Mulcahy v. Huddell

• Citation: 272 Mass. 539,172 N.E. 796
• Parties: MULCAHY v. HUDDELL et al.
• Decision Date: 25 September 1930
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

272 Mass. 539

172 N.E. 796

MULCAHY

v.HUDDELL et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Sept. 25, 1930.

Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Cox, Judge.

Suit by James Mulcahy against Arthur M. Huddell and others. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals.

Decree affirmed.

C. J. Redmond, of Boston, for appellant.

M. Witte, of Boston, for appellees.

WAIT, J.

The plaintiff appeals from an interlocutory decree sustaining a demurrer to his substitute second amended bill in equity, and from a final decree dismissing the bill.

The bill alleges that the plaintiff is a member of Local Union No. 4 of the International Union of Operating Engineers,a voluntary unincorporated association of which the defendant Huddell is general president, and in which, by his appointment, the defendant Fitzpatrick is international supervisor of Local Union No. 4, and the defendant Dwyer is assistant business agent of Local Union No. 4. It alleges that the defendant Huddell has for some years ‘undertaken to control the proceedings of the various Local Unions throughout the country,’ acting in this without right under the constitution of the International Union of Operating Engineers; and at considerable length it sets out actions of said Huddell illustrative of this purpose and control. It alleges that on July 1, 1929, the plaintiff received from the defendant Fitzpatrick notice to appear on July 8, 1929, before ‘the Advisory Board in charge of the affairs of Local Union #4’ to show cause why action against him should not be taken for grounds of offense therein stated; that, on July 17, 1929, he received notice from the defendant Huddell, as general president, that he was suspended from membership in the local union for reasons stated; that he appealed to the general executive board of the International Union of Operating Engineers and, on September 18, 1929, received notice that the board sustained the decision of General President Huddell; that, on July 30, 1929, he attempted to attend a meeting of the local union but was ejected forcibly. Copies of the notice, the suspension, and the appeal are annexed as exhibits to the bill. These show that he did not present himself at the hearing of July 8; that he contends that the proceeding was nugatory, in part, because the advisory board was illegal and without jurisdiction; that he asserts that he has not violated any rule or principle of the International Union of Operating Engineers and that the charges are untrue. The bill alleges, further, that, on August 3, 1929, in consequence of notice to his employer from the defendant Dwyer that he had been suspended, he was discharged by the employer; that, on August 5, 1929, he was denied employment elsewhere in consequence of notice sent by the defendant Fitzpatrick that he had been suspended; and that, bacause of the unlawful acts of Huddell, Dwyer and Fitzpatrick, he is unable to get work and is deprived of opportunity to earn a living. Finally the bill alleges that he has used all means within the International Union of Operating Engineers to secure a proper hearing in accord with its constitution and general laws and rules, without securing such a hearing; but sets out (in paragraph 15) that ‘he has a right of appeal to the International Convention according to the Constitution, General Laws and Rules of the I. U. O. E.; and the plaintiff says that no time has been set for a convention, and the only method by which a convention may be held is for a referendum to be submitted to the Local Unions throughout the country and fifty-five per cent of the members in good standing voting and a majority of these shall be required to carry the referendum for a convention; and the plaintiff says, as hereinbefore set forth, that due to the fact that more than fifty per cent of the membership of the I. U. O. E. throughout the country are under the domination and control of the defendant Huddell by his appointment of International Supervisors, so called, to manage and run the Local Unions, and further due to the fact that the said International Supervisors cast the votes of absent members in whatever way they see fit, there is no possibility of a convention being held unless it is called upon the orders of the defendant Huddell; and the plaintiff further says that according to the Constitution and General Laws and Rules of the I. U. O. E., it may not be held for four years and may be held at any place in the United States or Canada; and the plaintiff further says that due to the supervision and control of the Local Unions by the defendant Huddell, no convention can be called except on the orders of the defendant Huddell, and any appeal which the plaintiff might make to the convention would be futile and of no avail, because of conditions above set forth.’ It prays an order to Huddell to reinstate the plaintiff; orders to the several defendants to refrain from doing ‘any act which will prevent the plaintiff from working as a Union man’; the assessment of damages, and general relief. The defendant demurred. The court sustained the demurrer; but did not specify on which of the thirteen grounds of demurrer the decision was based.

The eighth ground, that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust the remedies provided for within the organization, is well taken. It is not necessary to discuss the others. It was stated in Correia v. Portuguese Fraternity, 218 Mass. 305, 308, 309, 105 N. E. 977, 978: ‘It is a well established principle relating to beneficiary organizations like the defendant, that the rights of its members must be settled in accordance with the provisions of their constitutions, and that every remedy available within the corporation or order must be exhausted before the aid of a court can be invoked. Hickey v. Baine, 195 Mass. 446, 452, 81 N. E. 201, and cases cited.’ The rule is applicable to voluntary associations such as the International Union of Operating Engineers. Hickey v. Baine, supra; Agrippino v. Perrotti (Mass.) 169 N. E. 793;Clark v. Morgan (Mass.) 171 N. E. 278. See also Puleio v. Sons of Itala...