Mullins v. City of Colo. Springs
| Decision Date | 15 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 21-cv-0589-WJM-KMT |
| Citation | 575 F.Supp.3d 1360 |
| Parties | John MULLINS, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS, Brian Kelly, in his official and individual capacities, Christopher Mace, in his official and individual capacities, Mark Neuenfeldt, in his official and individual capacities, and John Does 1–5, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
Reid Robertson Allison, David A. Lane, Killmer Lane & Newman LLP, Denver, CO, for Plaintiff.
Brian Matthew Stewart, City Attorney's Office, Colorado Springs, CO, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
This civil rights action arises out of the February 27, 2019 arrest of Plaintiff John Mullins by Colorado Springs Police Department ("CSPD") officers, which resulted in Mullins’ severe injury by a police canine. (ECF No. 1 at 1–4.) Mullins sues the City of Colorado Springs (the "City"), as well as CSPD officers Brian Kelly, Christopher Mace, Mark Neuenfeldt, and officers John Does 1-51 in their individual and official capacities (collectively, the "Defendant Officers") for Fourth Amendment violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. )
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Officers’ and the City's (collectively, "Defendants") Motion to Dismiss ("Motion"). (ECF No. 25.) For the following reasons, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
The following factual summary is drawn from Mullins’ Complaint and Jury Demand ("Complaint"). (ECF No. 1.) The Court assumes the allegations contained in the Complaint are true for the purpose of deciding the Motion. See Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider , 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007).
On February 27, 2019, "a large team" of CSPD officers, including Defendant Officers, arrived at Mullins’ home to arrest him and search his home. (¶ 12.)2 The crimes he was suspected of committing were nonviolent. (Id. ) When Defendant Officers arrived, they discovered Mullins’ mother and sister in his home and ordered them to go outside. (¶ 13.) Then Defendant Officers "decided to threaten and use a police canine" to apprehend Mullins. (¶ 15.) They unleashed the canine and sent it into his home "to find and bite [him]." (¶17.) Mullins was in the shower in an upstairs bathroom of his home and did not hear the officers give any warnings before they released the canine. (¶ 16.) The canine ran up the stairs and bit Mullins on the leg as he was exiting the shower. (¶ 17.) Defendant Officers went upstairs and found the canine continuing to bite Mullins’ leg. (¶ 18.) Defendant Officers saw Mullins "naked, clearly unarmed, [and] not resisting or threatening the canine or any other officer." (¶ 45.) Yet, for 20–25 seconds, Defendant Officers did not stop the canine from continuing to bite Mullins. (¶ 20.)
After the incident, Mullins was taken to the hospital, where he required multiple surgeries. (¶ 21.) The canine's bite caused severe injury to his leg and caused him "massive blood loss
." (Id. )
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a claim in a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." The Rule 12(b)(6) standard requires the Court to "assume the truth of the plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. , 493 F.3d at 1177. In ruling on such a motion, the dispositive inquiry is "whether the complaint contains ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). Granting a motion to dismiss "is a harsh remedy which must be cautiously studied, not only to effectuate the spirit of the liberal rules of pleading but also to protect the interests of justice." Dias v. City & Cnty. of Denver , 567 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"Thus, ‘a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’ " Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).
Mullins asserts a claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows an injured person to seek damages for the violation of his federal rights against a person acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; see also West v. Atkins , 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). To assert a claim under § 1983, Mullins must show (1) that he had a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States that was violated (2) by a person who acted under color of state law. Hall v. Witteman , 584 F.3d 859, 864 (10th Cir. 2009). "A defendant cannot be liable under § 1983 unless personally involved in the deprivation." Olson v. Stotts , 9 F.3d 1475, 1477 (10th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
"The Fourth Amendment forbids unreasonable seizures, including the use of excessive force in making an arrest." Casey v. City of Federal Heights , 509 F.3d 1278, 1281 (10th Cir. 2007). Claims of excessive force are analyzed under the objective reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) ; Thomson v. Salt Lake Cnty. , 584 F.3d 1304, 1313 (10th Cir. 2009). This standard "requires inquiry into the factual circumstances of every case; relevant factors include the crime's severity, the potential threat posed by the suspect to the officer's and others’ safety, and the suspect's attempts to resist or evade arrest." Medina v. Cram , 252 F.3d 1124, 1131 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Graham , 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 ). A "court assesses the reasonableness of an officer's conduct from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, acknowledging that the officer may be forced to make split-second judgments in certain difficult circumstances." Marquez v. City of Albuquerque , 399 F.3d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 2005) ().
"Individual defendants named in a § 1983 action may raise a defense of qualified immunity, which shields public officials ... from damages actions unless their conduct was unreasonable in light of clearly established law." Gutierrez v. Cobos , 841 F.3d 895, 899 (10th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Once the qualified immunity defense is asserted," the plaintiff must show: "first, the defendant[s’] actions violated a constitutional or statutory right, and, second, that the right was clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue." Thomas v. Kaven , 765 F.3d 1183, 1194 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). "If the plaintiff fails to satisfy either part of the inquiry, the court must grant qualified immunity." Carabajal v. City of Cheyenne , 847 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 211, 199 L.Ed.2d 118 (2017).
"In this circuit, to show that a right is clearly established, the plaintiff must point to a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains." Gutierrez , 841 F.3d at 900 (internal quotation marks omitted). "A plaintiff need not show the very act in question previously was held unlawful in order to establish an absence of qualified immunity." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). But "[a]n officer cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right's contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in his shoes would have understood that he was violating it." City and Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan , 575 U.S. 600, 611, 135 S.Ct. 1765, 191 L.Ed.2d 856 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"The dispositive question is ‘whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.’ " Mullenix v. Luna , 577 U.S. 7, 12, 136 S.Ct. 305, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015) (emphasis in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd , 563 U.S. 731, 742, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) ). Therefore, a plaintiff may not defeat qualified immunity "simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights." White v. Pauly , 580 U.S. 73, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552, 196 L.Ed.2d 463 (2017). Nonetheless, the clearly established inquiry "involves more than a scavenger hunt for prior cases with precisely the same facts. Pierce v. Gilchrist , 359 F.3d 1279, 1298 (10th Cir. 2004).
As an initial matter, Defendants do not dispute that a seizure occurred, and the Court finds that the canine's biting of Mullins constitutes a seizure. See Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo , 489 U.S. 593, 596, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989) (); Couture v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Public Sch. , 535 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008) ().
Defendants argue that Mullins’ official capacity claims against Defendant Officers should be dismissed as duplicative of his claim against the City. (ECF No. 25 at 4.) They argue that any official capacity claim against a municipal employee is treated as a suit against the municipality itself. See Johnson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs for Cnty. of Fremont , 85 F.3d 489, 493 (10th Cir. 1996). Mullins does not address this argument in his response. (See generally ECF No. 27.)
As the City is a named defendant in this action, and Mullins offers no argument or authority supporting additional official capacity claims against Defendant Off...
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