Muir v. City of Hartford
| Decision Date | 30 April 2018 |
| Docket Number | HHDCV156063640S |
| Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
| Parties | Renee Lamark Muir v. City of Hartford |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Sheridan, David M., J.
This action arises from a dispute between the plaintiff, Renee LaMark Muir, and the defendant, the city of Hartford regarding alleged gender discrimination and retaliation that the plaintiff was subjected to during the course of her prior employment with the Hartford Police Department (" the department" ).[1] The defendant has moved for summary judgment as to Count One of the revised complaint, which asserts a claim of unlawful gender discrimination, and Count Two of the plaintiff’s revised complaint, which asserts a claim of unlawful retaliation. For the reasons set forth below, the defendant’s motion is denied in its entirety.
The plaintiff, a female, first began her employment with the department as a police officer on April 15, 2007. At the time, she alleges that the department was " overwhelmingly male." Later in her employment, from April 16, 2007, to November 2, 2015, the plaintiff worked as a police detective. Specifically, from late 2011, to January 17, 2014, the plaintiff was a homicide detective in the department’s Major Crimes Division. The plaintiff alleges that, at that time, the Homicide Unit detectives were " exclusively male."
The plaintiff alleges that, starting in January 2009, the department, acting through its " employees and agents" including then Lieutenant Brian Foley, " regularly engaged in a continuing course and pattern of conduct" and thereby discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of her gender. On or about September 9, 2013, the plaintiff orally complained to Lieutenant Foley about gender discrimination against her. She alleges that, beginning that same day, the department, through its " employees," began to retaliate against her because of her complaints about gender discrimination. The plaintiff’s oral complaint to Lieutenant Foley was eventually memorialized in writing in October 2013.
On or about October 25, 2013, the plaintiff orally complained to Deputy Chief Scott Sansom about gender discrimination against her. The plaintiff’s oral complaint to Deputy Chief Sansom was documented in writing on or about November 4, 2013. The plaintiff alleges that the department did not take prompt and/or effective measures to investigate and remedy the gender discrimination of which she complained.
On January 13, 2014, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities alleging that the department had violated the CFEPA. The plaintiff alleges that after she filed her complaint with the CHRO, the department engaged in a " continuing course of conduct" and retaliated against her.
In particular, the department retaliated against the plaintiff by taking all of her homicide cases away from her, transferring her from the Major Crimes Division to the Internal Affairs Division, and, after transferring her to the Internal Affairs Division, assigning her four days’ worth of " clerical work" and no additional work thereafter, even though she had requested further work.
On June 11, 2014, the plaintiff took a medical leave of absence. She was suffering from panic attacks, diarrhea, insomnia, depression, and anxiety; losing thirty pounds over a two-month period. After the plaintiff exhausted her medical leave in November 2014, she was placed on an unpaid leave of absence. When the department inquired about her return to work, the plaintiff reported that, upon the advice of her therapist, she should not return to work if she would be returning to workplace conditions substantially similar to those present before she left on medical leave in June 2014. On April 16, 2015, department Chief James Rovella notified the plaintiff that if she was to return to work, she would be offered three different detective assignments, the Civil Litigation Unit, Pistol Permits, or Burglary. The plaintiff refused those assignments. The only assignment that the plaintiff would accept was a return to her prior position as detective in the Major Crimes Division, but the department did not offer that assignment. In addition, the plaintiff’s therapist would not clear her for full duty.
Since her health care provider would not clear the plaintiff for full duty, on or about October 6, 2015, the department gave the plaintiff a " Notice of Pre-Separation Hearing," which specified that the department intended to hold a hearing at which it would contemplate terminating the plaintiff’s employment if she did not return to work. The hearing was scheduled to occur on November 5, 2015. Rather than proceed with the hearing, the plaintiff submitted a letter of resignation to Department Chief James Rovella on November 2, 2015.
The plaintiff alleges that she " has been constructively discharged from employment" with the department. The defendant is alleged to have " caused the plaintiff’s constructive discharge by deliberately making the plaintiff’s working conditions so unbearable that the plaintiff was forced to involuntarily resign."
The CHRO issued a release of jurisdiction dated November 6, 2015 pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-101. Thus, the plaintiff has exhausted her available administrative remedies and brings Counts One and Two of the revised complaint against the defendant under General Statutes § 46a-100 et seq. In her prayer for relief, the plaintiff seeks, inter alia, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys fees.
The plaintiff alleges the following occurrences as typical of the " gender bias" she encountered at the department: (1) the plaintiff was called a " MILF" ; (2) the plaintiff was also called a " soccer mom" and told that " everyone wants to f**k a soccer mom" ; (3) the plaintiff’s colleagues would discuss how " females are not as good as males" ; (4) the plaintiff was told that, as compared to males, females were inferior homicide detectives; (5) the plaintiff was told that she did not fit the profile of a homicide detective because they " have the reputation of being tough, hard drinking and womanizing" ; (6) the plaintiff’s former partner warned the plaintiff that he would shoot her if she wore a skirt or dress to work; (7) the plaintiff’s colleagues forbade the plaintiff from driving when they traveled together because they did not want to be seen being driven around by a " chick" ; (8) the plaintiff was consistently excluded from her colleagues’ investigations and was instead assigned administrative tasks; and (9) the plaintiff’s colleagues refused to assist and/or cooperate with the plaintiff in regards to her investigations.
On September 29, 2017, the defendant filed the present motion for summary judgment. A memorandum of law accompanies the motion. In support of its summary judgment motion, the defendant submits, inter alia ,[2] the following evidence: (1) excerpts from the certified transcript of the plaintiff’s deposition; [3] (2) the signed and sworn affidavit of Colleen Kenton, an employee of the department’s support services personnel office; (3) the signed and sworn affidavit of Lieutenant Foley; (4) the signed and sworn affidavit of Lieutenant Brandon O’Brien, a former sergeant in the department’s Major Crimes Division; (5) the signed and sworn affidavit of Chief Rovella; and (6) the signed and sworn affidavit of Debra Carabillo, the department’s acting director of human resources.[4]
On November 16, 2017, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. In support of her opposing memorandum of law, the plaintiff submits the following evidence: (1) excerpts from the certified transcript of the plaintiff’s deposition; [5] and (2) excerpts of a certified transcript from a deposition given by Nicole Chomiak. On December 29, 2017, the defendant filed a reply to the plaintiff’s opposing memorandum of law.
The matter was argued at short calendar on January 16, 2018.
The legal standard governing summary judgment motions is well settled. Summary judgment " shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Practice Book § 17-49. " A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case ... The facts at issue are those alleged in the pleadings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Morrissey-Manter v. Saint Francis Hospital & Medical Center, 166 Conn.App. 510, 517, 142 A.3d 363, cert. denied, 323 Conn. 924, 149 A.3d 982 (2016). Moreover, " [a] genuine issue has been variously described as a triable, substantial or real issue of fact ... and has been defined as one which can be maintained by substantial evidence ... Hence, the genuine issue aspect of summary judgment procedure requires the parties to bring forward before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the material facts alleged in the pleadings can warrantably be inferred." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rickel v. Komaromi, 144 Conn.App. 775, 790-91, 73 A.3d 851 (2013).
" The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) St. Pierre v. Plainfield, 326 Conn. 420, 426, 165 A.3d 148 (2017). ...
To continue reading
Request your trial