Muhich v. Allen
| Citation | 603 F.2d 1247 |
| Decision Date | 25 September 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 78-1817,78-1817 |
| Parties | 20 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 551, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,216 Dolores MUHICH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William W. ALLEN, Ivan A. Elliott, Jr., Harold R. Fischer, Michael J. Bakalis, Martin V. Brown, Melvin C. Lockard, Earl Walker, John J. Cody, and Elmer J. Clark, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit) |
C. David Nelson, Harrisburg, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.
John C. Feirich, Carbondale, Ill., for defendants-appellees.
Before SWYGERT, SPRECHER and BAUER, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-appellant Dolores Muhich appeals from the order of the district court granting judgment in favor of the defendants-appellees on her amended complaint, in which she sought civil damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged discriminatory employment practices. Appellant further appeals from the order of the district court denying her motion for a new trial.
First, appellant challenges the adjudicatory procedure utilized by the district court, in which the trial of this action was referred to a United States Magistrate, and the district court, upon De novo review of the proceedings, adopted the findings and recommendations of the magistrate and ordered the entry of final judgment upon the verdicts of the magistrate and the jury. Appellant contends that the order of reference to the magistrate, entered pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, was Void ab initio because a civil trial before a magistrate is neither sanctioned by article III of the United States Constitution, the Magistrates Act (28 U.S.C. § 631 Et seq.), any local court rule, nor the consent of the parties. Appellant further asserts that the subsequent order of the district court, directing the entry of final judgment on the verdicts rendered by the magistrate and the jury, did not cure this allegedly invalid delegation of adjudicatory authority by the district court.
Second, appellant contends she was denied a fair trial by the cumulative effect upon the jurors of erroneously admitted evidence and improper argument by defense counsel, and that the district court therefore abused its discretion in denying her motion for a new trial.
We are unpersuaded by the arguments advanced in support of these contentions, and accordingly affirm the judgment appealed from for the reasons set forth below.
This is an appeal from an action brought by Dr. Dolores Muhich, formerly an assistant professor at Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois, against certain members of the University Board of Trustees, the Dean of the College of Education, and the Chairman of the Department of Guidance and Educational Psychology, seeking damages for employment discrimination on the basis of sex.
Appellant filed her amended complaint on August 25, 1975, alleging that defendants, acting under color of state law, had discriminated against her by reason of her sex and had denied to her the equal protection of the laws, privileges, and immunities accorded to male citizens of the United States in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment.
The alleged discriminatory acts against Dr. Muhich included compensating her at a lower salary than that paid to male assistant professors; employing her under less favorable terms and conditions as those under which male faculty members of equal or lesser academic rank were employed; and terminating her employment without good cause by reason of her sex. The amended complaint further alleged that, as a result of defendants' discriminatory acts, Dr. Muhich had been deprived of her employment and denied the opportunity to acquire tenure and other benefits of employment and had been unable to progress in her profession. The appellant sought money damages in the amount of $250,000.
On April 4, 1977, at the conclusion of various pre-trial matters, Chief Judge Wise, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Illinois, entered the following order:
"It Is Ordered That, in accordance with Title 28 U.S.C. 636, Rule 38 of the Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern Division of Illinois, and pursuant to stipulation of the parties, this matter is referred to United States Magistrate Kenneth J. Meyers, for purposes of conducting all proceedings, including trial and the entry of final judgment."
On February 28, 1978, the cause was tried before Magistrate Meyers and a jury in Benton, Illinois. At the close of appellant's case on February 28, the magistrate granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict as to the members of the Board of Trustees. On March 1, 1978, the jury returned verdicts in favor of the remaining defendants, Dean Clark and Department Chairman Cody, and the magistrate ordered the entry of judgment on the verdicts. The appellant filed a timely motion for a new trial, which was subsequently denied by the magistrate in an order entered April 4, 1978.
On May 23, 1978, the magistrate filed with the district court a document entitled "Report and Recommendation", in which the magistrate reported to the court the entry of an order granting defendants' motion for a directed verdict as to the board members, and the entry of an order granting judgment in favor of the other defendants on the jury verdict. Appended to the Report was a copy of the transcript of the proceedings, together with copies of the defendants' motion for a directed verdict, appellant's motion for a new trial, and the magistrate's order denying the appellant's motion.
Drawing the attention of the district court to this Court's opinion in Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1978), decided subsequent to the trial and the order granting judgment by the magistrate in this case, the magistrate concluded that the orders he had entered on the verdicts did not constitute final, appealable decisions. Accordingly, the magistrate recommended to the district court that it find the order directing a verdict as to the defendant trustees, the jury verdict, and the order denying appellant's motion for a new trial trial, were supported by the evidence adduced at trial and by the law applied thereto. The magistrate further recommended that the district court order the clerk to enter final judgment on the jury verdict, and that the court deny appellant's motion for a new trial, and otherwise adopt and affirm the rulings and orders of the magistrate.
On June 15, 1978, Chief Judge James L. Foreman, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District (now Southern District) of Illinois, entered an order affirming and adopting the rulings and orders of the magistrate, and directing the clerk of the district court to enter final judgment on the jury verdict. In his order, Chief Judge Foreman stated, Inter alia :
Appellant then appealed to this Court, contending that the order of reference to a United States Magistrate for the purpose of trial was Void ab initio on the grounds that a magistrate is without jurisdiction to conduct civil trials, and that the subsequent order of the district court directing the entry of final judgment in favor of the defendants did not cure this allegedly invalid delegation of adjudicatory authority. Appellant further contends that the magistrate committed certain errors in the conduct of the jury trial which mandated that her motion for a new trial should have been granted.
Appellant's primary contention on appeal is that the adjudicatory procedure utilized by the district court, in which the trial of this cause was referred to a United States Magistrate pursuant to the consent of the litigants, was constitutionally and statutorily infirm. Notwithstanding the fact that the reference was consensual, the appellant, relying upon the decision of this Court in Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1978), argues that the district court was not empowered either by article III, the Magistrates Act, any local court rule, or the consent of the parties, to confer authority upon the magistrate to conduct the trial of this action. We disagree.
First, we note that appellant's reliance on Taylor v. Oxford,supra, is misplaced. Contrary to the appellant's analysis of Taylor, this Court did not hold unconstitutional consensual references to a United States Magistrate pursuant to an order of the district court. In Taylor, we merely held that magistrates are not empowered to enter final judgments and that this Court is therefore without jurisdiction to entertain direct appeals from judgments entered upon the orders of a United States Magistrate. Taylor v. Oxford, supra at 153. Accord, United States v. Reeds, 552 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1977); Sick v. City of Buffalo, N.Y., 574 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1978). In the case at bar, unlike the situation presented in Taylor, the judgment appealed from is a final decision of a United States district court, and our jurisdiction is accordingly based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Second, we conclude the procedure utilized by the district court in this case was constitutionally and statutorily permissible. See DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 520 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1975). The appellant argues that an article...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc.
...curiae, the Department of Justice and the Oregon State Bar, for their helpful briefs on this difficult issue.3 E.g., Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir.1979); De Costa v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 520 F.2d 499 (1st Cir.1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073, 96 S.Ct. 856, 47 L.E......
-
Banks v. U.S.
...(1979) (district judge must hold de novo hearing on motion to suppress where witness credibility is in question). Compare Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1979) (2-1 decision) (consensual civil jury trial presided over by a magistrate proper). See also Hill v. Jenkins, 603 F.2d 1256......
-
U.S. v. Jenkins
...v. Saunders, 641 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918, 101 S.Ct. 3055, 69 L.Ed.2d 422 (1981); Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir.1979). They enjoy neither of the protections afforded by Article III: lifetime tenure subject to "good behavior," and undiminishabl......
-
Baker Industries, Inc. v. Cerberus, Ltd., Civ. A. No. 82-526.
...jurisdiction remains vested in the district court and is merely exercised through the medium of the magistrate." Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir.1979). The dissenting opinion noted that the case was one in which the magistrate acted "fully under the aegis of the formal judicia......