Muccianti v. Willow Creek Care Center

• Decision Date: 23 April 2003
• Docket Number: No. F038524.,F038524.
• Citation: 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 1,108 Cal.App.4th 13
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: John MUCCIANTI, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. WILLOW CREEK CARE CENTER, et al., Defendants and Appellants.

133 Cal.Rptr.2d 1

108 Cal.App.4th 13

John MUCCIANTI, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. WILLOW CREEK CARE CENTER, et al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. F038524.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District.

April 23, 2003.

Horvitz & Levy, Mitchell C. Tilner, Sandra J. Smith, David S. Ettinger; Law Offices of Mark Schreiber, Mark Schreiber, Encino, Jeffrey B. Stoltz; Law Offices of David B. Bloom and David B. Bloom, Los Angeles, for Defendants and Appellants.

Wilkes & McHugh, Stephen M. Garcia, Manhattan Beach, David T. Bamberger and Jennifer I. Rissier, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

OPINION

WISEMAN, J.

This case addresses application of Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8),¹ in the context of a request to vacate a multimillion-dollar verdict against a health care facility. The parties appear to assume that their request unquestionably will be granted and that we will give our judicial blessing to what is, for all practical purposes, a stipulated reversal. This assumption is based upon the parties' apparent belief that the judgment belongs solely to them to use in a manner that is in their best interests. What they fail to recognize is that under section 128, subdivision (a)(8), their assumption is no longer legally correct. This judgment now belongs to the public—not the parties—and the public indisputably has an interest in its continuing existence.

A brief review of the circumstances is warranted. Plaintiffs and respondents John Muccianti and Dorothy Beard, individually and as successors in interest of Margaret Muccianti, deceased (plaintiffs), filed a wrongful death action against defendants and appellants Willow Creek Care Center, Summit Corporation and Fountain View Corporation (collectively, Fountain View). Plaintiffs' mother died shortly after she was discharged from Willow Creek Care Center, a long-term, 24hour health care facility. A jury returned a verdict in excess of $5 million in favor of plaintiffs. After filing a notice of appeal, Fountain View reached a settlement with plaintiffs under which plaintiffs consented to vacation of the judgment. Fountain View then moved to vacate the judgment. Later, plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeal.

We conclude that the requirements of section 128, subdivision (a)(8), have not been met since vacation of this judgment will likely affect the rights of nonparties (e.g., prospective patients and insurance carriers) and erode the public trust. Further, based on the clarity of the parties' settlement agreement, we see no choice but to dismiss the appeal as moot.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORIES

On February 5, 1998, 65-year-old Margaret Muccianti was admitted to Willow Creek Care Center as a Medicare patient. At the time, Willow Creek Care Center was owned and operated by Summit Care California, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Summit Care Corporation. Muccianti was diagnosed with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, acute bronchitis and bronchiolitis, pneumonia, hypertension, congestive heart failure, diabetes and anxiety. Muccianti had stayed at the facility three times before, beginning in 1997.

Over the next several weeks, Muccianti was treated by Juan Touya, M.D., a physician specializing in the treatment of geriatric patients. Touya visited Muccianti two or three times per week. Muccianti's psychiatrist diagnosed her as having a major depression with anxiety. In addition to receiving antidepressant and antianxiety medication, Muccianti was counseled weekly by a therapist. She complained that she wanted to go home and that the Willow Creek Care Center staff did not pay attention to her.

According to several nurses and certified nursing assistants at Willow Creek Care Center, the facility was frequently understaffed, making it difficult to properly care for patients. For example, the nursing staff usually could not check on patients and turn them in their beds every two hours as required. Patients often were not checked for over three hours and were sometimes found lying in their own waste.

Muccianti did not keep a schedule for meals and often refused the food served to her, despite being offered different choices in her diet. Instead, she ate junk food from the vending machines and cookies brought by her family. Muccianti was treated for nausea and vomiting, some of which was self-induced. She complained of having no appetite and was losing weight. However, Touya found nothing abnormal in examining Muccianti's abdomen. Touya was concerned about Muccianti's diet because of her diabetes, which he described as "out of control." Muccianti consistently refused to attend physical therapy because she did not feel well. According to Fountain View, Medicare will not pay for a patient who shows no improvement or who consistently refuses to participate in physical therapy, even if the patient is still sick.

By March 6, 1998, Muccianti complained of having anterior abdominal pain. Touya concluded Muccianti was not suffering from an infection in her abdomen, ischemic necrosis of the bowel, or a urinary tract infection. He did not definitively identify the cause of her pain.

On March 8, 1998, Touya received a call from someone at Willow Creek Care Center requesting he discharge Muccianti. Touya did not approve of the discharge because of Muccianti's psychiatric/psychological condition. In fact, he had expected Muccianti would remain in the nursing home for a long time. Touya consulted with Muccianti's psychiatrist, who advised him to focus on her physical, rather than mental, condition. Muccianti's psychiatrist opined that her condition could be treated on an outpatient basis. Touya also spoke to Willow Creek Care Center's medical and nursing directors. As a result of these discussions, Touya reached the conclusion that it was medically safe to discharge Muccianti. During this process, Touya was informed that Muccianti's Medicare benefits had been exhausted.

On March 9, 1998, Muccianti was discharged. Touya examined Muccianti to ensure she was not suffering from any physical or medical condition that would preclude her discharge. Touya again concluded, based on a physical examination and lab reports, that Muccianti was not suffering from ischemic necrosis of the bowel. Touya found Muccianti's prognosis to be poor. According to Touya, the sole reason for Muccianti's discharge was because her Medicare benefits had run out and the family was incapable of paying the fee privately.

Approximately 16 hours after her discharge, Muccianti collapsed at her daughter's home. On March 10, 1998, Muccianti was admitted to Saint Agnes Medical Center, but the physicians could not ascertain the problem. Muccianti died on March 12, 1998. An autopsy revealed she died from ischemic necrosis of the bowel, secondary to mitral valve emboli. The California Department of Health Services investigated the incident and later issued a citation, finding that Willow Creek Care Center's failure to assess Muccianti's medical condition, identify and treat her dehydration in a timely manner, and/or implement the care plan as written proximately caused her death.

On March 28, 1998, FV-SCC Acquisition Corp., a wholly owned subsidiary of Fountain View, Inc., purchased all outstanding shares of Summit Care Corporation. The parties had signed the merger agreement on February 6, 1998. Under the agreement, FV-SCC Acquisition Corp.'s separate corporate existence ceased upon consummation of the merger, and Summit Care Corporation continued as the surviving corporation and became a wholly owned subsidiary of Fountain View, Inc. Prior to March 28, 1998, Fountain View, Inc., had no ownership interest in either Summit Care Corporation or Summit Care California, Inc., and had no connection to Willow Creek Care Center.

On January 12, 1999, plaintiffs filed suit against Fountain View, among others. Plaintiffs' second amended complaint alleged eight causes of action: 1) willful misconduct; 2) negligence; 3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; 4) elder abuse; 5) fraud—misrepresentation; 6) fraud—concealment; 7) wrongful death; and 8) unlawful business practices. Although the record is unclear, it appears plaintiffs dismissed and/or abandoned one of the fraud claims and the unfair business practices claim.

A jury found in favor of plaintiffs on claims for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress and willful misconduct. It awarded plaintiffs $94,927.63 in economic damages, $623,000.00 in noneconomic damages, and $4.5 million in punitive damages ($1.5 million against each of the three defendants). The court awarded plaintiffs $375,777.19 in attorney fees and $44,803.28 in costs. Fountain View appealed. Fountain View then filed voluntary petitions for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, title 11 of the United States Code. The bankruptcy court later lifted the automatic stay on this action.

Before Fountain View filed its opening brief, the parties settled. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, Fountain View's insurers agreed to pay plaintiffs the sum of $1,050,000.00. Plaintiffs agreed to consent to vacation of the judgment, and Fountain View agreed to dismiss the appeal. The bankruptcy court approved the settlement. Fountain View moved to vacate the judgment in light of the settlement. We deferred ruling on the motion, and Fountain View filed its opening brief. Plaintiffs subsequently moved to dismiss the appeal in light of the settlement.

DISCUSSION

We have two motions before us: 1) Fountain View's motion to vacate the judgment and 2) plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the appeal. We begin with the motion to vacate the judgment.

I. Motion to vacate the judgment

In addressing Fountain View's motion to vacate the judgment in light of the parties' settlement, it is enlightening to examine the history of the use of stipulated reversals of judgments. Prior to January 1, 2000, our power to reverse or vacate a trial court's judgment when the parties...