Mullins v. Cranor, 32344

• Decision Date: 20 March 1953
• Docket Number: No. 32344,32344
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: MULLINS, v. CRANOR, Superintendent of State Penitentiary.

Page 310

42 Wn.2d 310

254 P.2d 1038

MULLINS, v. CRANOR, Superintendent of State Penitentiary.

No. 32344.

Supreme Court of Washington, Department 2.

March 20, 1953.

Don G. Abel, Chehalis, for petitioner.

Don Eastvold, Cyrus A. Dimmick, Olympia, for respondent.

FINLEY, Justice.

The petitioner, Willis Mullins, shot his wife, Patricia Mullins, and his father-in-law, Ray Mannin, with a rifle. The two crimes were committed almost simultaneously, at the same location and with the same weapon. Initially, one information was filed. It contained two counts. Each related to the shooting of one of the aforementioned individuals, and charged assault in the first degree. Thereafter, one count of the original information was dismissed, and a separate information--covering the offense charged in the count that was dismissed--was filed. Petitioner was convicted, by a jury, of assault in the first degree, in Cause No. 1924, Lewis county. He pleaded guilty to assault in the first degree in Cause No. 1941, Lewis county.

In Cause No. 1924, petitioner was sentenced to confinement in the state penitentiary for not less than five years and not more than twenty years. The judgment provided that the sentence would run concurrently with the sentence in Cause No. 1941. In the latter cause, petitioner was sentenced to confinement in the state penitentiary for not less than five years and not more than twenty years; that judgment therein provided that the sentence would run concurrently with the sentence imposed in Cause No. 1924.

On July 31, 1951, the board of prison terms and paroles fixed the duration of petitioner's confinement at three years, relative to Cause No. 1924; and at two years, relative to Cause No. 1941; and ordered that the periods of confinement would run consecutively. Thereafter, on September 25, 1951, the board revoked its order of July 31, 1951, and ordered that petitioner would be confined for a period of five years, on Cause No. 1924; and for a period of seven and one-half years, on Cause No. 1941; further providing that the two periods of confinement would run consecutively.

As the basis for granting a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner contends, (a) that the judgments of the superior court in each of the above-mentioned causes provided that the sentences imposed therein would run concurrently; consequently, that the board had no authority to order that the periods of confinement, fixed as to each sentence, would run consequently; (b) that the board, after once fixing the periods of confinement in the order of July 31, 1951, had no authority to revoke such order, or to enter the order of September 25, 1951, purportedly changing and extending the periods of confinement of the petitioner; (c) that the board had no authority to enter the order of September 25, 1951, thereby purportedly imposing upon petitioner a period of confinement greater than the minimum sentence provided by law. Lastly, it is contended that, in any event, the petitioner was not accorded a fair hearing in connection with the revocation of the order of July 31, 1951, and the promulgation of the order of September 25, 1951.

On our own motion, we note that RCW 9.92.080 provides as follows:

'Whenever a person is convicted of two or more offenses before sentence has been pronounced for either, the imprisonment to which hs is sentenced upon the second or other subsequent conviction shall commence at the termination of the first or other prior term or terms of imprisonment to which he is sentenced; and whenever a person while under sentence of felony commits another felony and is sentenced to another term of imprisonment, such latter term shall not begin until the expiration of all prior terms: Provided, That...