Magnuson v. Cassarella

• Decision Date: 09 July 1992
• Docket Number: No. 92 C 0046.,92 C 0046.
• Citation: 812 F. Supp. 824
• Parties: Jennifer A. MAGNUSON, Plaintiff, v. Officer Michael CASSARELLA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

812 F. Supp. 824

Jennifer A. MAGNUSON, Plaintiff, v. Officer Michael CASSARELLA, et al., Defendants.

No. 92 C 0046.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.

July 9, 1992.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jennifer A Magnuson, pro se.

Terry L. McDonald, Connie R. Barba, Cook County State's Atty.'s Office, Chicago, IL, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ASPEN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Jennifer A. Magnuson brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Cook County Sheriff's Police Department, Officer Michael Cassarella, nine unknown police officers, Cook County Board President Richard Phelan, and sixteen commissioners of the Cook County Board, alleging violations of the United States and Illinois Constitutions and of Illinois state law. Presently before the court are (1) a motion to dismiss filed on behalf of the Cook County Sheriff's Department, Board President Phelan and the sixteen commissioners of the Cook County Board,¹ and (2) Officer Cassarella's motion to dismiss Counts III, IV, and VII-IX of Magnuson's complaint, as well that portion of Count II alleging deprivation of property. For the reasons set forth below, we grant both motions.

I. Standard of Review

It is settled law that the allegations within a pro se complaint, "however inartfully pleaded are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers...." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); see also Maclin v. Paulson, 627 F.2d 83, 86 (7th Cir.1980). "Such a complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10, 101 S.Ct. 173, 176, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980) (per curiam) (citing Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-21, 92 S.Ct. at 596); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1832, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). As always, in ruling on each of the motions to dismiss, the court accepts as true the factual allegations of the complaint. See Hughes, 449 U.S. at 10, 101 S.Ct. at 176 (citing Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972)).

II. Background

On August 15, 1991, at approximately 10:05 p.m., Officer Michael Cassarella, along with another police officer, entered Magnuson's parents home, unannounced and without a valid search warrant. Magnuson, a minor, was present at the time, as was her baby and the baby's father, identified in the complaint as Manuel. Magnuson instructed the officers to leave, but the officers refused informing Magnuson that they were responding to a report of domestic violence. At the officers' request, Magnuson produced identification for herself and Manuel.

Shortly thereafter, eight additional officers entered the Magnuson home, again unannounced and without a valid warrant. One officer, apparently inspecting the baby's condition, shined a flashlight into the baby's face. Manuel protested, leading the officer to ask who the baby belonged to. Magnuson informed the officer that the baby was hers, prompting the officer to order Manuel to hand the baby to Magnuson. Two officers escorted Magnuson and her baby into the kitchen, restraining Manuel in the living room. Responding to questioning from the officers, Magnuson informed them that she had an argument with Manuel. One of the officers shined a flashlight at Magnuson, lifting her shirt sleeve to reveal a red mark on her arm admittedly caused by Manuel.

The officers asked Magnuson to "sign a complaint" against Manuel, but she refused. In order to persuade her, the officers allegedly threatened to sign the complaint themselves and then call the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services to have the baby taken from her. Once again Magnuson refused to sign a complaint, and asked the officers to leave the premises. While Magnuson was being questioned in the kitchen, other officers in the living room told Manuel to leave. Manuel refused, claiming he had been an invited guest. The officer handcuffed Manuel, removing him from the house and bringing him to the Rolling Meadows Police Station. Another officer escorted Magnuson and her baby to a separate vehicle, likewise bringing them to the Rolling Meadows Police Station. Once at the station, Magnuson was questioned regarding her parents' opinion of Manuel, whether Manuel was affiliated with a streetgang, his birthplace, and any possible drug use. After this questioning, she and her baby were driven home by a police officer. No charges were filed against Magnuson in connection with this incident.

III. Discussion

A. Cook County Sheriff's Police Department

Cook County Sheriff's Police Department ("CCSPD") claims that it is a nonsuable entity, and therefore must be dismissed from this case. The federal courts look to state law to determine if a defendant is amenable to suit. Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b). To be sued in Illinois, a defendant must have a legal existence, either natural or artificial. Jackson v. Village of Rosemont, 180 Ill.App.3d 932, 937-38, 129 Ill. Dec. 670, 673, 536 N.E.2d 720, 723 (1st Dist.1988). Illinois law provides that CCSPD is to be maintained as a "division" of the Sheriff of Cook County, consisting of deputy sheriffs charged with the duty of law enforcement. Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 34, ¶ 3-7001 (1992). Further, a review of the Sheriff's responsibility over such deputy sheriffs reveals that CCSPD does not enjoy a separate legal existence apart from the Sheriff of Cook County, and therefore is not a suable entity. See Larsen v. Leak, No. 90-7289, 1992 WL 5294, at *1, 1992 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 229, at *2-3 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 8, 1992); Mayes v. Elrod, 470 F.Supp. 1188, 1192 (N.D.Ill.1979). Accordingly, we grant CCSPD's motion to dismiss.

B. Individual Liability of Board Defendants

A defendant sued in her individual capacity can only be held liable under § 1983 for her individual wrongdoing. Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269, 273 (7th Cir.1986); Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 650 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816, 107 S.Ct. 71, 93 L.Ed.2d 28 (1986). As stated in Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir.1983): "Section 1983 creates a cause of action based upon personal liability and predicated upon fault. An individual cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused or participated in an alleged constitutional violation." Thus, § 1983 does not recognize the doctrine of superiors' liability, McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383, 1390 (7th Cir.1984), or the doctrine of respondeat superior. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

Furthermore, "a showing of mere negligence on the part of state officials is insufficient to implicate an individual's constitutional rights for purposes of a claim under § 1983." Rascon, 803 F.2d at 273 (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986)). Rather, to prevail Magnuson must allege "that the officials knowingly, willfully, or at least recklessly caused the alleged deprivation by their action or failure to act." Id. at 274; see also Smith v. Rowe, 761 F.2d 360, 369 (7th Cir.1985).

Even under the deferential review accorded pro se complaints, Magnuson has failed to state an individual claim against any of the Board defendants. Magnuson has failed to allege that any of the Board defendants participated in, directed or had knowledge of the purportedly unlawful entry into the Magnuson home on August 15, 1991. Further, her pleadings are devoid of any allegation indicating that those defendants participated in, directed or had knowledge of the events following the purportedly illegal entry, culminating in the questioning of Magnuson at the Rolling Meadows Police Station. Accordingly, we dismiss the individual claims against the Board defendants.²

C. Official Liability of Board Defendants

A suit against a state officer in her official capacity is essentially an action against the state entity by which the officer is employed. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471, 105 S.Ct. 873, 877, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985); Burmeister v. Stone, 751 F.Supp. 759, 760 (N.D.Ill.1990), aff'd, 958 F.2d 1419 (7th Cir.1992). Government entities, such as Cook County, cannot be held liable unless an official policy or custom caused the constitutional violation asserted in the complaint. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Thompson v. Duke, 882 F.2d 1180, 1187 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 929, 110 S.Ct. 2167, 109 L.Ed.2d 496 (1990).

The clearest case for municipal liability under § 1983 is the case like Monell itself, where an unconstitutional policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision is formally adopted and promulgated by the governing body itself. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 661, 98 S.Ct. at 2020 (Department of Social Services and Board of Education officially adopted a policy requiring pregnant employees to take unpaid maternity leaves before medically necessary).

In addition, Monell allows the imposition of municipal liability when the challenged conduct reflects "practices of state officials ... so permanent and well settled as to constitute a `custom or usage' with the force of law." Id. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1613, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)). "Custom and usage" by municipal employees and agents may be attributed to a municipality when the duration and frequency of the practices are sufficiently widespread so as to give rise to an inference of actual or constructive knowledge on the part of the municipality. Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1387 (4th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1027, 108 S.Ct. 752, 98 L.Ed.2d 765 (1988); McLin v. City of Chicago, 742 F.Supp....