Mullins v. Evans
| Decision Date | 19 August 1957 |
| Parties | , 68 A.L.R.2d 723 Sallie MULLINS v. J. J. EVANS et al. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
J. R. Ketron, Tazewell, Harry B. Brown, Jellico, and Joe M. Agee, La Follette, for appellants.
John P. Davis, Tazewell, for appellee.
The primary question in this case is whether royalties for the mining of coal, accruing after the death of the lessor, pass as realty to the heirs at law of the lessor or as personalty to the surviving husband. The Chancellor determined the question in favor of the heirs at law and the husband, J. J. Evans, having died and the cause properly revived, his executors appeal. The administrator, C. T. A., of W. H. Teague, deceased, who was sued as trustee under the trust instrument hereinafter mentioned also appeals.
The original bill was filed by Sallie Teague Mullins, a sister of Mary J. Evans, the deceased wife of J. J. Evans, against J. J. Evans individually and as executor of W. H. Teague to recover royalties paid by W. H. Teague, trustee, to J. J. Evans after the death of Mary J. Evans. J. J. Evans filed an answer and cross bill alleging that Teague, trustee, for a certain period of time, had improperly paid to cross defendant Sallie Mullins a portion of the royalties accruing after the death of Mary J. Evans. The cross bill sought a recovery of these royalties.
The insistence of J. J. Evans, rejected by the Chancellor, is that the execution of the trust instrument by Mary J. Evans and the subsequent execution of a lease by the trustee effected an equitable conversion of the interest of Mary J. Evans from realty to personalty and that she had only an interest in a mining partnership which descended as personalty to him as surviving husband under T. C. A. Sec. 31-201.
Lewis Teague, deceased, was the father of W. H. Teague, Mary J. Evans and complainant Sallie Mullins. On September 1, 1925, these children owned in their own right certain tracts of land adjoining lands of their father, and of J. J. Evans and G. W. Fortner. On that date all of these parties, including Lewis Teague, executed what is called a 'pool agreement' by which they conveyed to W. H. Teague, trustee, all the unmined coal on their respective properties. The preamble to the trust instrument recites: 'Said tracts of land adjoin and are valuable for their coal deposits, and it is deemed by the parties hereto to be to the best advantage of all that said several tracts be consolidated so that the same can be operated for coal mining purposes as a unit.'
The trustee was expressly empowered, but was not required, to lease these lands for coal mining purposes for such length of time and upon such terms and conditions as he might deem proper and, in event such lease should be executed, the accruing royalties were to be paid to the grantors according to the acreage owned by them, respectively, apparently without regard to which tract might, at any given time, be the source of the royalties. The trust instrument expressly states that the trustee should not have power to sell or encumber the trust property and that all of the trustors by unanimous agreement might revoke the trust and execute a valid conveyance of the property.
A short time after executing the trust, Lewis Teague died leaving as his heirs at law complainant, Mrs. Mullins, and W. H. Teague and Mary J. Evans. Thereafter and on December 2, 1929, W. H. Teague, Trustee, executed a mining lease to Tennessee Jellico Coal Company to run for a period of 50 years with the right to renew for an additional 50 years. The lease neither in express terms nor by implication confers upon the lessee the right to exhaust all of the coal deposits on the land. On the contrary, significantly, the lessee's rights are expressly limited 'to the Jellico seam or bed of coal' and the 'refusal' of other seams in event the lessor should 'desire that same be worked or mined'.
The mines were in operation at the date of the death of Mary J. Evans. For a short time thereafter the trustee paid the royalties which would have accrued to her, if living, to her husband, J. J. Evans, but later discontinued making payments to him and began paying the royalties to complainant. The amount paid to each is not in dispute. The royalties for coal mined before the death of Mrs. Evans is not involved.
The character of the right to receive future rents from realty and, particularly whether it is personal property or realty was before the Supreme Court in Combs v. Combs, 131 Tenn. 66, 173 S.W. 441, wherein the widow of the lessor sought to subject notes for rents accruing after his death to the payment of her claim to a year's support. In rejecting the widow's insistence that, by accepting notes, the intestate had severed the rents from the reversion estate, the Court said:
See also Schmid v. Baum's Home of Flowers, Inc., 162 Tenn. 439, 37 S.W.2d 105, 75 A.L.R. 261, expressly holding that, unless severed from the reversion by some act of the lessor, rents accruing after his death are realty and not personalty.
While it must be conceded that there are certain characteristics distinguishing rents from royalties, generally speaking, unless altered by contract, the rules of law which govern rights and liabilities as to rents also apply in cases growing out of mining leases. 58...
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