Mullins v. Weaver
| Decision Date | 17 April 1882 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3411. |
| Citation | 57 Tex. 5 |
| Parties | CHARLES MULLINS v. TILMAN WEAVER. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL from Lampasas. Tried below before the Hon. E. B. Turner.
Mullins brought this suit of trespass to try title against Weaver, January 9, 1873. The petition alleged that Weaver made the unlawful entry on January 1, 1873.
By an amended petition he alleged his possession of the land for more than three years under title and color of title, and for more than three years before September 3, 1858; that he had had fifteen years' peaceable possession before Weaver's entry, and during that time he had in good faith put lasting and valuable improvements upon the land.
Weaver answered by plea of “not guilty.”
The cause was tried without a jury, and judgment rendered for Weaver, from which Mullins took this appeal, and assigned several errors, only one of which was relied on by counsel, and that was the ruling of the court in excluding as evidence a deed under which he claimed, on account of alleged defects in the certificate of the officer of the acknowledgment of a married woman.
The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion.
C. C. McGennis, for appellant.
Terrell & Walker, for appellee.
Counsel for appellant insists upon but one question in this case. It is contended that the district court erred in excluding the deed of George W. Scott and his wife, Elizabeth Scott, to the appellant Charles Mullins, dated October 1, 1856. When this deed was offered in evidence the appellee objected to its introduction, on the ground that the acknowledgment of Mrs. Scott was not in due form for the conveyance of the wife's separate property. This objection was sustained by the court, and the deed excluded. The certificate of acknowledgment attached to the deed is as follows:
“STATE OF TEXAS, County of Lampasas.
Before me, the undersigned, clerk in and for said county, personally appeared G. W. Scott, to me known, and whose name appears to the within deed, and he, the said G. W. Scott, did acknowledge to me that he signed, sealed and delivered the same for all the uses and purposes therein contained and expressed; and also appeared E. L. Scott, wife of the said G. W. Scott, and whose name appears to the within and attached deed of conveyance, bearing date October 1, A. D. 1856, who, after having the deed aforesaid fully explained to her separate and apart from her husband, did acknowledge to me that she signed the same as her voluntary act and deed, for all the uses and purposes therein contained and expressed, and she wished not to retract the same.
In testimony whereof I hereunto set my hand and seal of office in the town of Lampasas, October 1, A. D. 1856.
W. B. COVINGTON, Cl'k C. C. L. C.”
The particular objection urged to this certificate of acknowledgment is the omission of the words “sealed and delivered” after the word “signed.” Art. 1003, Paschal's Digest, was the statute then in force, and used the term “willingly sign and seal the said writing,” whereas in the form therein prescribed the following term is used: “willingly signed, sealed and delivered the same.” And it is also provided that...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Kenley v. Robb
...who executed the instrument was the person whose act the deed or other instrument purports to be." The Supreme Court said, in Mullins v. Weaver, 57 Tex. 5: "The particular objection urged to this certificate of acknowledgment is the omission of the words `sealed and delivered' after the wor......