Mulford v. Cotton States Hotel Co.
| Decision Date | 25 May 1938 |
| Docket Number | 673. |
| Citation | 197 S.E. 169,213 N.C. 603 |
| Parties | MULFORD v. COTTON STATES HOTEL CO. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Guilford County; E. C. Bivens, Judge.
Action by Elizabeth Mulford against the Cotton States Hotel Company trading as the King Cotton Hotel, for injuries sustained in a fall at the entrance of a coffee shop operated by the defendant. From a judgment of nonsuit, plaintiff appeals.
Reversed.
Evidence that customer who fell in leaving coffee shop entered well-lighted coffee shop through same entrance, but due to change of lighting conditions could not distinguish change of floor level on leaving, did not show that customer was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law so as to bar recovery for injuries.
That part of the evidence which is pertinent to this appeal is substantially as follows:
Plaintiff was a saleswoman in the Ellis Stone Store at Greensboro, and was charged with the duty of purchasing goods for her department. In the performance of that duty she went to the King Cotton Hotel, inspected a stock of goods on exhibit there, and made purchases therefrom. At lunch time she had not completed her purchases, and was invited by the saleswoman in charge of the stock to lunch with her in the hotel coffee shop.
Plaintiff testified that she had never been to the coffee shop before and that she entered it by the same way she subsequently made her exit. The light was very dim and "dingy" at the entrance of the coffee shop and in the basement along the route she had to traverse. The basement floor and the entrance to the coffee shop were on different levels, requiring a step up or down, according as she entered or made her exit.
The plaintiff testified that she automatically, or subconsciously, stepped up that step in entering the coffee shop. The shop was lighted by electricity and daylight, and was "brilliantly lighted in comparison with the basement entrance."
On going out of the coffee shop, she testifies, the exit as it looked to her was very dim. .
The plaintiff fell to the floor and was seriously injured.
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's testimony, the defendant moved for judgment as of nonsuit, which motion was allowed and plaintiff appealed.
Herbert S. Falk, of Greensboro, for appellant.
Smith, Wharton & Hudgins, of Greensboro, for appellee.
The defendant frankly admits that there is sufficient evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant to go to the jury, and such admission is in accord with the inferences to be drawn from the evidence. The only question necessary to a decision of this case is: Was the plaintiff, under the evidence, guilty of such contributory negligence as would bar her recovery, and as would justify the Court in rendering a judgment of nonsuit?
In support of the contention that the plaintiff was properly nonsuited on the evidence because of her contributory negligence, the defendant points out that plaintiff had once traversed the dangerous passage on her way to the coffee shop, and had sustained her injury only on her return trip from the shop; that she had become so familiar with the surroundings, and particularly the arrangement of the step, the difference in level, the lighting, and other details to which she attributes her injury, that the Court must necessarily find that her own negligence contributed to the injury.
This case is typical of the difficulties which sometimes confront the Court in passing upon the question whether, under the evidence, there is such contributory negligence as would bar recovery, and justify the Court in taking the case from the jury.
From remote times the Court has undertaken to declare what is negligence per se on the part of a defendant when there is only one reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence, but has never, as far as we are aware, undertaken to declare, without the intervention of the jury, that such negligence was the proximate cause of an injury. Since Neal v. Carolina Cent. R. Co., 126 N.C. 634, 36 S.E. 117, 49 L.R.A. 684, the Court has undertaken to say, in appropriate cases, what is contributory negligence, in law, barring plaintiff's right of recovery, and to dismiss or nonsuit the action accordingly. In doing so the Court necessarily passes upon the question of proximate, or contributing, cause as shown by the evidence of plaintiff's conduct. There is suggested, therefore, a danger of invading the province of the jury.
Since counsel insist upon a more liberal exercise of this power of the Court, citing borderline cases...
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