Mullins v. MGD Graphics Systems Group, Civ. A. No. 1:93-cv-1954-FMH.

• Decision Date: 15 September 1994
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 1:93-cv-1954-FMH.
• Citation: 867 F. Supp. 1578
• Parties: Donald Foster MULLINS, Plaintiff, v. M.G.D. GRAPHICS SYSTEMS GROUP, Rockwell International, Heidelberg Eastern, Inc., The Colour Group, Gold Coast Graphics, Inc., H. Wohlenberg KG, AM International, Inc., and A.M. Wohlenberg GmbH, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

867 F. Supp. 1578

Donald Foster MULLINS, Plaintiff, v. M.G.D. GRAPHICS SYSTEMS GROUP, Rockwell International, Heidelberg Eastern, Inc., The Colour Group, Gold Coast Graphics, Inc., H. Wohlenberg KG, AM International, Inc., and A.M. Wohlenberg GmbH, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 1:93-cv-1954-FMH.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

September 15, 1994.

Jason T. Schneider, Atlanta, GA, Arthur Alan Wolk and Catherine B. Slavin, Philadelphia, PA, for plaintiff.

Michael W. McElroy, James Dartlin Meadows, William J. Holley, II, W. Seaborn Jones, Eve Anne Appelbaum, Atlanta, GA, for defendants.

ORDER

HULL, District Judge.

This action is before the Court on Defendant Heidelberg's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 14-1, and Defendant AM International's Motion for Protective Order 27-1.¹

I. Defendant Heidelberg's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Defendant Heidelberg brings this Motion seeking judgment on the pleadings as to Count One (strict liability) and Count Three (breach of warranty) of Plaintiff's Complaint. In considering Defendant Heidelberg's Motion, the Court must presume, for purposes of this motion, that all well-pleaded factual allegations of the Complaint are true and all contravening assertions in the movant's pleadings are false. See National Metropolitan Bank v. U.S., 323 U.S. 454, 65 S.Ct. 354, 89 L.Ed. 383 (1945); Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45, 51, 61 S.Ct. 418, 421, 85 L.Ed. 577 (1941); Cannon v. Clark, 6 A.D.D. 339, 1994 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 9770, *2 (S.D.Fla.1994); Mathis v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 786 F.Supp. 971, 973 (N.D.Ga.1991). The Court must grant a Motion for judgment on the pleadings where no material issue of fact exists, and when the movant demonstrates it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c); see also Atlanta Pulmonary Diagnostic Clinic v. Haynes, No. 93-1466, 1994 WL 258260, *2-3, 1994 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 2743, *6 (N.D.Ga. Jan. 21, 1994).

This action arises from injuries sustained by Plaintiff Mullins, while employed by Action Bindery, a corporation in Norcross, Georgia. Plaintiff was operating a Wohlenberg High-Speed Guillotine Model 150, Serial Number 11221 (the "Guillotine") papercutter, when the machine allegedly descended on Plaintiff's hand and cut off several of his fingers. Plaintiff alleges that the injuries caused by the machine were a result of faulty safety devices on the Guillotine.

Plaintiff sued several entities which had been in possession of this particular Guillotine since its manufacture. Plaintiff's action is founded on theories of recovery under strict liability, negligence, breach of warranty, and the wilful, wanton and reckless conduct of Defendants.

Defendant Heidelberg has filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Count One and Three of Plaintiff's Complaint 14-1. Count One alleges that Defendant Heidelberg is strictly liable in tort for Plaintiff's injuries, and Count Three alleges that Defendant Heidelberg breached its warranties of fitness and merchantability. Defendant Heidelberg contends that Plaintiff has not asserted factual allegations that, even if proven, would permit Plaintiff recovery under Georgia law.

Plaintiff Mullins responds (1) that New York, not Georgia, law applies to this case, and (2) that even if Georgia law does apply, Georgia law supports Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Heidelberg. First, the Court will address the choice of law question presented by Defendant Heidelberg's Motion.

A. Substantive Law of Georgia Applicable to Plaintiff's Claims Against Defendant Heidelberg

When considering a choice of law question, a federal court sitting in diversity is to apply the choice of law rules of the forum state, here Georgia. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941); Wammock v. Celotex Corp., 835 F.2d 818, 829 (11th Cir.1988); Harris v. City of Chattonoogo, 507 F.Supp. 374, 376 (N.D.Ga.1981). Under Georgia's choice of law rules, the substantive law to be applied in a tort case is governed by the doctrine of lex loci delicti, the law of the place of the wrong. Risdon Enterprises, Inc. v. Colemill Enterprises, Inc., 172 Ga. App. 902, 903, 324 S.E.2d 738 (1984).

In this case, Plaintiff was injured while at work in Norcross, Georgia. Defendant Heidelberg contends that, under Georgia law, the place of the wrong is where the injury was sustained and not where the last act causing the injury occurred. Numerous cases indicate that under Georgia law, the place of the wrong is where the injury is sustained, and not where the last tortious act causing the injury occurred. See Best Canvas Prod. & Supplies v. Ploof Truck Lines, 713 F.2d 618, 621 (11th Cir.1983) ("Georgia follows the traditional rule that in tort actions, the law of the place of the injury- or lex loci delicti- governs the resolution of the substantive issues"); Whitaker v. Harvel-Kilgore Corp., 418 F.2d 1010, 1017 (5th Cir. 1969) ("it is quite lucid that the Georgia conflicts of law rule is that the law of the place of injury governs in tort liability"); Orr v. Sasseman, 239 F.2d 182, 186 (5th Cir. 1956); Cash v. Armco Steel Corp., 462 F.Supp. 272, 274 (N.D.Ga.1978) (under Georgia choice of law rules, "the place of the wrong is the place where the injury was sustained"); Brooks v. Eastern Air Line, Inc., 253 F.Supp. 119, 121 (N.D.Ga.1966) (under Georgia choice of law rules, "the place of the wrong is the place where the injury was sustained"); see also Risdon Enterprises, Inc. v. Colemill Enterprises, Inc., 172 Ga. App. 902, 903, 324 S.E.2d 738 (1984) (applying the substantive law of the place of the injury); Wardell v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 133 Ga.app. 378, 210 S.E.2d 854 (1974) (where court applied substantive law of place injury occurred); Ohio Southern Express Co. v. Beeler, 110 Ga.App. 867, 868, 140 S.E.2d 235 (1965) (where court applied substantive law of place of injury).

Plaintiff Mullins argues that the doctrine of lex loci delicti is not rigidly applied by the Georgia courts, and does not encompass just the final injury, but should include a consideration of the actual tortious activity which preceded the injury. Therefore, argues Plaintiff, under Georgia's choice of law rules, the substantive law of New York should govern this case.

To support his contention, Plaintiff relies heavily on four cases: Best Canvas Products & Supplies, Inc. v. Ploof Truck Lines, 713 F.2d 618 (11th Cir.1983), Baltimore Football Club, Inc. v. Lockheed Corp., 525 F.Supp. 1206 (N.D.Ga.1981), Pittway Corp. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 641 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1981), and Karimi v. Crowley, 172 Ga.App. 761, 324 S.E.2d 583 (1984). In both Baltimore Football Club and Pittway,² the structural cracks in the airplane were discovered in one state, but the court was unable to determine where the cracks actually had occurred. See Pittway, 641 F.2d at 527 ("the location of the aircraft at the time the crack occurred is indeterminate"); Baltimore Football Club, 525 F.Supp. at 1208 ("the actual situs of the place of injury- i.e., the exact location of the airplane when the cracks occurred- is basically impossible to determine"). Because the place of the injury was indeterminable in these cases, the courts did not apply strictly Georgia's lex loci delicti doctrine. Nonetheless, in both Pittway and Baltimore Football Club, the courts acknowledged Georgia's general well established rule that the law of the place of the injury governs rather than the law of the place of the tortious acts allegedly causing the injury. However, since the place of the injury was indeterminable, the courts were unable to apply rigidly the lex loci delicti doctrine.

In Best Canvas Products, the plaintiff, Best Canvas Products & Supplies Inc. ("Besco"), sued defendant Ploof Truck Lines ("Ploof") for the balance of a shipment of tarpaulins Besco had sold to Ploof. Ploof counterclaimed alleging that the tarpaulins had not been waterproofed and as a result several shipments of wood transported by Ploof across the Southeast had been damaged. In reviewing the case, the Eleventh Circuit stated that "Georgia follows the traditional rule that in tort actions, the law of the place of the injury — or lex loci delicti — governs the resolution of the substantive issues." Best Canvas Products, 713 F.2d at 621 (citations omitted). In examining the facts, the Eleventh Circuit found that it was almost impossible to ascertain the place of injury because the water damage occurred during several interstate shipments over the course of six months. Since, the place of the injury was "indeterminate," the Eleventh Circuit did not strictly apply Georgia's lex loci delicti doctrine, but instead applied the law of the place of manufacture, which happened to be Georgia. Id. at 622.

In Best Canvas Products, Pittway, and Baltimore Football Club, the courts found the place of the injury to be indeterminate and therefore did not strictly apply Georgia's lex loci delicti doctrine. Unlike the above cases, the facts in this case do not present a scenario where the situs of the injury is impossible, or even difficult, to determine. Rather, Plaintiff's injury occurred here in Georgia. See Complaint 1-1, at ¶ 21. Under the doctrine of lex loci delicti, the law of the place of the wrong governs the liability of the tort-feasor, and the location of the last event necessary to make the tort-feasor liable is the place of the wrong. See Brooks v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 253 F.Supp. 119, 121 (N.D.Ga.1966) (Under Georgia law, "the place of the wrong is the place where the injury was sustained rather than where the acts were committed").

Plaintiff also directs the Court to Karimi v. Crowley, 172 Ga.App. 761, 324 S.E.2d 583 (1984), a Georgia Court of Appeals decision where the injury occurred in Alabama, yet the Georgia court did not follow the doctrine of lex loci delicti, but instead applied the law of the forum — Georgia law. In Karimi, the...