Mueller v. City of Seattle
| Decision Date | 04 March 1932 |
| Docket Number | 23416. |
| Citation | 167 Wash. 67,8 P.2d 994 |
| Parties | MUELLER et ux. v. CITY OF SEATTLE. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 1.
Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Malcolm Douglas, Judge.
Suit by John W. Mueller and wife against the City of Seattle. From decree for defendant, plaintiffs appeal.
Affirmed.
Carkeek, McDonald & Harris, of Seattle, for appellants.
A. C Van Soelen and John E. Sanders, both of Seattle, for respondent.
The plaintiffs, Mueller and wife, seek injunctive relief against the defendant, city, restraining it from interfering with their maintenance of their small garage building at the rear of their dwelling premises upon land which they claim to own as a portion thereof, and which the city claims as a portion of one of its dedicated existing public streets. Mueller and wife also seek a decree quieting title in them against the claim of the city to the land in question. The cause, being of equitable cognizance, proceeded to trial upon the merits in the superior court for King county, sitting without a jury, and resulted in judgment denying to Mueller and wife relief as prayed for, from which they have appealed to this court.
Primarily our problem is as to whether or not the strip of land lying along and within the western boundary of Crawford's addition to Seattle became a legally dedicated public street by the execution and recording of the plat of that addition in the office of the auditor of King county in the year 1882. The plat and the indorsements thereon, as remaining of record in the office of the county auditor, are as follows:
The indorsement across the face of block C of the plat was not there when it was originally executed and recorded. That indorsement is but a reference to the replatting of that block several years later, and is of no consequence in our present inquiry. In the year 1922, Mueller and wife acquired title to the south half of block 6 of block D of the addition, since which time they have continued to reside in the dwelling house thereon. Mueller and wife claim title to a tract of land outside of and abutting upon the western end of the south half of lot 6 of block D, approximately 10 feet wide east and west and 25 feet long north and south, which tract the city claims to be a part of a public street dedicated by the execution and recording of the plat of Crawford's addition. In the year 1928, Mueller and wife constructed a garage, 10 by 16 feet in area, largely, if not entirely, upon that tract. The city authorities threatened to remove the garage, in so far as it extends west of the west line of lot 6 of block D. Thereupon Mueller and wife commenced this action.
It is first contended in behalf of Mueller and wife that the city has no right to use for street purposes any portion of the strip of land west of the west lines of the blocks of the addition, because that strip was not dedicated to the public for street purposes by the execution and recording of the plat of the addition. To support this contention, there is called to our attention section 2328 of the Territorial Code of 1881, now section 9288, Rem. Comp. Stat., reading as follows: 'Any person or persons who may hereafter lay off any town within this state shall, previous to the sale of any lots within such town, cause to be recorded in the recorder's office of the county wherein the same may lie, a plat of said town, with the public grounds (if any there be), streets, lanes, and alleys, with their respective widths properly marked, and the lots regularly numbered and the size stated on said plat.'
It is argued that the plat fails to comply with this statute, in that the strip of land is not expressly named as a street, and in that its width is not shown upon the plat; and that therefore the plat does not evidence a dedication of the strip as a street.
As to the failure to expressly designate upon the plat the strip as a street, the statute does not, in terms, require streets to be expressly designated in words, letters or figures upon the plat. This, it seems to us, renders it plain that the mere absence of words designating a particular strip upon the plat as a street does not necessarily mean that the platter thereby fails to express his intent to dedicate such strip as a street when the plat and indorsements thereon otherwise evidence an intent to so dedicate such a strip as a street.
As to the failure to show the width of the strip as a street on the drawing of the plat, it is to be noticed that the dedication language indorsed on the plat is in part that: 'The initial point is the 1/4 stake between sections 29 and 32 and is 33 feet west of the southwest corner of Block A.' This plainly shows that the strip is 33 feet wide at its south end. True, its side lines, as drawn upon the plat, apparently converge and come nearer together at its north end, and there is not any stated width of the strip at its north end; but subsequent surveys, made by the city, show the strip to be 17.74 feet wide at its north end. That width, while not expressly stated upon the plat or in its indorsements, was capable of being mathematically determined from the ascertainable width of the northern end of the government lot 6 and the expressly designated feet figures showing the length of block D of the addition. This, we think, constituted a substantial compliance with the statute in showing the width of the strip as a dedicated street, if its dedication be otherwise sufficiently evidenced.
We have these outstanding facts pointing to an intention on the part of Crawford to dedicate to the public as a street the strip of land in question. (1) The evidence shows that government lot 6 is composed of a strip of land some 243 feet wide east and west and approximately one-quarter of a mile long north and south, lying between the west line of a donation claim and the north and south center line of section 29; that is, that government lot 6 is the fraction of the southwest quarter of the southeast quarter of section 29 left by the encroachment of the donation claim upon that government quarter section. (2) Crawford says in his dedication language indorsed upon his plat that it covers that lot. Of course, that means that the plat covers the whole of that lot. (3) The unbroken line upon the plat running north from the south 1/4 corner of section 29 Crawford manifestly intended to represent the west line of the plat and the west line of government lot 6. (4) While the strip lying between that line and the west lines of the...
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Lucier v. United States
...also Tsubota v. Gunkel, 364 P.2d 549, 551 (Wash. 1961); Ditty v. Freeman, 347 P.2d 870, 872 (Wash. 1959) (quoting Mueller v. City of Seattle, 8 P.2d 994, 996 (Wash. 1932)); Selby v. Knudson, 890 P.2d 514, 517 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) ("It is well settled law that the intention of the dedicator......
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Beres v. United States
...also Tsubota v. Gunkel, 364 P.2d 549, 551 (Wash. 1961); Ditty v. Freeman, 347 P.2d 870, 872 (Wash. 1959) (quoting Mueller v. City of Seattle, 8 P.2d 994, 996 (Wash. 1932)); Selby v. Knudson, 890 P.2d 514, 517 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) ("It is well settled law that the intention of the dedicator......
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Galvis v. State, Dept. of Transp.
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Gillis v. King County
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