Muller v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort
| Decision Date | 11 August 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-207.,05-207. |
| Citation | 139 P.3d 1162,2006 WY 100 |
| Parties | Sharon MULLER and Jeff Muller, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. JACKSON HOLE MOUNTAIN RESORT, Appellee (Defendant), and State of Wyoming, Appellee (Intervenor). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Representing Appellant: William R. Fix and Jenna V. Mandraccia of William R. Fix, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Fix.
Representing Appellees: Carter H. Wilkinson and James K. Lubing of Lubing Law Office, Jackson, Wyoming, for Appellee Jackson Hole Mountain Resort. Argument by Mr. Lubing. No appearance on behalf of Appellee State of Wyoming.
Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, and BURKE, JJ., and ARNOLD, D.J.
[¶ 1] By order entered on September 20, 2005, this Court agreed to answer questions certified to us pursuant to W.R.A.P. 11, by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. In that order we designated Sharon Muller and Jeff Muller (Muller or Mullers) as Appellants. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort (Resort) is the Appellee.
[¶ 2] These are the questions we agreed to answer:
1. Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-122(a)(ii), Wyoming's Recreational Safety Act (RSA) "does not apply to a cause of action based upon the design or manufacture of sport or recreational equipment or products or safety equipment used incidental to or required by the sport or recreational opportunity." The magistrate judge interpreted this provision as a product liability provision applying to design and manufacture claims. Does the design and manufacture component of the statute apply to products and safety equipment or only sport and recreational equipment? Does this exemption exclude the operation of a ski lift by a recreational provider from the protections of the RSA?
[¶ 3] Our general answer to this question is "No." However, to specifically answer the compound questions posed: We conclude that the section at issue is not ambiguous and the Act does not apply to those items listed by it, i.e., the Act does not apply to the design or manufacture of sports equipment or products, or recreational equipment or products, or safety equipment, the use of which is incidental to the sport or recreational activity; and, "No," this statute does not exclude a ski lift operated by a recreational provider from the protections of the RSA.
2. The RSA provides that "[a]ny person who takes part in any sport or recreational opportunity assumes the inherent risks in that sport or recreational opportunity, whether those risks are known or unknown, and is legally responsible for any and all damage, injury or death to himself or other persons or property that results from the inherent risks in that sport or recreational opportunity." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-123(a). The RSA defines inherent risks as "those dangers or conditions which are characteristic of, intrinsic to, or an integral part of any sport or recreational opportunity." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-122(a)(i). Are inherent risks of alpine skiing limited to skiing, can an injury that occurs while boarding the ski lift be an inherent risk of alpine skiing, and can the injury in this case be such an inherent risk?
[¶ 4] Our answer to this question is also generally "No." However, to specifically answer the compound question posed: The "inherent risks" of alpine skiing are not limited only to the act of skiing; an injury that occurs while boarding a ski lift may be an "inherent risk" of skiing; and the injury in this case may be an "inherent risk" of skiing.
3. If not mooted by the answers to Questions 1 and 2, is the operator of a ski lift a common carrier, and if so, what standard of care is owed to those riding on a ski lift gondola?
[¶ 5] Our answers above render this question moot.
[¶ 6] We accept the "Procedural and Factual Background" set out in the Tenth Circuit's certification document:
The presiding United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Wyoming noted that Appendix at 32. Noting its finding on a special verdict form, following a trial with the magistrate judge presiding, the jury concluded that Muller's injuries resulted from an inherent risk of the recreational activity in which she was taking part. The Mullers argued before the trial court and before this court on appeal that the RSA was not applicable to their case.
[¶ 7] Because it became a focus of the argument before the court, we take note that while boarding the Bridger Gondola, skiers are not wearing their skis; rather, they are stowed on exterior racks affixed to the gondola. We also discern from the briefs and from argument that no motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment was filed in this case. It was contemplated from the outset that the "inherent risk" in question here was one for the jury to resolve. The trial was held in Jackson.
[¶ 8] We set out the statutes at issue in their entirety:
§ 1-1-121. Recreation Safety Act; short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Recreation Safety Act".
§ 1-1-122. Definitions.
(i) "Inherent risk" with regard to any sport or recreational opportunity means those dangers or conditions which are characteristic of, intrinsic to, or an integral part of any sport or recreational opportunity [Emphasis added.];
(ii) "Provider" means any person or governmental entity which for profit or otherwise, offers or conducts a sport or recreational opportunity. This act does not apply to a cause of action based upon the design or manufacture of sport or recreational equipment or products or safety equipment used incidental to or required by the sport or recreational opportunity;
(iii) "Sport or recreational opportunity" means commonly understood sporting activities including baseball, softball, football, soccer, basketball, swimming, hockey, dude ranching, nordic or alpine skiing, mountain climbing, river floating, hunting, fishing, backcountry trips, horseback riding and any other equine activity, snowmobiling and similar recreational opportunities;
(iv) "Equine activity" means:
(A) Equine shows, fairs, competitions, performances or parades that involve any or all breeds of equines;
(B) Any of the equine disciplines;
(C) Equine training or teaching activities, or both;
(D) Boarding equines;
(E) Riding, inspecting or evaluating an equine belonging to another, whether or not the owner has received some monetary consideration or other thing of value for the use of the equine or is permitting a prospective purchaser of the equine to ride, inspect or evaluate the equine;
(F) Rides, trips, hunts or other equine activities of any type however informal or impromptu;
(G) Day use rental riding, riding associated with a dude ranch or riding associated with outfitted pack trips; and
(H) Placing or replacing horseshoes on an equine.
(v) Repealed by Laws 1996, ch. 78, § 2.
(vi) "This act" means W.S. 1-1-121 through 1-1-123.
§ 1-1-123. Assumption of risk.
(a) Any person who takes part in any sport or recreational opportunity assumes the inherent risks in that sport or recreational opportunity, whether those risks are known or unknown, and is legally responsible for any and all damage, injury or death to himself or other persons or property that results from the inherent risks in that sport or recreational opportunity.
(c) Actions based upon negligence of the provider wherein the damage, injury or death is not the result of an inherent risk of the sport or recreational opportunity shall be preserved pursuant to W.S. 1-1-109.1
Wyo. Sta. Ann. §§ 1-1-121-1-1-123 (Lexis-Nexis 2005).
[¶ 9] Because we are answering certified questions from the United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, and because our answers must rely on the very limited factual background provided in the Tenth Circuit's submission to us and the Joint Appendices submitted by the parties, our traditional standards of review are only tangentially of service. However, the principle source of our answers must come from the statutes at issue, and so our resolution of this matter must be guided by our well established principles of statutory construction:
In interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the legislature's intent. All statutes must be construed in pari materia and, in ascertaining the meaning of a given law, all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose must be considered and construed in harmony. Statutory construction is a question of law, so our standard of review is de novo. We endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with the legislature's intent. We begin by making an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection. We construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe all parts of the statute in pari materia. When a statute is sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and do not resort to the rules of statutory construction. We must not give a statute a meaning that will nullify its operation if it is susceptible of another interpretation. Moreover, we will not enlarge, stretch, expand, or extend a statute to matters that do not fall within its...
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