Mulligan v. Village of Bradley

Decision Date06 March 1985
Docket NumberNo. 3-84-0201,3-84-0201
Citation86 Ill.Dec. 650,475 N.E.2d 1029,131 Ill.App.3d 513
Parties, 86 Ill.Dec. 650, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3157 Glenn MULLIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VILLAGE OF BRADLEY and Kenneth Hayes, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

John Bernard Cashion, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.

Alan F. Smietanski, Berz & Smietanski, Kankakee, William W. Kurnik, Kurnik & Cipolla, Arlington Heights, for defendants-appellees.

SCOTT, Justice:

The plaintiff, Glenn Mulligan, appeals a decision of the circuit court of Kankakee County which dismissed his complaint against the Village of Bradley and Kenneth Hayes, President of the Board of Trustees, following plaintiff's termination as Village Administrator.

Plaintiff's complaint was in four counts and sought damages for breach of contract, malicious prosecution, and a civil rights violation for being deprived of a "property right" in his employment position and that his firing was politically motivated.

The claims of malicious prosecution and the alleged civil rights violations were dismissed by the circuit court for failure to state a cause of action.

The circuit court then granted the Village's motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to plaintiff's claim for breach of contract.

The factual background for the complaint are derived, in part, from the minutes of the meetings of the Village Board.

On October 8, 1979, Mulligan, as President of the Board of Trustees of the Village of Bradley, appointed Trustee Novak as chairman of a committee of the whole, to study the question of whether there was a need for a full-time employee to look into the Village business and to look out for the general growth and well-being of the Village.

In the interim between the October 8 meeting and the next regular meeting of the Board of Trustees on October 29, 1979, Mulligan discussed the necessity of creating a new position of Village Administrator with committee chairman Novak and other members of the Board of Trustees. Mulligan not only urged the board members to vote in favor of creating the position of Village Administrator, but to vote in favor of offering the position to him.

The October 29 meeting commenced with Mulligan presiding as Village President. Novak reported that although they had interviewed other candidates for the position as Village Administrator, they had decided to offer the position to Village President Mulligan.

A resolution was read and approved which created the new position of Village Administrator. Four trustees voted in favor of the resolution and two trustees voted against it. Mulligan did not vote. A motion was then made to offer the contract to Mulligan. The motion passed 5 to 1 with Mulligan abstaining. Mulligan offered his resignation as Village President, which was accepted by a unanimous vote of the trustees. Mulligan accepted the position of Village Administrator for a period of three years commencing November 1, 1979, up to and including October 31, 1982. No appropriation ordinance was ever made to pay the $27,000 per year salary and annual 7% pay raises.

The position of Village Administrator involved soliciting and assisting the relocation of business entities into the Village of Bradley. Hayes, who had been Mulligan's former political adversary in the Village, became President of the Village Board. The contract provided that either party to the agreement could terminate it by 30 days written notice during the first year, 60 days written notice the second year, and 90 days written notice the third year. There was no provision in the contract that it could only be terminated "for cause."

On May 4, 1981, Hayes fired Mulligan after a hearing. Thereafter, Mulligan was subpoenaed to testify before the Grand Jury of Kankakee County. Mulligan alleged that Hayes instigated the criminal proceedings without probable cause and with malice. The Grand Jury returned a "No Bill" and Mulligan filed suit against the Village of Bradley and Hayes on the grounds enumerated above.

In granting a judgment on the pleadings to the defendant Village with respect to plaintiff's allegation of a breach of contract, the circuit court held that the plaintiff's agreement with the Village was void and unenforceable for two reasons. First, the court believed that chapter 24, paragraph 8-1-7, Illinois Revised Statutes 1979, prohibits the making of a contract unless an appropriation has been made concerning the contract. Second, the court indicated that in its opinion, the contract was void and unenforceable because it violated both chapter 102, paragraph 3, and chapter 24, paragraph 3-14-4, Illinois Revised Statutes 1979, which both prohibit an elected or appointed official from having an interest in a contract upon which he may be called upon to vote or when the consideration of the contract is paid from the public treasury.

We believe that there exists ample evidence in the record which supports the decision of the circuit court in declaring the contract in question to be void and unenforceable on the basis of plaintiff's conflict of interest. Nor are we deterred from such a conclusion by the Grand Jury's refusal to return an indictment since there existed alternative authority to declare the agreement null and void without the necessity of finding a criminal violation had occurred, i.e., chapter 24, paragraph 8-1-7, Ill.Rev.Stat.1979; Hogan v. City of Centralia (1979), 71 Ill.App.3d 1004, 28 Ill.Dec 428, 390 N.E.2d 595 (purported 2 year contract for chief of police held to be void ab initio without a proper budget being passed).

We also believe the circuit court properly dismissed plaintiff's complaint with respect to his allegations of malicious prosecution.

The plaintiff has contended that he...

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10 cases
  • Rodgers v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 30 Junio 2000
    ...not commence a prosecution when he merely gives false information to the proper authorities. Mulligan v. Village of Bradley, 131 Ill. App.3d 513, 516, 86 Ill.Dec. 650, 475 N.E.2d 1029 (1985). However, when a citizen knowingly gives false information to a police officer, who then swears out ......
  • Magnuson v. Cassarella
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • 9 Julio 1992
    ...law, "a prosecution is commenced by a complaint, an information, or an indictment." Mulligan v. Village of Bradley, 131 Ill. App.3d 513, 516, 86 Ill.Dec. 650, 653, 475 N.E.2d 1029, 1032 (3d Dist.1985) (citing Ill. Rev.Stat. ch. 38, ¶¶ 2-16, 111-1). Accordingly, Count IX of Magnuson's compla......
  • Van Audenhove v. Perry
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 19 Mayo 2017
    ...710 F.Supp. 13, 14-15 ; Standard v. Falstad (2015) 334 Ga.App. 444, 447, 779 S.E.2d 682, 685 ; Mulligan v. Bradley (1985) 131 Ill.App.3d 513, 516, 86 Ill.Dec. 650, 475 N.E.2d 1029, 1032.)3 We need not decide this question. The complaint does not allege that Van Audenhove was arrested pursua......
  • Barrow v. Blouin
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • 7 Mayo 2014
    ...912, 922 (7th Cir.2001) ; Magnuson v. Cassarella, 812 F.Supp. 824, 832 (N.D.Ill.1992) (citing Mulligan v. Village of Bradley, 131 Ill.App.3d 513, 86 Ill.Dec. 650, 475 N.E.2d 1029, 1032 (1985) ). A plaintiff who is only arrested and detained does not have a claim for malicious prosecution. S......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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