Mullen v. Alarmguard of Delmarva, Inc.

• Decision Date: 16 March 1993
• Parties: Thomas R. MULLEN, D.M.D., individually, as Executor of the Estate of Jill R. Mullen, deceased, as Administrator of the Estates of Erin B. Mullen, deceased, and Thomas C. Mullen, deceased, and as Next Friend of Craig T. Mullen, a minor, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. ALARMGUARD OF DELMARVA, INC., a Maryland corporation, Donald Edwin Williams, and Theresa G. Williams, Defendants Below, Appellees. . Submitted:
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 258

625 A.2d 258

Thomas R. MULLEN, D.M.D., individually, as Executor of the

Estate of Jill R. Mullen, deceased, as Administrator of the

Estates of Erin B. Mullen, deceased, and Thomas C. Mullen,

deceased, and as Next Friend of Craig T. Mullen, a minor, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. ALARMGUARD OF DELMARVA, INC., a Maryland corporation, Donald

Edwin Williams, and Theresa G. Williams,

Defendants Below, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: March 16, 1993.

Decided: June 2, 1993.

Appeal from Superior Court. Reversed and Remanded.

Walter L. Pepperman, II (argued), and Karen L. Pascale, Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, Wilmington, and Michael J. Rich, Twilley, Street, Rich & Braverman, Dover (Christopher C. Fallon, Jr., Cozen & O'Connor, Philadelphia, PA, of counsel), for appellant Thomas R. Mullen, D.M.D.

Richard D. Levin, Connolly, Bove, Lodge & Hutz, Wilmington (David N. Zeehandelaar (argued), Bolger, Picker, Hankin & Tannenbaum, Philadelphia, PA, of counsel), for appellee Theresa G. Williams.

Before MOORE and WALSH, JJ., and BERGER, Vice Chancellor (sitting by designation pursuant to Del. Const. art. IV, § 12).

WALSH, Justice:

In this interlocutory appeal from the Superior Court, we examine the basis for permitting a plaintiff to amend his complaint to add an additional defendant after the period of limitations has expired. The Superior Court ruled that such an amendment relates back under Superior Court Civil Rule 15(c) only where there is a mistake concerning the identity of an original defendant and that the subjective knowledge of the party sought to be added concerning the mistake is irrelevant. We hold that misconception of identity of parties within the meaning of Rule 15(c) extends to additional parties as well as named, original parties. We also conclude that the party sought to be added in this case knew or should have known that a mistake was made concerning her identity and but for that mistake she would have been joined as a defendant within the period of limitations. Accordingly, we find the proposed amendment properly to relate back under Rule 15(c) and reverse the judgment of the Superior Court.

I

The underlying action arises from a house fire which occurred on November 23, 1988 in Laurel, Delaware. At the time of the fire, the house was owned by Thomas R. Mullen ("Mullen") and his wife Jill R. Mullen. The Mullens and their three children were trapped in the fire, resulting in the death of Mrs. Mullen and two of their children. Mullen and one son escaped with injuries.

On September 7, 1990, Mullen, for himself and in various representative capacities, brought an action for property damage, personal injury and wrongful death in the United States District Court for Delaware ("the federal action"). Named as defendants in the federal action were certain entities who had designed, sold, and installed a fire alarm system in the Mullen home which allegedly had failed to function. The named defendants included Alarmguard of Delmarva, Inc. ("Alarmguard"), a Maryland corporation, Donald E. Williams ("Mr. Williams"), the sole shareholder and president of Alarmguard, and Scantronic U.S.A., Inc., a New Jersey corporation, the manufacturer of certain electrical components of the fire alarm system. After the filing of the federal action, it was discovered that Scantronic U.S.A., Inc. had subsequently been merged into a Delaware corporation, thus precluding complete diversity. Mullen thereupon determined that it would be necessary to dismiss the federal action and refile his claim in the Superior Court.

Because of the impending running of the two year statute of limitations for the personal injury and death claims, Mullen obtained an order from the federal court, permitting the taking of a limited deposition of Mr. Williams. This deposition took place on November 16, 1990, seven days before the expiration of the limitations period. Theresa G. Williams ("Mrs. Williams") was present during the deposition of her husband. Prior to questioning, Mr. Williams, counsel for Mullen, announced that the deposition was "being taken for the purposes of determining whether there are other parties who should be brought into this case or a separate case prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations on November 23, I think it is, 1990."

Mr. Williams was examined extensively concerning his duties as an officer and employee of Alarmguard in general and his specific activities in relation to the installation of the fire alarm system in the Mullen residence. When asked to describe the role played by his wife in Alarmguard's business, Mr. Williams testified that his wife was Vice President and Secretary of the company but that her duties were confined to the overseeing of inventory. He specifically denied that his wife made any decisions concerning the selection of components for the alarm systems installed by his company. ¹

Apparently satisfied with Mr. Williams' testimony, in his wife's presence, that Mrs. Williams played no role in the selection of components or was otherwise involved in sale of the fire alarm system, Mullen refiled his action in the Superior Court against the original defendants in the federal action. In July 1991, in the course of pretrial discovery, Mullen deposed a current Alarmguard employee who testified that one of Mrs. Williams' responsibilities at Alarmguard was, and had always been, the approval of sales contracts. In a separate deposition, a former employee of Alarmguard testified that all alarm protection contacts required the approval of Mrs. Williams. Additionally, this witness claimed that Mrs. Williams determined the type of wire to be installed in alarm systems and, in fact, Mrs. Williams made the decision to use a less expensive, non-insulated wire in the Mullen contract. ²

On July 30, 1991, Mullen filed a motion pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 15 ("Rule 15") for leave to file an amended complaint joining Mrs. Williams as a defendant, with the amendment relating back to the date of the original complaint. Mullen claimed that Mrs. Williams was aware at the time of her husband's deposition that plaintiff was mistaken concerning her role in the Mullen fire alarm contract and but for that mistake Mrs. Williams would have been named as a defendant in the original complaint filed in the Superior Court. Mullen also argued that Mrs. Williams' conduct should estop her from asserting a statute of limitations defense. Mrs. Williams opposed the motion, contending that Rule 15 did not permit the adding of an additional defendant after the statute of limitations had expired.

The Superior Court denied Mullen's motion to amend the complaint to add Mrs. Williams as a defendant. It ruled that the "mistake concerning identity" provision of Rule 15(c) does not apply to a situation where there was a failure to identify a defendant before the statute of limitations had expired. The Court further concluded that "the objective evidence" did not establish that Mrs. Williams knew or should have known that she was a defendant before the statute of limitations passed, and that "Rule 15(c) may not be used in a situation where a person's subjective knowledge is called into play." Mullen v. Alarmguard of Delmarva, Inc., Del.Super., C.A. No. 90C-11-40-1-CV, Graves, J., 1992 WL 302278, (Sept. 18, 1992). The Court further ruled that Mrs. Williams conduct did not estop her from asserting a statute of limitations defense. ³

In view of the importance of the ruling to the further course of litigation, the Superior Court certified, and this Court accepted, review under Supreme Court Rule 42 of the question of whether the proposed amendment to the complaint should be permitted under Rule 15 with relation back to the time of the filing of the original complaint.

II

Generally, a trial court's order permitting or refusing an amendment to a complaint is reviewable only for abuse of discretion. Mergenthaler, Inc. v. Jefferson, Del.Supr., 332 A.2d 396, 398 (1975). Here, however, the Superior Court ruled that Rule 15's relation back provision did not apply to the undisputed circumstances prompting Mullen's attempt to amend. The issue thus posed, the application of the rule to undisputed facts, is one of law, subject to plenary review. Rohner v. Neimann, Del.Supr., 380 A.2d 549, 552 (1977).

Superior Court Rule 15 is virtually identical to its counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 15(a) which confers the basic entitlement to amendment provides:

Rule 15. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS.

(a) Amendments. A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, the party may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend the party's pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the Court otherwise orders.

Although Rule 15(a) permits a party to amend a pleading without leave of court within certain narrow limits, the decisional law interpreting the rule has most often addressed the circumstances in which court approval has been required. Rule 15(a) applies equally to plaintiffs and defendants for any purpose relating to the pleadings. 3 Moore's Federal Practice p 15.08 (1993). The rule directs the liberal granting of amendments "when justice so requires." Rule 15(a). In the absence of prejudice to another party, the trial court is required to exercise its discretion in favor of granting leave to amend. Ikeda v. Molock, Del.Supr., 603 A.2d...