Muller v. Casino, Case No. EDCV 14-02308-VAP (KKx)
| Decision Date | 17 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. EDCV 14-02308-VAP (KKx) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | CRYSTAL A. MULLER, Plaintiff, v. MORONGO CASINO, RESORT, AND SPA; ET AL., Defendants |
[Motion filed on April 8, 2015]
Plaintiff worked as a slot attendant at a casino owned and operated by the Morongo Band of Mission Indians ("Morongo"), a federally-recognized Indian tribe. Morongo provided her several leaves of absence under a policy it implemented that afforded its employees protections based on the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. During one such approved leave, Morongo discharged Plaintiff for drug use. Plaintiff alleges her drug use at the time was connected to the illnesses for which she received the leave in the first place.
Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint on March 10, 2015. (See Doc. No. 7 ("FAC").) On April 8, 2015, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss. (See Doc. No. 14 ("Notice"); Doc. No. 14-1 ("Motion").)
After considering the papers filed in support of, and in opposition to, the Motion, and the arguments presented at the June 1, 2015 hearing, the Court GRANTS the Motion and DISMISSES this action WITH PREJUDICE.
Plaintiff began working as a slot attendant for the Morongo Casino, Resort & Spa ("MCRS") in about 2002. (FAC ¶ 5.) MCRS is owned and operated by Morongo, an Indian tribe. (Id. ¶ 2(b).)1
In 2010, Plaintiff was diagnosed with fibromyalgia and chronic migraine headaches. (Id. ¶ 6.) As a result, Plaintiff qualified for, and received, several leaves of absence under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), as implemented by Morongo. (Id.)
On May 7, 2013, Plaintiff received another leave of absence that was due to expire on August 8, 2013. (Id. ¶9.) On July 26, 2013, while Plaintiff was at work, an unnamed manager sent Plaintiff home because "it was brought up that [she] was taking drugs for her disability for years." (Id. ¶ 11.) On July 31, 2013, Plaintiff received a letter from Morongo notifying her she had been discharged "because of her drug use[,] which interfered with her ability to perform her job." (Id. ¶ 12.)
Plaintiff made several calls to the Human Resources Department and requested "to appear before the Tribal Counsel" because she had been terminated during an approved leave of absence. (Id. ¶ 13.) She alleges that the drugs she was taking did not impair her ability to perform her work. (Id.) Plaintiff also repeatedly wrote to Morongo. (Id. ¶ 15.) She sought "to arbitrate the matter" (id.), because she had "been informed by Human Resources that Morongo had adopted federal standards for employees under the FMLA[,] and that she could not go to court but could arbitrate" (id. ¶ 14).2
On August 29, 2014, Morongo responded to Plaintiff's letters. (Id. ¶ 16.) It informed her that arbitrationwas not available for employment-related claims, such as hers. (Id.)
On November 10, 2014, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit. (See Doc. No. 1.) On March 10, 2015, Plaintiff filed her FAC, titled, "Plaintiff Crystal A. Muller's First Amended Complaint for Equitable Relief or, in the Alternative, Petition to Compel Arbitration." It is not clear what equitable relief Plaintiff seeks other than to compel arbitration.
Plaintiff asserts three claims in her FAC: (1) violation of the FMLA (see id. ¶¶ 18-21); (2) violation of the California Family Rights Act (see id. ¶¶ 22-23); and (3) wrongful termination (see id. ¶¶ 25-27). She alleges these claims against the following Defendants: MCRS, Morongo,3 Kandi Kelley, and Briton Cook (collectively "Defendants").
On April 8, 2015, Defendants filed the instant Motion. On May 11, 2015, Plaintiff filed an opposition. (Doc. No. 17 ("Opposition").) She attached to her Opposition several exhibits. (See, e.g. Doc. No. 21, 23.) Defendants filed a reply. (Doc. No. 19 ("Reply").)
Plaintiff has attempted numerous times to file exhibits with her Opposition. She has failed each time.
Plaintiff initially filed the exhibits as Doc. No. 18. The Court ordered that document stricken because Plaintiff's counsel, Ms. Haney, failed to redact Plaintiff's sensitive information, including her home address and telephone numbers, as required by the Central District's Local Rules. (See Doc. No. 20.) Ms. Haney timely re-filed the exhibits as Doc. No. 21, this time with the appropriate redactions. With this filing, Ms. Haney submitted her own declaration and simply attached the exhibits without attempting to authenticate them. See Fed. R. Evid. 901(a) (). Her declaration discussed, inter alia, her conversations with opposing counsel on the merits of the lawsuit without referencing the attached exhibits. Defendants, therefore, objected to the declaration and exhibits. (See Doc. No. 22.)
The day after Defendants filed their objection, Ms. Haney filed a document titled, "Notice Errata;Declaration of Gloria Dredd Haney." (Doc. Nos. 23 ("Errata").)4 In it, she explained that the declaration she filed as Doc. No. 21, although relating to this case and the instant Motion, "was an inadvertent error and mistake." (Doc. No. 23 ¶ 3.) She "was . . . completely surprised that the wrong declaration was filed," Ms. Haney stated. (Id.) Attached to the Errata was a new declaration, signed only by Ms. Haney, which attempted to authenticate the exhibits. (See Doc. No. 23-1 ("Haney Decl.").)
As identified by Defendants' additional objections to the Haney Decl. and the attached exhibits (see Doc. No. 25), Ms. Haney does not state whether she has personal knowledge of Exhibits A-Q, or whether she is able to authenticate these exhibits.5 Ms. Haney only states that these are documents sent or received by her client. That, however, is insufficient for authentication purposes. See, e.g. Barefield v. Bd. of Trustees of CA State Univ., Bakersfield, 500 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1258 (E.D. Cal. 2007) ( ); see also Fed. R. Evid. 602 (); Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). Ms. Haney's declaration does not authenticate Exhibits A-Q. Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS Defendants' objections (see Doc. No. 25) and does not consider Exhibits A-Q attached to Doc. No. 23.
* * *
On the merits, the Court finds it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this case due to tribal sovereign immunity. It therefore GRANTS the Motion and DISMISSES this action WITH PREJUDICE.
When invoked, tribal sovereign immunity deprives a federal court of jurisdiction and requires dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1). Alvarado v. Table Mtn. Rancheria, 509 F.3d 1008, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2007). A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be "facial" or "factual." Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir.2000)); Kohler v. CJP, Ltd., 818 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1172 (C.D. Cal. 2011). In a facial attack, the challenging party asserts that the allegations in the complaint are, on their face, insufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction. Id. In a factual attack, the challenging party disputes the truth of the allegations that otherwise would be sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction. Id.; Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003).
In general, when reviewing a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, the court may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See Safe Air For Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039 (citing Lee, 227 F.3d at 1242). The court does not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations, and it "is ordinarily free to hear evidence regarding jurisdiction and to rule on that issue prior to trial, resolving factual disputes where necessary." Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983); see also O'Donnell v. Wien Air Alaska, Inc., 551 F.2d 1141, 1145 nn.3-4 (9th Cir. 1977).
"Indian tribes are 'domestic dependent nations' that exercise 'inherent sovereign authority.'" Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Comty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014) (quoting Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991)). They possess "the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers." Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978). Therefore, "an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity." Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998); see also White v. Univ. of California, 765 F.3d 1010, 1023 (9th Cir. 2014) (). "Tribal sovereign immunity may extend to subdivisions of a tribe," Native Am. Distrib. v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co., 546 F.3d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 2008), and "to tribal officials when acting in their official capacity and within the scope of their authority," Cook v. AVI Casino Enterprises, Inc., 548 F.3d 718, 727 (9th Cir. 2008).
Plaintiff asserts this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over her lawsuit based on the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (See FAC ¶1.)6 The only federal claim she asserts is under the FMLA, 29...
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