Ms. Com'n On Jud. Performance v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 17 January 2008
• Docket Number: No. 2007-JP-01484-SCT.,2007-JP-01484-SCT.
• Citation: 972 So.2d 582
• Parties: MISSISSIPPI COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE v. Rickey W. THOMPSON.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

972 So.2d 582

MISSISSIPPI COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE v. Rickey W. THOMPSON.

No. 2007-JP-01484-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

January 17, 2008.

Darlene D. Ballard, Ayanna Batiste, attorneys for appellant.

William C. Murphree, Tupelo, attorney for appellee.

EN BANC.

CARLSON, Justice, for the Court.

¶ 1. The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance (Commission) filed a Formal Complaint charging Lee County Fourth District Justice Court Judge Rickey W. Thompson with willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute, thus causing such alleged conduct to be actionable pursuant to the provisions of Article 6, Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890. In due course, the Commission and Judge Thompson submitted to us a joint motion for approval of a recommendation that Judge Thompson be publicly reprimanded and assessed with costs. Having conducted our mandated review of the Commission's recommendation consistent with Article 6, Section 177A, Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance Rule 10, Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure 16(d), and upon consideration of our judicial canons and our case law, we adopt the joint recommendation that Judge Thompson be publicly reprimanded and assessed with costs in the amount of $100.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

¶ 2. After the Commission's filing of the formal complaint against Judge Thompson and the filing of Judge Thompson's answer to the formal complaint, the Commission entered its scheduling order; however, in due course, without the necessity of a hearing, the Commission's counsel and Judge Thompson, along with his counsel, filed with the Commission an Agreed Statement of Facts and Proposed Recommendation, which was accepted by the full Commission.

¶ 3. A reading of the Agreed Statement of Facts and Proposed Recommendation reveals certain agreed facts as follows: On May 22, 2006, a physical altercation occurred between two siblings, Deborah Ann Moody and Sally Thompson Gill, while they were attending their grandmother's funeral at Union Baptist Church in Shannon. That evening, Moody appeared at the Lee County Sheriff's Department to file charges against Gill. An officer at the Sheriff's Department took a statement from Moody and then informed her that she should go to the Justice Court Building the next day to file the necessary papers to have a warrant issued for her sister's arrest. On May 23, 2006, Moody went to the Justice Court Clerk's office, as previously directed, and while there she happened to see Judge Thompson, who informed her that she should take her grievance to another judge, whereupon Moody appeared before Lee County Justice Court Judge John H. Sheffield. We now quote from this agreed statement of facts:

While Moody and Judge Sheffield were in the process of discussing the issuance of a warrant, [Judge Thompson] entered Judge Sheffield's office. [Judge Thompson] expressed a desire to talk to Judge Sheffield about the situation before he signed the warrant. Judge Sheffield expressed that he would be issuing the warrant. [Judge Thompson] became angry and left Judge Sheffield's office. Thereafter, Judge Sheffield authorized the warrant and explained to Moody that it would be issued on a Recognizance Appearance Bond and advised Moody to take the warrant to the Justice Court Clerk's office.

As Moody entered the hallway she saw [Judge Thompson] standing outside of his office. [Judge Thompson] then asked Ms. Shea Willis, Lee County Justice Court Deputy Clerk, not to send the warrant. Ms. Willis agreed. Moody then asked Ms. Willis if the warrant would be sent to the Lee County Sheriff Department, and Ms. Willis responded no.

Moody then walked back to Judge Sheffield's office to tell him what happened. Judge Sheffield gave Moody the telephone number for the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance. Afterwards, Moody went back to the Justice Court Clerk's office. A different deputy clerk advised Moody that she would send the warrant in that day. Moody obtained a copy of the warrant and departed.

¶ 4. A constable received the warrant and telephoned Gill concerning the outstanding arrest warrant. Gill then voluntarily surrendered herself at the Lee County Justice Court Office, whereupon she was processed and released on her own recognizance. In due course, a justice court date was assigned for Gill based on the charges brought by Moody. In the Agreed Statement of Facts and Proposed Recommendation, Judge Thompson acknowledged that he improperly allowed "his family, social or other relationships to influence his judicial conduct and that he, as well as his staff, must be courteous, cooperative with other judges, and observe standards of fidelity and diligence when performing [his] official duties." Judge Thompson also acknowledged that failure to follow these judicial tenets constitutes misconduct. Additionally, Judge Thompson acknowledged that his judicial misconduct caused him to be in violation of Canons 1, 2B and 3B(2) of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct. Thus Judge Thompson's conduct is actionable pursuant to the provisions of Article 6, Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution inasmuch as Judge Thompson's conduct unquestionably constitutes willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, bringing the judicial office into disrepute.

¶ 5. The Commission entered its Findings of Fact and Recommendation, adopting the Agreed Statement of Facts and Proposed Recommendation. The Minutes Excerpt filed by the Commission reveals that on motion duly made and seconded, the Commission unanimously recommended to this Court that Judge Thompson be publicly reprimanded and assessed with costs in the amount of $100.00.

DISCUSSION

¶ 6. Consistent with our practice in judicial misconduct cases, we first consider the judge's conduct, and if found to be actionable, we then consider the appropriate sanction.

I. WHETHER JUDGE THOMPSON'S CONDUCT CONSTITUTED WILLFUL MISCONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE WHICH BRINGS THE JUDICIAL OFFICE INTO DISREPUTE.

¶ 7. Our cases are legion on the point that this Court conducts a de novo review of judicial misconduct proceedings, while affording deference to the Commission's recommendations when the Commission's findings are based on clear and convincing evidence. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Cole, 932 So.2d 9, 10 (Miss. 2006) (citing Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Hartzog, 904 So.2d 981, 984 (Miss.2004)). See also Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Gibson, 883 So.2d 1155, 1156 (Miss.2004). "While we do give great deference to the Commission's findings, we are also charged to render an independent judgment." Id. (citing Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Peyton, 645 So.2d 954, 956 (Miss.1994)). In essence, this Court serves as the "the trier of fact" since we "have the sole power to impose sanctions in judicial misconduct cases." Id. at 1156-57 (citing Peyton, 645 So.2d at 956).

¶ 8. With our appropriate standard of review and mandated duty in mind, we return to today's case. The Commission charges Judge Thompson with violating Canons 1, 2B and 3B(2) of our Code of Judicial Conduct. We set out here the judicial canons which Judge Thompson admits he violated:

CANON 1

A Judge Shall Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary[.]

An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct, and shall personally observe those standards so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved. The provisions of this Code should be construed and applied to further that objective.

CANON 2

A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All His Activities[.]

. . . .

B. Judges shall not allow their family, social, or other relationships to influence the judges' judicial conduct or judgment. Judges shall not lend the prestige of their offices to advance the private interests of the judges or others; nor shall judges convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judges. Judges shall not testify voluntarily as character witnesses.

CANON 3

A Judge Should Perform the Duties of His Office Impartially and Diligently[.]

. . . .

B. Adjudicative Responsibilities.

. . . .

(2) A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it. A judge shall not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism.

¶ 9. We note that while Judge Thompson readily admits the violation of these judicial canons, the facts of this case likewise support a finding by us that Judge Thompson violated these canons, and is thus guilty of willful misconduct while in office.

¶ 10. This Court has for many years been consistent in its definition of willful judicial misconduct. We recently stated once again:

Willful misconduct in office is the improper or wrongful use of power of his office by a judge acting intentionally or with gross unconcern for his conduct and generally in bad faith. It involves more than an error of judgment or a mere lack of diligence. Necessarily, the term would encompass conduct involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption, and also any knowing misuse of the office, whatever the motive. However, these elements are not necessary to a finding of bad faith. A specific intent to use the powers of the judicial office to accomplish a purpose which the judge knew or should have known was beyond the legitimate exercise of his authority constitutes bad faith. . . .

Willful misconduct in office of necessity is conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute. However, a judge may also, through negligence or...