Dowis v. Mud Slingers, Inc.

• Decision Date: 24 October 2005
• Docket Number: No. S05G0336.,S05G0336.
• Parties: DOWIS et al. v. MUD SLINGERS, INC. et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

279 Ga. 808

621 S.E.2d 413

DOWIS et al. v. MUD SLINGERS, INC. et al.

No. S05G0336.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

October 24, 2005.

Ronald P. Jayson, Decatur, for Appellant.

Gregory T. Presmanes, Amy Rogers Perkins, Bovis, Kyle & Burch, LLC, Atlanta, for Appellee.

HINES, Justice.

This Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in Dowis v. Mud Slinger Concrete, 269 Ga.App. 805, 605 S.E.2d 615 (2004), to consider whether the conflict of laws rule lex loci delicti should be retained in Georgia. For the reasons which follow, this Court will not abandon the traditional rule.

Johnny Edwin Dowis ("Dowis"), a Tennessee resident, was hired by a Missouri corporation, Mud Slingers, Inc. ("Mud Slingers"), whose president is Michael Clement Graves ("Graves"), to hang large sheets of precast plaster molding at a national chain hotel in Roswell, Georgia. Dowis was injured at the Roswell project when he fell four stories from the basket of a telescopic boom forklift operated by Graves.

Mud Slingers had workers' compensation insurance in Missouri, where Dowis filed his claim and received benefits. Dowis later filed this tort action in Georgia seeking damages against Mud Slingers and Graves. Dowis argued that, under Missouri's workers' compensation law, he could collect benefits and bring a tort action against Mud Slingers and/or Graves. Applying the exclusive remedy provision of the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act, OCGA § 34-9-11 et seq., and the lex loci delicti rule regarding the applicable substantive law, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment, holding that lex loci delicti and the consequent application of Georgia's exclusive remedy provision precluded Dowis from maintaining his tort action in Georgia. In so doing, the Court of Appeals correctly noted that this Court has addressed the issue of the viability of the rule of lex loci delicti and has continued to apply it. Sargent Indus., Inc. v. Delta Air Lines, 251 Ga. 91, 303 S.E.2d 108 (1983); see also Mullins v. M.G.D. Graphics Systems Group, 867 F.Supp. 1578 (N.D.Ga.,1994).

There are several principle approaches to the resolution of conflict of laws issues in tort cases. 16 Am.Jur.2d Conflict of Laws § 124. The traditional approach, frequently referred to as the "vested rights" approach was set forth in the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws and established the rule of lex loci delicti.¹ See ATLA-TORT § 3:21. Under this traditional rule, a tort action is governed by the substantive law of the state where the tort was committed. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 266 Ga.App. 540, 541(n.4), 597 S.E.2d 430 (2004). Subsequently, due in part to an attempt to accommodate the increased mobility of the population and interstate and international commerce, other approaches emerged which were perceived to be less territorial. Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53, 57 (Tenn., 1992). These approaches have gained acceptance in deciding which state's substantive law should apply.² 16 Am.Jur.2d Conflict of Laws § 124. The first such approach is based upon a concept of "governmental interest."³ Id. This approach developed by Professor Brainerd Currie, involves an analysis of the respective interests of the involved states to determine the law that most appropriately applies to the issues in the case; controlling effect is given to the law of the jurisdiction which has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation, unless a public policy exception dictates a contrary result. 16 Am.Jur.2d Conflict of Laws § 129; See Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 Law and Contemporary Problems 754 (1963). Specifically, this theory mandates that a court first identify the specific law in each state bearing upon the legal issue in dispute, then determine the precise policies which the respective laws were designed to serve, and finally, that the court examine the relationship of each jurisdiction with the litigation and determine whether the application of a particular state's law would be consistent with the purposes identified as supportive of that law. Hataway v. McKinley, supra at 58, citing Gregory E. Smith, Choice of Law in the United States, 31 Hastings L.J. 1041, 1047 (1987); B. Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (1963).

Another approach is that of "choice-influencing considerations"⁴ espoused by Robert A. Leflar. Under this theory, five factors are examined: (1) predictability of result; (2) maintenance of the interstate and international order; (3) simplification of the judicial task; (4) advancement of the forum's governmental interest; and (5) application of the better rule of law. Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 267 (1966); Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 Cal. L.Rev. 1584 (1966).

A third alternative to the traditional doctrine is lex fori, which provides that the rights and liabilities of the parties are governed by the law of the forum.⁵ Hataway v. McKinley, supra at 58.

Finally, a majority of the states that have abandoned the rule of lex loci delicti have embraced the formulation expressed in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which calls for an assessment of which jurisdiction has the "most significant relationship"⁶ to the dispute, based upon several sets of factors. 16 Am.Jur.2d Conflict of Laws § 128. The appellants Dowis urge that Georgia join this group of states and adopt the "most significant relationship" test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, and thus, allow them under Missouri law to proceed with their Georgia lawsuit against Mud Slingers and Graves. But it is well-settled that Georgia will continue to adhere to a traditional conflict of laws rule until a better approach is found. Convergys Corp. v. Keener, 276 Ga. 808, 812, 582 S.E.2d 84 (2003); General Telephone Co. of the Southeast v. Trimm, 252 Ga. 95, 96, 311 S.E.2d 460 (1984). So the initial question becomes whether the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws is superior to the traditional rule utilized in Georgia.

The doctrine of lex loci delicti has served the resolution of conflict of laws issues in tort actions in this State for nearly 100 years. See Southern Railway Co. v. Decker, 5 Ga.App. 21, 62 S.E. 678 (1908). It is desirable to have stability and certainty in the law; therefore, stare decisis is a valid and compelling argument for maintaining the doctrine. Hall v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 625, 216 S.E.2d 839 (1975); see also In re J. M., 276 Ga. 88, 91, 575 S.E.2d 441 (2003) (Carley, J., concurring). Moreover, as appellants acknowledge, lex loci delicti has the virtues of consistency, predictability, and relative ease of application. See Fitts v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 581 So.2d 819 (Ala.,1991); Mills v. Quality Supplier Trucking, 203 W.Va. 621, 510 S.E.2d 280 (1998); Paul v. National Life, 177 W.Va. 427, 352 S.E.2d 550 (1986). Appellants and other opponents of the rule criticize its perceived rigidness and argue that its strict application is insufficient to address the complexities of modern litigation and can lead to unjust results, in that the results may be "unrelated to the contemporary interests of the states involved or the realistic expectations of the parties." First Nat. Bank in Fort Collins v. Rostek, 182 Colo. 437, 514 P.2d 314, 317 (1973). But such criticism ignores several salient facts. As appellees point out, some courts in other jurisdictions have been motivated to depart from the traditional rule in order to redress perceived unjust results by applying their own law. See e.g., Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967); Chambers v. Dakotah Charter, 488 N.W.2d 63 (S.D., 1992). In fact, the first departure by a sister state from the use of lex loci delicti accomplished the application of the law of that state. See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963). By contrast, appellants are asking this Court to abrogate its long-used conflict of laws rule in order to bypass Georgia law. Furthermore, the criticism glosses over the fact that the courts of this State have the power to ameliorate the sometimes seeming harshness of the rule when public policy considerations dictate that they do so. See Alexander v. General Motors Corp., 267 Ga. 339, 478 S.E.2d 123 (1996); Karimi v. Crowley, 172 Ga.App. 761, 324 S.E.2d 583 (1984).

Appellants also go so far as to assert that the rule of lex loci delicti is premised upon "absolute fortuity," in that the place of the incident giving rise to the litigation is an entirely fortuitous factor. But this ignores the reality that the place of an allegedly tortious act is not irrelevant to the conflict issue, in that a state has an interest in wrongs committed within its boundaries. The crux of the matter in regard to criticism of the traditional rule is the common underlying misconception that the resolution of a conflict of laws in complex litigation requires an equally complicated mechanism to do so.

The approach taken by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) certainly fits a description of complexity. It is expansive; it provides a multi-step procedure for making the determination of which state's law should prevail. Section 145 provides the general principle for determining the relevant contacts:

(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.

(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:

(a) the place where the injury occurred,

(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,

(c) the...