Mugavero v. Arms Acres Inc
| Decision Date | 15 January 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 03 Civ. 05724(PGG).,03 Civ. 05724(PGG). |
| Citation | 680 F.Supp.2d 544 |
| Parties | Leslie MUGAVERO, Plaintiff, v. ARMS ACRES, INC. and Frederick Hesse, M.D., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
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Paula Johnson Kelly, The Law Office of Robert David Goodstein, Esq., New Rochelle, NY, for Plaintiff.
Daniel V. Duff, Scott T. Baken, Susanne Kantor, Matthew Howard Woodard, Jackson Lewis, LLP, White Plains, NY, for Defendant.
In this action, Plaintiff Leslie Mugavero seeks relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. ("Title VII") and New York law for alleged retaliation by her former employer Arms Acres, Inc. ("Arms Acres") and her former supervisor, Dr. Frederick Hesse. (Cmplt. Counts I, II, III, IV) Mugavero alleges that after she supported a co-worker's sexual harassment complaint, Defendants retaliated against her by, inter alia issuing her written disciplinary warnings reporting her to New York State's Office of Professional Discipline for professional misconduct, and ultimately terminating her employment. (Id.) Following an eight-day trial, a jury rendered a verdict in Mugavero's favor against both defendants, and awarded Mugavero a total of $764,183 in compensatory damages and $350,000 in punitive damages.
The Defendants have moved for judgment as a matter of law, for a new trial for discovery sanctions and to vacate or reduce the damage awards. (Docket Nos 105, 108, 110, and 112). For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial (Docket Nos. 105, 108) are DENIED; Defendants' motion to vacate or reduce the damage awards (Docket No. 110) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; and Defendants' motion for discovery sanctions (Docket No. 112) is GRANTED, insofar as attorneys' fees and costs are awarded.
Defendant Arms Acres is a drug and alcohol rehabilitation facility. (Tr. 97:2023) During the relevant time period, Mugavero was employed at Arms Acres as a nurse practitioner and was supervised by Defendant Hesse, who was Arms Acres' medical director. (Tr. 68:23-25, 69:14-16 299:20-300:10, 302:6-9) Mugavero asserts that Hesse began retaliating against her in a variety of ways after she informed him in late April 2002 that Marie McArdle, an Arms Acres nurse, was going to make a sexual harassment complaint against the facility's Director of Psychiatry, Dr. Omar Gutierrez—a complaint that Mugavero formally supported with a written statement on May 1, 2002. (Tr. 108:21-109:21, 687:17-688:2, 950:7-10, 952:2-25) Mugavero claims that Hesse's retaliation escalated over time and included (1) reporting her to the New York State Office of Professional Discipline ("OPD") for alleged professional misconduct in July 2002; and (2) instigating the termination of her Arms Acres employment in October 2002. (Tr. 1903:12-20, 1907:18-24)
The Court granted Defendants summary judgment on certain of Mugavero's claims in March 2009. Mugavero v. Arms Acres, Inc. et al, No. 03-Civ.-5724(PGG), 2009 WL 890063 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009). The case then proceeded to trial on Mugavero's claims that the following actions constituted unlawful retaliation under federal and New York law: (1) the removal of her oncall duties on the evening of April 24, 2002; (2) a May 2002 written warning; (3) an August 2002 written warning; (4) Hesse's oral and written requests in July and August 2002 that the OPD investigate her for professional misconduct; (5) Arms Acres placing her on administrative leave on October 1, 2002; and (6) Arms Acres terminating her employment effective October 25, 2002.1 (See Tr. 154:25-155:18, 191:21192:2, 585:21-24, 1966:6-15; JX 60 (May 2002 written warning); JX 62 (August 2002 written warning); JX 109 (written complaint to OPD))
The jury found that Mugavero proved all elements of her retaliation claim against both defendants with respect to each of the alleged adverse actions. (Tr. 2016:162017:14, 2018:12-2019:3, 2019:20-2020:16) The jury also found, however, that Arms Acres—but not Hesse—had proven an affirmative defense with respect to the removal of Mugavero's on-call duties and the two written warnings—i.e., Arms Acres had proven that it would have taken the adverse actions regardless of any retaliatory motive. (Tr. 2017:15-2018:11, 2019:42019:19) The jury found that Hesse was directly liable under state law for the first four adverse actions and liable as an aider and abettor under state law for Mugavero's placement on administrative leave and the termination of her employment. (Tr. 2018:12-2019:3, 2019:20-2020:16)
With respect to damages, the jury found that Mugavero had not proven that she was entitled to compensation for the removal of her on-call duties or for the two written warnings. (Tr. 2020:17-2021:3) It awarded her the following compensatory damages for emotional distress relating to the three later adverse actions: $75,000 for Hesse's request that the OPD investigate Mugavero; $75,000 for placing Mugavero on administrative leave; and $100,000 for the termination of her employment. (Tr. 2021:8-2021:23) The jury also awarded Mugavero $468,183 in lost wages and $46,000 in lost fringe benefits. (Tr. 2021:24-2022:2) Finally, the jury awarded $350,000 in punitive damages with respect to the OPD investigation claim. (Tr. 2022:7-2022:24)
II. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW OR TO A NEW TRIAL ON PLAINTIFF'S RETALIATION CLAIMS
Defendants seek judgment as a matter of law with respect to Mugavero's claims that they unlawfully retaliated against her by placing her on administrative leave and terminating her employment. (Def. JMOL Br. (Docket No. 107) at 4-13) In addition, Arms Acres argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Mugavero's retaliation claim concerning Hesse's report to OPD. (Id. at 13-14) Defendants argue that, in the alternative, they are entitled to a new trial on those retaliation claims. (Def. New Trial Br. (Docket No. 109) at 3-6)
The standard for granting judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 is "well established":
Judgment as a matter of law may not properly be granted under Rule 50 unless the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party, is insufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find in her favor. In deciding such a motion, the court must give deference to all credibility determinations and reasonable inferences of the jury, and it may not itself weigh the credibility of witnesses or consider the weight of the evidence. Thus, judgment as a matter of law should not be granted unless
(1) there is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or
(2) there is such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair minded [persons] could not arrive at a verdict against [it].
Galdieri-Ambrosini v. Nat'l Realty & Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 288 (2d Cir.1998); see also Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 531 F.3d 127, 133-34 (2d Cir.2008) (same).
In order for the Court "to order a new trial under Rule 59(a), it must conclude that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or... [that] the verdict is a miscarriage of justice, i.e., it must view the jury's verdict as against the weight of the evidence." Manley v. AmBase Corp., 337 F.3d 237, 245 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotations omitted). The Rule 59(a) standard is "less stringent" than the standard for granting judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 "in two significant respects: (1) a new trial under Rule 59(a) may be granted even if there is substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict, and (2) a trial judge is free to weigh the evidence himself, and need not view it in the light most favorable to the verdict winner."2Id. at 244-45 (internal quotations omitted). In weighing the evidence, however, the Court "should not ordinarily ignore the jury's role in resolving factual disputes" and assessing witness credibility. MacMaster v. City of Rochester, No. 05-Civ06509, 2009 WL 63045, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2009).
To prove a retaliation claim at trial under federal or state law, a plaintiff must show:
by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) [the plaintiff] participated in a protected activity, (2) the defendant knew of the protected activity; (3) [the plaintiff] experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Cifra v. Gen. Elec. Co., 252 F.3d 205, 216 (2d Cir.2001). The McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis applies to retaliation claims brought pursuant to Title VII. See Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 140-41 (2d Cir.2003). Accordingly, if a plaintiff properly alleges a prima facie case of retaliation, and the employer proffers a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the challenged employment decision, the plaintiff must present evidence that would be sufficient to permit a rational jury to conclude that the employer's explanation is merely a pretext for impermissible retaliation. See Cifra v. Gen. Elec. Co., 252 F.3d 205, 216 (2d Cir.2001) (citations omitted).3
Jackson v. New York City Transit, 348 Fed.Appx. 666, 669 (2d Cir.2009) (emphasis in original). Defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law or a new trial on Plaintiffs retaliatory termination claim because: (1) the evidence was insufficient for a jury to find that Hesse had retaliatory animus toward Plaintiff; and (2) even if the jury could have...
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