Muller v. Curran
Decision Date | 13 November 1989 |
Docket Number | No. 88-2896,88-2896 |
Citation | 889 F.2d 54 |
Parties | Alfred MULLER, M.D.; Friendship Heights Village Council, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. J. Joseph CURRAN, Jr., Attorney General; Montgomery County Council; Friendship Properties; The Barlow Corporation, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Stephen McKenzie Truitt (Susan L. Launer, Daniel I. Prywes, Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, Washington, D.C., on brief), for appellants.
Ralph S. Tyler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, Md., Angela Katherine Hart, Asst. County Atty., Rockville, Md., , for appellees.
Before SPROUSE, Circuit Judge, BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge, and KAUFMAN, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
The questions presented in this appeal are whether a Maryland statute relating to incorporation of an unincorporated area violates the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and, if so, whether the challenged portion of the statute should be severed, with the rest of the statute left intact. 1 Plaintiffs-appellants seek a declaratory judgment holding the offending section of the Maryland statute unconstitutional. However, they also maintain that the remainder of the statutory scheme should survive under principles of severability. The District Court rejected appellants' constitutional challenge and their quest for declaratory relief, and did not reach the severability issue.
Under Maryland law the only way in which an unincorporated area of three hundred or more residents can become a municipality is pursuant to the three-step process set forth in Md.Ann. Code art. 23A, Secs. 20-30 (1981 Repl.Vol.). The first step requires a petition to the county council signed by at least 20% of the registered voters of the area to be incorporated and also by the owners of at least 25% of the assessed value of the real property within that area. The second step involves a decision by the county council, in its sole discretion, to submit the issue of incorporation to the voters of the area. The third step is an election in which all registered voters in the area can vote.
In Hayward v. Clay, 573 F.2d 187 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959, 99 S.Ct. 363, 58 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978), this Court held invalid a South Carolina statutory provision which provided a two-step process for annexation of an area: (1) a petition signed by 15% of the property owners in the area involved; (2) the favorable vote of a majority of such property owners and also of the majority of the registered voters in both the annexed and the annexing areas. Noting that "South Carolina need not grant anyone the right to vote on annexation," Judge Butzner wrote that "once the right to vote is established, the equal protection clause [of the fourteenth amendment] requires that, in matters of general interest to the community, restriction of the franchise on grounds other than age, citizenship and residence can be tolerated only upon proof that it furthers a compelling state interest." Id. at 190. Judge Butzner held that "[a] change in the entire structure of local government is a matter of general interest," id., and that "while the referendum [of the property owners] in form may be a condition precedent to the actual election, in effect it grants to some individuals--who are identified on the basis of ownership of realty--the right to nullify a vote for annexation by the electorate at large." Id. at 189. Judge Butzner concluded that the equal protection clause was offended, relying upon Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 95 S.Ct. 1637, 44 L.Ed.2d 172 (1975), and noting that although the "mechanics" of the Texas procedure held unconstitutional in Hill differed from the procedure challenged in Hayward, it is the "restriction of the effective franchise to a property owning class--not the mechanics of accomplishing the restrictions--that offends the equal protection clause." 573 F.2d at 190. A result similar to that in Hayward was reached in City of Seattle v. State, 103 Wash.2d 663, 694 P.2d 641 (1985) ( ).
In Berry v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422 (4th Cir.1978), the Fourth Circuit distinguished Hayward in dealing with another South Carolina annexation provision. The statutory procedure challenged in Berry authorized the governing body of the annexing area to annex upon the filing of a petition signed by 75% of the property holders in the area to be annexed. Judge Russell, in upholding the challenged statutory provision, wrote: Id. at 424. Judge Russell also wrote: Id. at 425. Finally, Judge Russell stated that the challenged procedure "involves no election; in fact, it is a procedure which does not contemplate an election." Id.
In the instant case, an election is involved, thus presenting a different question than that in Berry. Under the procedure attacked herein, no popular vote is taken unless the county council, in its sole discretion, authorizes the election. However, a vote by the county council can be entirely blocked if the owners of at least 25% of the assessed value of the real property within the area to be incorporated fail to petition in favor of incorporation. Because in no event can any vote take place unless the county council exercises its discretion in favor of permitting a vote, the district court concluded that this case is closer to Berry than to Hayward. We cannot agree. The challenged Maryland procedure permits a popular vote to be blocked by property owners. That is so because the county council cannot schedule such a vote unless a given percentage of the property owners authorize it. That in and by itself offends equal protection principles unless a compelling state...
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