Mullen v. Mullen
| Decision Date | 06 April 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 5979,5979 |
| Citation | 184 So.2d 917 |
| Parties | Marie Sprigg MULLEN, Appellant, v. F. O. MULLEN, Ruth V. Causey, Exchange National Bank, etc., et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Raymond C. Smith, Lakeland, for appellant.
William C. Norvell, Lakeland, for appellees.
The parties to this suit are two exwives and their errant consort. Appellant was the first wife of Appellee F. O. Mullen. Appellee Ruth V. Causey was the second wife. Both marriages were dissolved in appropriate proceedings. In 1939, when Appellant severed connections with F. O. Mullen, they entered into a property settlement agreement which provided, among other things, that Appellee F. O. Mullen would pay $70.00 per month as permanent alimony to Appellant. There were other provisions not material to this appeal. The Appellees were married to each other in 1940. Shortly thereafter Appellee F. O. Mullen disposed of many of his holdings and reinvested the proceeds variously. Among the investments was a 10-acre citrus grove, title to which was taken in the name of Appellees, as husband and wife. Many years transpired and in 1959 Appellant sought and secured a judgment for $2,856.60 as past-due alimony payments, interest and attorney's fees allowed. (The actual alimony deficiency was $2,310.00.) Mullen, by this time, was not as affluent as he had been in 1940, so Appellant was unable to collect on her judgment. The orange grove still remained in the name of the two Appellees as man and wife. In an attempted levy move Appellant sought to reach the equities in the orange grove, but was thwarted by the fact that title was held and had been held for all the years as an estate by the entireties. In September, 1962, Appellees were divorced and Appellant then proceeded to levy against the equities in the grove held by the Exchange National Bank in Winter Haven, Florida. The Bank ultimately paid Appellant one-half of the moneys they held but refused to pay the balance under the theory that the one-half interest was claimed by Ruth V. Causey, formerly Ruth V. Mullen. Appellant then brought this action in the lower court attempting to garner the remaining one-half of the funds on the grounds that Appellee Causey had, in fact, no interest in the grove and thus the resultant money. Appellant alleged that Appellee Mullen placed the title in the estate by the entireties status in an effort to avoid payment under the 1940 separation agreement. The agreement had been made a part of a Circuit Court proceeding in the same circuit in 1959 when Appellant had obtained the judgment against F. O. Mullen for $2,856.60. Appellee Causey filed answer denying the pertinent charges and claimed the 1959 proceedings made the matter res judicata. Motions were made by both Appellant and Appellee Causey for summary decrees on the pleadings, affidavits and a frequently mentioned 'tender' of the record of the 1958--59 action in which judgment was obtained, together with subsequent proceedings supplemental. The lower court held hearings upon the motions and did deny the summary decrees sought, saying Subsequently, by final decree, the lower court denied the relief sought by Appellant, and directed release of the moneys to Appellee Causey. This appeal followed.
Appellant would pose the point that when opposing parties file opposing...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Kobetitsch v. American Mfrs.' Mut. Ins. Co., 80-275
...an affirmance of the summary judgment entered against him. See, Spear v. Martin, 330 So.2d 543 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Mullen v. Mullen, 184 So.2d 917, 919 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966). This is so because, unlike the factual situation in Ball (as well as those in Chase & Co. and Ivey ), the record does ......