Mueller v. TL90108, LLC
| Decision Date | 04 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2017AP1962,2017AP1962 |
| Citation | 390 Wis.2d 34,938 N.W.2d 566,2020 WI 7 |
| Parties | Richard A. MUELLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, Joseph L. Ford, III, Plaintiff-Co-Appellant, v. TL90108, LLC, Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs filed by Stephen E. Kravit, Brian T. Fahl, and Kravit, Hovel & Krawczyk S.C., Milwaukee; joined by Lawrence H. Heftman, Robert Middleton, and Schiff Hardin LLP, Chicago, Illinois. There was an oral argument by Lawrence H. Heftman.
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by Matthew V. Fisher, Brian C. Tokarz, and Meissner Tierney Fisher & Nischols S.C., Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Matthew V. Fisher.
For the plaintiff-co-appellant, there was a brief filed by Joseph L. Ford, Boca Raton, Florida. There was an oral argument by Joseph L. Ford.
¶1 A late 1930s Talbot Lago is considered by some one of the most beautiful and innovative cars in the world. This collector's gem sang such a siren song that it became the subject of an international smuggling effort at the heart of today's case. The Talbot Lago here—a 1938 model—mysteriously disappeared from a Milwaukee business in 2001. It reappeared in 2015 after being purchased in Europe by TL90108, LLC (TL). When TL tried to obtain title in Illinois, it triggered a hit on a stolen vehicle report.
¶2 After hearing that the prized vehicle had turned up, Plaintiffs Richard Mueller and Joseph Ford III demanded its return from TL, claiming to be the rightful owners. When TL did not oblige, Mueller and Ford brought an action for replevin1 seeking possession of the vehicle and damages. The circuit court, however, granted TL's motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the claim was barred by the applicable six-year statutes of repose. Wis. Stat. §§ 893.35, 893.51(1) (2017-18).2 The court of appeals reversed, holding that when Mueller and Ford demanded TL return the vehicle, this triggered a wrongful detention claim and restarted the six-year repose clock.
¶3 The core issue we address today is whether the six-year statutes of repose bar Mueller and Ford's action for replevin. More specifically, we address whether a wrongful detention claim may exist for previously converted property, and if so, when a replevin cause of action based on a subsequent wrongful detention accrues. We conclude that under the plain language of the statutes of repose and our cases, the true owner can maintain a replevin action for wrongful detention against a subsequent purchaser of converted property. We hold that under Wis. Stat. §§ 893.35 and 893.51(1), a cause of action for replevin based on wrongful detention under facts like those alleged here accrues when the subsequent purchaser obtains the property; no demand is necessary.
¶4 Thus, for purposes of the motion to dismiss, the replevin action based on TL's alleged wrongful detention of the vehicle accrued when TL obtained (and thereby wrongfully detained) the vehicle. TL purchased the prized vehicle sometime in 2015. Hence, Mueller and Ford's cause of action for replevin is not barred by the relevant statutes of repose.
¶5 On the morning of March 4, 2001, Roy Leiske arrived at his place of business and found the front door curiously unlocked.3 When he entered, he discovered that his mid-restoration 1938 Talbot Lago, then worth an estimated one million dollars, was gone. Leiske reported this to the Milwaukee Police Department, which entered a stolen vehicle report into a national database.
¶6 In 2005, Leiske died and bequeathed the vehicle to Mueller. Mueller later sold a percentage of ownership in the missing vehicle to Ford. Both attempted—without success—to locate the vehicle.
¶7 At around the same time, in either 2005 or 2006, the vehicle was transported from the United States to Europe. In 2015, TL purchased the vehicle through an international automobile broker. TL then arranged for the vehicle to be transported to the United States, and applied for title in Illinois in 2016. The application, however, triggered a hit on the 2001 stolen vehicle report. The Milwaukee Police Department confirmed to Illinois officials the vehicle had been reported stolen, and Illinois did not issue title to TL.
¶8 Upon learning of the vehicle's reappearance, Mueller and Ford sent TL a demand to return the vehicle. When TL refused the demand, Mueller and Ford filed a two-count complaint, bringing both a replevin action to obtain possession of the vehicle and recover damages, and a declaratory judgment as to their ownership and possession of the vehicle. TL moved to dismiss Mueller and Ford's claims, arguing they were timed-barred by the applicable statutes of repose, Wis. Stat. §§ 893.35 and 893.51(1).
¶9 After entertaining multiple briefs and hearings, the circuit court granted TL's motion to dismiss on the grounds that the replevin cause of action accrued in 2001 when the vehicle was stolen; the clock did not restart when the property changed hands; and therefore, the replevin action was barred by the six-year statutes of repose in Wis. Stat. §§ 893.35 and 893.51(1). It also dismissed the declaratory judgment action, reasoning that a cause of action for ownership cannot exist apart from replevin.4
¶10 The court of appeals reversed. It concluded that the statutes of repose recognize separate claims for conversion and wrongful detention. The court of appeals reasoned that while a conversion claim accrued in 2001 when the vehicle was allegedly stolen, a separate wrongful detention claim accrued when TL refused Mueller and Ford's demand to return the vehicle. Mueller v. TL90108, LLC, 2018 WI App 52, ¶29, 383 Wis. 2d 740, 917 N.W.2d 551. The court of appeals also remanded the cause for a ruling on Mueller and Ford's declaratory judgment action, stating that an action for a declaration of ownership differs from a replevin action for possession. Id., ¶30 & n.5. We granted TL's petition for review.
¶11 The issue before us is whether the replevin action is barred by the six-year statutes of repose provided in Wis. Stat. §§ 893.35 and 893.51(1).5 As this presents a question of law arising from a motion to dismiss based on a question of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. Doe 56 v. Mayo Clinic Health Sys.—Eau Claire Clinic, Inc., 2016 WI 48, ¶14, 369 Wis. 2d 351, 880 N.W.2d 681 (); State v. Pinder, 2018 WI 106, ¶23, 384 Wis. 2d 416, 919 N.W.2d 568 ().
¶12 Replevin is an action for possession where the factual question that must be resolved is "which party is entitled to possession of the disputed property." Ford Motor Co. v. Lyons, 137 Wis. 2d 397, 468, 405 N.W.2d 354 (Ct. App. 1987). To succeed on a replevin claim, the court or jury must find:
Wis. Stat. § 810.13(1). This statutory provision tracks the requirements for replevin at common law. See Eldred v. Oconto Co., 33 Wis. 133, 136 (1873) (). A party bringing an action for replevin, then, may recover not only possession of personal property, but also damages for its detention.
¶13 To that effect, the legislature has enacted two statutes of repose—one regarding recovering possession of the property and one with respect to damages. See Wis. Stat. § 893.35 (); Wis. Stat. § 893.51(1) (). Mueller and Ford's complaint seeks both possession of the vehicle and damages for its wrongful detention, therefore we examine both §§ 893.35 and 893.51(1).6
¶14 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.35 governs when a cause of action for replevin seeking possession of personal property must be brought. It provides: "An action to recover personal property shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of action accrues or be barred." § 893.35. Wisconsin Stat. § 893.51(1) governs an associated claim for damages: "an action to recover damages for the wrongful taking, conversion or detention of personal property shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of action accrues or be barred." § 893.51(1). Both statutes continue: "The cause of action accrues at the time the wrongful taking or conversion occurs, or the wrongful detention begins." §§ 893.35, 893.51(1).
¶15 Thus, the two provisions impose a six-year limit starting from when (a) "the wrongful taking ... occurs," (b) the "conversion occurs," or (c) "the wrongful detention begins." Wis. Stat. §§ 893.35, 893.51(1). It is plain from the text that each of these are different causes of action, and therefore each could have different dates from which the six-year clock starts to run. Notice also that the plain language links the onset of the six-year period to when the taking, conversion, or detention occurred; the claims are not tied to the property itself.
¶16 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 893.35 and 893.51(1) are properly described as statutes of repose, not statutes of limitation. A statute of repose "provides that a cause of action must be commenced within a specified amount of time after the defendant's action which allegedly led to injury, regardless of whether the plaintiff has discovered the injury or wrongdoing." Tomczak v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245, 252, 578 N.W.2d 166 (1998)....
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