Mullen v. United States

• Decision Date: 04 December 1958
• Docket Number: No. 14663.,14663.
• Parties: Carolyn MULLEN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

263 F.2d 275 (1958)

Carolyn MULLEN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 14663.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued November 21, 1958.

Decided December 4, 1958.

Additional Statements January 29, 1959.

Mr. Lawrence J. Latto, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this court) for appellant.

Mr. Walter J. Bonner, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. Oliver Gasch, U. S. Atty., and Carl W. Belcher, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before Mr. Justice REED, retired,^* and EDGERTON and FAHY, Circuit Judges.

EDGERTON, Circuit Judge.

This appeal is from a conviction under D.C.Code (1951) § 22-901, which makes it a crime to "torture, cruelly beat, abuse, or otherwise wilfully maltreat" a child. Appellant's young children were found chained in her house while she was absent. There was evidence that she had chained them, and also that she had done so for their "protection". The District Court rightly charged the jury as a matter of law that appellant did not "torture" the children. But with regard to the statutory words "abuse" and "wilfully maltreat", the court charged the jury to decide whether appellant "was acting reasonably under the circumstances or whether it was unreasonable and dangerous."

It was certainly unreasonable, and probably dangerous, to chain the children. But if appellant chained them for their own protection, she did not "abuse" or "wilfully maltreat" them within the meaning of the Code. That language calls for something worse than good intentions coupled with bad judgment. As we recently held in construing less explicit statutory language, "the common law concept of crime as a combination of an evil state of mind with the doing of an evil act applies to this felony." Levine v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C. ___, 261 F.2d 747; Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288. The court's charge omitted the requirement of an evil state of mind and was therefore erroneous.

The jury might well have acquitted appellant but for the erroneous charge. We therefore reverse under F.R. Crim.P. Rule 52(b), 18 U.S.C. Cf. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107, 65 S. Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495. We do not consider other alleged errors.

Appellant is a woman of limited understanding. She was indicted more than two years ago and imprisoned more than one year. We commend these facts to the consideration of the United States Attorney.

Reversed.

FAHY, Circuit Judge (concurring).

In concurring I add that another ground for reversal is urged by appellant, namely, the admission in evidence of the testimony of a minister of statements made to the minister by the appellant as a penitent in preparation for receiving communion as a Lutheran communicant. Not desiring to delay the decision, I will file at a later date a statement of my views on the question of the admissibility of this testimony.

Statement by Circuit Judge FAHY, with Whom Circuit Judge EDGERTON Concurs, and Separate Statement by Circuit Judge EDGERTON, on the Question of the Admissibility of Certain Testimony.

January 29, 1959

FAHY, Circuit Judge, with whom Circuit Judge EDGERTON concurs: When the case was decided December 4, 1958, I concurred and stated that I would later give my views on the question of admissibility of the testimony of a minister as to statements made to him by appellant as a penitent in preparation for receiving communion as a Lutheran communicant. The question is whether these statements were privileged communications, such as those between husband and wife and client and attorney, and, therefore, not admissible in evidence.

The minister had testified briefly as a character witness for appellant. He then appears to have become troubled because of what occurred subsequent to his testimony. Appellant had taken the stand and had denied chaining the children. The minister then asked to see the trial judge and visited him in chambers, where he stated that he felt he had been unable to say all that his conscience impelled him to say. As a result the judge himself recalled the minister as the court's witness to give further evidence. After stating his impressions of the family and the relations between the children and appellant, their mother, the minister testified as follows:

"After I had seen the defendant in the District Jail, she came to my office. She wanted to know whether she could come to communion. I advised her that as long as there was any suspicion as to her mistreating the children by chaining them I could not admit her to communion; that the Good Book says that if we confess our sins God is faithful and just to forgive us our sins and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness.

"She admitted that she had chained the children with the explanation that she did it for their protection * * *.

"I advised her and counselled with her that that was wrong and sinful."

The lack of objection to this testimony does not preclude our ruling upon its admissibility. There was no affirmative consent to its use, and the fact that the judge called the witness tended to restrain objection. In addition, uncertainty as to the applicable rule of evidence goes far to excuse failure to object. But more important, the testimony was so critical that we should exercise our discretion to consider its admissibility even if not required to do so. "`Plain errors * * * affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.' Rule 52(b), Fed.Rules Crim. Proc. 18 U.S.C.A." Pinkard v. United States, 99 U.S.App.D.C. 394, 395, 240 F. 2d 632, 633. Appellant had denied chaining the children and there was no direct evidence that she had done so except a reluctant assent drawn from her loyal, six-year old son after he had been subjected to a lengthy and persistent examination, despite his age, during which he had repeatedly exonerated his mother.

A further preliminary matter. Was the disclosure of appellant to the minister a confidential confession to a spiritual adviser? The answer would be clearer were the relationship of priest and penitent involved, where the priest is known to be bound to silence by the discipline and laws of his church. The present witness appears not to have felt bound in this manner. But I think the privilege if it exists includes a confession by a penitent to a minister in his capacity as such to obtain such spiritual aid as was sought and held out in this instance.¹ The minister definitely indicated that by confessing her sins to him appellant would receive the spiritual benefits she desired. In any event, enough was indicated to cause further inquiry by the court as to the character of the disclosure if doubt remained. In these circumstances I deem it appropriate to reach the question of admissibility, especially as the question might arise again should the case be retried. My view is that such a confession is a privileged communication which is not competent evidence on a trial, at least in the absence of the penitent's consent to its use.²

In Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107, 23 L.Ed. 605, the Supreme Court said:

"Suits cannot be maintained which would require a disclosure of the confidence of the confessional, or those between husband and wife, or of communications by a client to his counsel for professional advice, or of a patient to his physician for a similar purpose."

This was dictum, since the confessional privilege was not involved. So, too, is Judge Learned Hand's statement in McMann v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2 Cir., 1937, 87 F.2d 377, 378, 109 A.L.R. 1445, certiorari denied McMann v. Engle, 301 U.S. 684, 57 S.Ct. 785, 81 L.Ed. 1342, where he included among the traditional privileges that of a penitent. And Judge Holtzoff of our District Court has also said in passing that under the law of the United States privileged communications include that of "clergyman and penitent" as well as those of attorney and client and physician and patient.³ These statements, though not decisions on the question, indicate the correct position. They assume the existence of the privilege.

It is highly probable that the priestpenitent privilege was part of the common law of England in the centuries preceding the Reformation. See the lengthy study by Nolan, The Law of the Seal of Confession, 13 Catholic Encyc. 649-65. This same study demonstrates, however, that after the Reformation the privilege was by no means generally recognized, and in fact appears to have been abrogated or abandoned. Because of this it is said the claimed privilege was not one at common law and, therefore, if now to be recognized must be enacted into statute, which Congress has not done.⁴ However, as we shall see, recognition of the privilege in federal courts does not depend upon finding that it has either existed uniformly at common law or has been approved in terms by act of Congress. Before enlarging upon this it is worth noting that even during the post-Reformation period, when religious and political tensions largely set the pattern in such matters, judicial decisions and legal writings were not uniformly hostile to the privilege.⁵

The resolution of the problem today for federal courts is to be found in a proper application of Rule 26, Fed.R. Crim.P., adopted in 1948 under the authority of Congress. This Rule provides:

"* * * The admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses shall be governed, except when an act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience."

This was decisional law even before thus formalized in a Rule. See Notes of the Advisory Committee on the Rules, where it is stated that Rule 26 reflects the decisions of the Supreme Court in Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 54 S.Ct. 212, 78 L.Ed. 369, and in Wolfle v. United States, 291...