Muckel v. Rose
| Citation | 15 Mo.App. 393 |
| Parties | ALBERT MUCKEL, Respondent, v. PETER ROSE, Appellant. |
| Decision Date | 29 April 1884 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Missouri (US) |
APPEAL from the St. Louis Circuit Court, ADAMS, J.
Reversed and remanded.
T. J. ROWE, for the appellant: A statement of trespass quare clausum must describe the land with reasonable accuracy.-- Cook v. Callaway, 1 Mo. 545; Donohoe v. Chappell, 4 Mo. 34; Burt v. Waine, 31 Mo. 296. Instructions not warranted by the evidence, are erroneous.-- Franz v. Hilterbrand, 45 Mo. 121; The State v. Newkirk, 49 Mo. 85.
DAVIS & DAVIS, for the respondent.
)
ALBERT MUCKEL, ) Before Thomas Campbell,
Plaintiff, ) Justice of the Peace, v. ) 14th District,
PETER ROSE, ) 26th and 27th Wards.
Defendant.
)
Plaintiff for cause of action states that the defendant, on or about the ____ day of January, 1883, unlawfully and maliciously came on to the plaintiff's premises in the city of St. Louis and State of Missouri, where plaintiff was cutting ice, and said defendant unlawfully and maliciously interfered with plaintiff's work, injured plaintiff's business, intimidated plaintiff's employés, and destroyed plaintiff's tools to plaintiff's damages in the sum of $80, for which, with costs, plaintiff asks judgment.”
On trial anew in the circuit court the defendant objected to the introduction of any evidence, on the ground that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. This objection was overruled, and, the judgment having gone for the plaintiff, this is the first question in the case. The well settled rule is that the statement in a suit commenced before a justice of the peace will be deemed sufficient if it inform the defendant of the nature of the action against him, and so identify the cause of action as to bar another action for the same cause. It is contended that this statement is insufficient, because it does not identify the premises upon which the trespasses complained of are alleged to have been committed; and the cases of Cook v. Callaway (1 Mo. 545), Donohoe v. Chappell (4 Mo. 34), and Burt v. Warne (31 Mo. 296), are appealed to as sustaining this doctrine. In the first of these cases the petition was held insufficient, because it neither set out the land by metes and bounds, named it, nor showed, nor averred in any way that it was situated within the county, and hence within the jurisdiction of the justice. It was held that, for want of this averment, it did not appear that the justice had jurisdiction. In the second of these cases the statement was deficient in the same respect. It did not even show that the land was situated within the state of Missouri, and it was held that it was too defective to ground an action upon it; not for the reason stated in the preceding case of Cook v. Callaway, but because it did not apprise the defendant of what he had to answer.
The third of the above cases has no particular bearing upon the question before us. It merely states the general rule, and holds the statement before the court sufficient. The statement in this last case, though drawn in the form of an account between debtor and creditor, described the building and premises upon which the damage was alleged to have been committed, as being in block 84 in the city of St. Louis.
It is thus apparent that none of the foregoing cases furnishes a direct precedent for the solution of the question presented in this case. We think, on the whole, that the statement, though defective in the particulars named, should be regarded as sufficient. It is true that it does not locate the trespass more definitely than by the statement that the premises were in the city of St. Louis, nor does it state the exact date of the trespass, except that it was in the month of January, 1883; but it must be borne in mind that the sufficiency of a statement before a justice of the peace is not to be tested by the rules of pleading which govern causes in the superior courts of record; the policy of the law being to allow parties to litigate small controversies without going to the expense of employing counsel learned in the law, and without incurring the delay of bringing their actions in courts presided over by judges learned in the law.
If the rules of pleading which apply in ...
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General Exchange Ins. Corp. v. Young
... ... was error. The measure of damages as defined is error. There ... must be evidence of the extent of damages. Muckel v ... Rose, 15 Mo.App. 393; Lee v. Armour Bldg. Co., ... 18 S.W.2d 702; Newton Burial Park v. Davis, 78 ... S.W.2d 150. (16) The courts have laid ... ...