Muggenburg v. Leighton

Decision Date26 March 1954
Docket Number26235,Nos. 36234,s. 36234
Citation63 N.W.2d 533,241 Minn. 498
PartiesMUGGENBURG et al. v. LEIGHTON et al.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Where railroad company maintains mechanical railroad crossing warning signals at grade crossing and the same fail to warn of an approaching train, the fact that the signals are not on is an assurance of safety and an invitation to travelers to pass. This is not, however, an unqualified assurance or invitation, for the traveler is, nevertheless, obliged to use such reasonable care, by looking and listening, as a person of ordinary prudence would use under like circumstances. If he relies exclusively upon the assurance or invitation which is implied by the fact that the warning signals are not on, he is negligent. If he does not rely exclusively on such assurance, then the question is whether he exercises a degree of care that is reasonable under the circumstances, and that question must be one of fact for the jury, unless the facts leave the inference of negligence so plain that reasonable men could not draw different conclusions therefrom.

2. In passengers' actions for personal injuries resulting from automobile-train collision at obstructed grade crossing protected by the conventional Griswold railroad crossing signals against the driver of automobile in which they were riding and the railroad companies which were operating the train and maintaining the crossing signals, evidence considered and Held not to establish negligence on the part of the automobile driver as a matter of law.

3. Certain instructions to the jury requested by railroad companies and denied by the trial court considered and Held not to present grounds for a new trial on the issue of automobile driver's negligence.

4. Trial court's instructions on standard of care required of automobile driver if crossing signals were not operating, when considered as a whole and in light of court's general charge, did not present grounds for reversal, although a portion thereof, standing alone, could have been prejudicial to railroad companies.

5. Trial court's exclusion of certain testimony considered and found not to present grounds for reversal under circumstances of the case.

W. J. Quinn, St. Paul, Fordyce W. Crouch, Minneapolis, Philip Stringer, St. Paul, for appellants.

Meagher, Geer, Markham & Anderson, O. C. Adamson, II and E. J. Leathers, Minneapolis, for defendant-respondent Leighton.

Doherty, Rumble, & Butler, St. Paul, for plaintiffs-respondents.

CHRISTIANSON, Justice.

Separate actions were originally commenced in Ramsey county district court by plaintiffs, Shirley Muggenburg and Urcel Muggenburg, sisters, to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from an automobile-train collision. Plaintiffs alleged that their injuries were caused by the negligence of the defendants, Minneapolis, St. Paul and Sault Ste. Marie Railroad Company (hereafter called Soo Line), Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company (hereafter called Milwaukee Railroad), and Myron F. Leighton, driver of the car in which the plaintiffs were riding. The actions were consolidated for the trial which was held in May 1952. The jury returned verdicts against both railroads but in favor of defendant Leighton.

Pending an appeal to this court by the railroads, the railroads and both plaintiffs entered into a stipulation of settlement. In consideration for the payment of a total sum less than the verdicts plaintiffs released the railroads from all liability growing out of the automobile-train collision. The stipulation expressly stated that it in no way affected any possible rights to contribution available to the railroads against Leighton. The initial appeal by the railroads was dismissed by this court as not being from an appealable order. 1 However, at that time we suggested that the railroads could obtain a review of the verdicts exonerating Leighton from liability, which if allowed to stand would foreclose a recovery by the railroads of contribution from Leighton under the rule of American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Vigen, 213 Minn. 120, 5 N.W.2d 397, 142 A.L.R. 722, by appealing from the judgments exonerating Leighton from all liability to the plaintiffs arising out of the accident in question. The railroads have followed our suggestion and accordingly we must now review the judgments entered in favor of Leighton, respondent in this appeal.

On the morning of May 19, 1950, a 1950 Ford automobile owned and driven by Leighton collided in St. Paul with a Soo Line passenger train at the intersection of Chestnut street and the main line tracks of the Milwaukee Railroad over which the Soo Line train was operating. The weather that ill-fated morning was dry, cloudy, and overcast. Plaintiffs, who were passengers in the automobile, and Leighton were proceeding to work at the time along a route which they infrequently traveled but which enabled them that particular morning to view flood conditions along the banks of the Mississippi River. After traveling east on 'Levy Road' for some distance, they turned north on Chestnut street and in less than a block reached the railroad track upon which the Soo Line train was proceeding in a westerly direction to Minneapolis.

The railroad crossing where the accident occurred is composed of four sets of tracks running in a general east-west direction. Two of the four sets of tracks have their inception just a few feet east of the crossing at which point they switch off in a westerly direction from the two through-traffic tracks. This group of eight separate rails has an approximate total width of 21 1/2 feet in the immediate area of the Chestnut street crossing. The train involved in the accident was traveling on the most northerly of the main line tracks. In addition to the above-mentioned four tracks, an industry-spur track, also running east and west, is located just south of the main line tracks and to the east of Chestnut street. This single track, however, does not traverse Chestnut street. At the time of the accident at least one boxcar was situated on the industry-spur track, its exact location however being in dispute.

Situated on both the southeast and northwest corners of the crossing are conventional Griswold railroad-crossing warning signals which may be briefly described as consisting of a crossbuck sign, a rotating stop sign, and two alternate flashing red lights which face both north and south. The warning signal on the southeast corner is approximately eight to nine feet south of the nearest rail. At the time of the accident both signals were manually operated by means of a switch located in what is termed a railroad tower at the northeast corner of the crossing. The grade of Chestnut street is relatively level between 'Levy Road' and the crossing, but there is a slight but fairly abrupt incline just south of the crossing. Located on the southeast corner of the crossing, some 18 to 20 feet south of the most southerly main line track, is a fairly large building referred to as the Old Style Lager building. Because of the presence of this building, which extends for some distance to the east of Chestnut street, it is impossible when traveling north on Chestnut street to see any appreciable distance down the tracks in an easterly direction until a position is reached from which a view can be obtained around the northwest corner of the building.

Although there is considerable dispute concerning the other pertinent facts surrounding the accident, in viewing the evidence, as we must, in the light most favorable to the verdicts exonerating Leighton from all liability, the following additional facts appear. Leighton, after making the turn north from 'Levy Road,' traveled on Chestnut street at a top speed of 25 miles per hour, but as he neared the railroad crossing he reduced his speed to 15 to 20 miles per hour. Leighton first looked to his right when he was in a position, when seated in his car, almost directly opposite the north edge of the Old Style Lager building or roughly 40 feet from the center of the track on which the train was approaching. It was at the time of this initial glance that Leighton first became aware of the train. Rather than attempting to stop in order to avoid the oncoming train, he swerved slightly to the left and accelerated as much as possible before being hit. The engine struck the right rear corner of the car and pushed it against the warning signal at the northwest corner of the crossing.

At all times during the approach of Leighton's car to the crossing, the warning signal did not register stop nor did the red lights attached to the signal flash any warning. Further, no whistle was sounded by the train as it approached the crossing nor was any warning given by the ringing of the train's bell. Estimates of the speed of the train as it approached the crossing ranged from 20 to 25 up to 40 to 45 miles per hour.

The only direct testimony regarding viewing distances available to Leighton in an easterly direction from various points on Chestnut street was given by an engineer from the Soo Line. He stated that at a distance of 70 feet from the center of the track on which the train was traveling, Leighton had a view down the track in an easterly direction of 85 feet from the center line of Chestnut street; at 65 feet, a view of 92 feet could be had; at 60 feet, a view of 105 feet; at 50 feet, a view of 161 feet; at 45 feet, a view of 264 feet; and at 40 feet, a view of 296 feet was possible. In their brief, Leighton's counsel assert that these calculations, which were made from a diagram drawn to scale and offered into evidence by the railroads, are both misleading and erroneous. They point out that in the first place the railroads' calculations are all measured from the center line of Chestnut street to the tracks which would mean Leighton was exactly in the middle of the street as he approached the crossing and...

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2 cases
  • Western Sur. Co. v. Friederichs
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • 26 Marzo 1954
  • Markle v. Haase, 36576--7
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • 25 Noviembre 1955
    ...978, 47 A.L.R. 601, and 164 A.L.R. 34.3 Steinke v. Indianhead Truck Line, Inc., 237 Minn. 253, 54 N.W.2d 777.4 Cf. Muggenburg v. Leighton, 241 Minn. 498, 63 N.W.2d 533; Norton v. Nelson, 236 Minn. 237, 53 N.W.2d 31; Fickling v. Nassif, 208 Minn. 538, 294 N.W. 848.5 See, Hagen v. Snow, 244 M......

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