a promotion process for appointment to the rank of sergeant in Stafford Township. That process included objective and subjective components. At the conclusion of the objective component, Mrazek had the highest score. Chief Giberson and other supervisory officers then participated in the subjective component of the exam, a roundtable discussion, and Mrazek ranked last in that portion. Based on his cumulative scores, Mrazek was not promoted, and indeed, Mrazek was never promoted after that exam process.
After failing to be promoted, Plaintiff filed a complaint, alleging that Defendants violated his procedural and substantive due process rights (which I dismissed in my previous Opinion), and retaliated against him in violation of his First Amendment rights. Initially, Mrazek claimed that the defendants retaliated against him based upon (1) his constitutionally-protected speech criticizing the former Mayor and Stafford Township; and (2) his union affiliation — both of which are First Amendment related claims. However, as noted in this Court's previous Opinion, Mrazek has abandoned his speech claims, and he is proceeding only on the claim that Defendants have allegedly retaliated against him in the promotion process based upon his union affiliation, which violates Plaintiff's First Amendment right to freely associate with a union.
Specifically, in Count IV of the Complaint, Plaintiff claims that Chief Giberson retaliated against him for his union-related activities by negatively influencing his scores in the promotion exam process, whichresulted in Plaintiff being passed over for promotion. In his defense, Chief Giberson argues he is entitled to qualified immunity. In Count III, Plaintiff claims Stafford Township is liable under Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), for the retaliatory acts committed by Chief Giberson. However, in the previous motion, since neither party had adequately addressed whether Plaintiff's Constitutional right had been "clearly established" for purposes of qualified immunity, and whether Chief Giberson possessed "policymaking" authority in making promotion decisions for Monell purposes, I directed both parties to submit supplemental briefs. I will first turn to qualified immunity.
In my previous Opinion, I found that Plaintiff established a prima facie claim of First Amendment retaliation: (1) Plaintiff's rights to associate with a union and his position as a Union President are protected under the First Amendment; (2) Chief Giberson's alleged failure to promote Plaintiff solely because of Plaintiff's union affiliation was sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his Constitutional rights; and (3) Plaintiff met his initial burden of showing that his union association was a "substantial" or "motivating factor" in Chief Giberson's decision not to promote Plaintiff. Mrazek, 2016 WL 5417197, at *9-14. Despite Plaintiff establishing his prima facie case, Chief Giberson argues that he should be entitled to qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity shields government officials, in their performance of discretionary functions, "from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). As a government official performing a discretionary function — administering a promotion examination for officers — Chief Giberson is entitled to qualified immunity unless Plaintiff "pleads facts showing (1) that [Chief Giberson] violated [Plaintiff's] statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was 'clearly established' at the time of the challenged conduct." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818).
As to the first prong, this Court previously determined that Plaintiff enjoys a Constitutional right to associate with a union free from retaliation for his union affiliation. The Court further determined that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Chief Giberson violated Plaintiff's right. Thus, to defeat the qualified immunity defense, Plaintiff must show that the specific Constitutional rights asserted by Plaintiff were "clearly established." See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 233 (1991) ( (citation omitted); HynsonBy & Through Hynson v. City of Chester, 827 F.2d 932, 935 (3d Cir. 1987). Accordingly, I now address that issue.
At the outset, the parties have not disputed the manner in which this Court previously framed the "clearly established" right involved here: "whether Mrazek, as the Union President, had a clearly established constitutional right, at the time of the official conduct, to be free from retaliatory action taken because of his membership in the Union." Mrazek, 2016 WL 5417197, at *16. However, as a general matter, in assessing a "clearly established" right, "the right allegedly violated must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999)). Notably, the Third Circuit's recent decisions — in the context of First Amendment claims — have narrowly framed the "clearly established" Constitutional right allegedly violated in those cases. See, e.g., Mirabella v. Villard, 853 F.3d 641, 653 (3d Cir. Apr. 4, 2017); Rossiter v. City of Philadelphia, No. 16-1187, 2016 WL 7478494 (3d Cir. Dec. 29, 2016); Zaloga v. Borough of Moosic, 841 F.3d 170, 175 (3d Cir. 2016). In light of those recent cases, it is incumbent upon this Court to define the rights involved, here, at the appropriate level of specificity, and in retrospect, I find that the way it was defined in my previous Opinion is too broad.
To determine whether a right is clearly established, "[t]he relevant, dispositive inquiry . . . is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officerthat his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202 (citation omitted); accord Zaloga, 841 F.3d at 175 ( " . "This inquiry turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken.'" Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244 (2009) (quoting Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614). "If the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202 (citation omitted); Zaloga, 841 F.3d at 174.
While a strict factual correlation between applicable precedent and the challenged conduct is not required to determine whether a right is clearly established, the Third Circuit "require[s] some but not precise factual correspondence." Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723, 733 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Three Mile Island v....
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