Mullholland v. State Racing Com'n

• Decision Date: 10 September 1936
• Citation: 3 N.E.2d 773,295 Mass. 286
• Parties: MULLHOLLAND et al. v. STATE RACING COMMISSION et al. MASTERS et al. v. SAME.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

295 Mass. 286

3 N.E.2d 773

MULLHOLLAND et al. v. STATE RACING COMMISSION et al.

MASTERS et al. v. SAME.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

September 10, 1936

Report from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Sisk, Judge.

Suits in equity by Peter J. Mullholland and others, and by Harry L Masters and others, against the State Racing Commission and others. Without decision, the trial judge made a single report covering both cases for determination by the Supreme Judicial Court.

Decrees ordered to be entered dismissing the bills.

Edward M. Dangel, L. E. Sherry, and S. Andelman, all of Boston, for plaintiffs Mullholland and others.

R Clapp, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants Connors and others.

C. H. Innes, of Boston, for defendants Eastern Racing Ass'n and others.

RUGG Chief Justice.

These suits in equity by agreement were submitted to a judge of the superior court on a case stated, as it is termed in the record, signed by attorneys representing all parties, wherein is a recital that the material ultimate facts on which the rights of the parties are to be determined are there set forth. The parties presented no evidence. Without decision, the trial judge made a single report covering both cases for determination by this court. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 231, § 111; Atlantic Maritime Co. v Gloucester, 228 Mass. 519, 522, 523, 117 N.E. 924; Boucher v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 259 Mass. 259, 266, 267, 156 N.E. 424; Merrimac Chemical Co. v. Moore, 279 Mass. 147, 152, 181 N.E. 219.

The plaintiffs are citizens, property owners and taxpayers in Boston and Revere, the cities in which they live, the nearest to the race track hereafter described being located about two thousand feet away in a direct line and four thousand feet from the projected stables. The defendants are (1) the members of the state racing commission (hereafter called the commission), established by St.1934, c. 374, § 2, whereby a new section 48 was inserted in G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 6, (2) Eastern Racing Association Inc. (hereafter called the corporation), a corporation organized under the laws of this commonwealth for the purpose of promoting and engaging in the business of racing, and (3) three individuals who are officers and the sole directors of the corporation. The object of the suits is to prevent the corporation from conducting horse racing meetings at a location in Boston and Revere known as Suffolk Downs. The essential facts are these: On April 9, 1935, the commission acting under St.1934, c. 374, § 3 (G.L.[Ter.Ed.] c. 128A, § 3), issued to the corporation a license to conduct a running horse racing meeting between June 29 and August 19, 1935, at a track called Suffolk Downs located in Boston and Revere. A general description of the location was in the license. By its terms the license was to expire on the last day of the meeting. At the time of the filing of the application for a license and at the time of the issuance of the license, (1) there were no actual racing track or grounds and no physical structures at the location therein described, although tentative plans had been prepared showing a clubhouse, grandstand, track and other buildings where a racing meeting could be held; (2) no authority had been granted by the city of Boston or the city of Revere under G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 271, §§ 33, 34 consenting to the use of the land as a race track; (3) the location described in the application and license was within fifty miles of a race track in the state of New Hampshire and of another in the state of Rhode Island, each of one mile or more in circumference, and a third at Readville in this commonwealth of like circumference, which has not been used for horse racing for many years and has not been licensed by the commission; (4) the location known as Suffolk Downs was within the ‘ industrial districts' under the zoning laws of Boston and within the industrial and general residence districts under the zoning ordinance of Revere. On April 22, 1935, the city councils of Boston and Revere consented to the laying out and use of a race track called Suffolk Downs and on the day following the mayors of said cities respectively approved the actions of the respective city councils. On April 27, 1935, the corporation acquired title to a tract comprising approximately one hundred ninety-five acres of vacant land constituting the location of Suffolk Downs and immediately started construction work on the race track. The plans called for a grandstand seating twelve thousand five hundred people, a clubhouse accommodating four thousand people, four entrances to the park, a paddock and stable for one thousand horses to be occupied during the racing season, and restaurants and lunch counters. On June 6, 1935, the mayor of Revere approved previous action by the city council whereby the zoning ordinance of Revere was amended by rezoning so that the entire portion of Suffolk Downs within that city came within the ‘ business district’ and was no longer in the ‘ general residence district.’

The prayers of the bills are (1) that the commission be ordered to revoke the license granted to the corporation, (2) that the corporation be enjoined from laying out, constructing or using the land for a race track, (3) that the individual officers of the corporation be likewise restrained, (4) that the license issued by the commission to the corporation be declared illegal and void, and (5) for further general relief.

The burden of the plaintiffs' complaint against the commission is that the license was improperly and illegally granted to the corporation to conduct a running horse racing meeting between June 29 and August 19, 1935. The merits of these contentions need not be considered. The license stated in terms that it ‘ will expire on the last day of the meeting.’ It is plain, therefore, that the license became inoperative according to its express words on August 19, 1935. Therefore the alleged wrong by the commission of which the plaintiffs complain has ceased to exist. In these circumstances the court takes cognizance of facts supervening since the institution of the proceedings. When, at the time of the disposition of a cause, the situation is such that the relief sought is no longer available or of any use to the plaintiffs and a decision by the court will not be applicable to existing rights, no decision will be rendered. The questions originally involved have become moot. They are not proper subjects for litigation. Sullivan v. Secretary of Commonwealth, 233 Mass. 543, 545, 546, 124 N.E. 422; Independent-Progressive Party v. Secretary of Commonwealth, 266 Mass. 18, 21, 22, 164 N.E. 654; Clifford v. School Committee of Lynn, 275 Mass. 258, 260, 175 N.E. 634. The present suits were filed on April 25, 1935. The report of the trial judge was made on June 18, 1935. The cases were not reached for argument before this court in ordinary course until November 12, 1935. Through no fault of anybody, the afflux of time renders the form of redress sought by the plaintiffs against the commission of no avail to them. It follows that the plaintiffs show no ground for a decree against the commission.

The relief sought against the corporation and its directors is an injunction against the laying out, the construction, or the use of the premises in question as a race track. The allegations of the plaintiffs' bills and their prayers indicate that their complaint against these defendants is not restricted to the conduct of the single racing meeting authorized by the license. The race track seemingly is still in existence and is physically available for use as may be authorized. Provided the plaintiffs are in a position to demand relief and to prove wrongs by the defendants entitling them to redress, it does not appear that the injunction against these defendants would be of no avail to them or would relate to a matter which has become moot. A decision with respect to such issues would relate to existing facts.

The plaintiffs contend that the statute is unconstitutional, that no license could be lawfully issued pursuant to its terms that for various reasons the particular license was invalid, that the zoning laws were violated in the construction of the race track,...