Multinational Life Ins. Co. v. Pedro M. Van Rhyn Solder (In re Pedro M. Van Rhyn Solder)
| Decision Date | 08 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 14-10211 BKT,Adversary No. 15-00181 BKT |
| Parties | IN RE: PEDRO M. VAN RHYN SOLDER Debtor MULTINATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY Plaintiff v. PEDRO M. VAN RHYN SOLDER Defendant |
| Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Before this Court is the Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment [Dkt. No. 51], filed by Multinational Life Insurance Company ("Plaintiff"), and the Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment [Dkt. No. 52], filed by Pedro M. Van Rhyn Solder ("Defendant"). For the reasons set forth below, the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment is DENIED.
On December 13, 2014, Defendant, Mr. Pedro M. Van Rhyn Soler, petitioned for relief under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. [Case No. 14-10211, Dkt. No. 1]. The first meeting of the creditors was set pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 341(a) for January 15, 2015. Any objections to discharge were to be filed by March 16, 2015. [Case No. 14-10211, Dkt. No. 5].
On March 3, 2015, the United States trustee filed his Motion for an Extension of Time to Object to Discharge [Case No. 14-10211, Dkt. No. 31], as there were continuing investigations into the Defendant's financial affairs and the financial review would not be finalized prior to the original deadline. On March 4, 2015, this Court granted the request for a ninety (90) day extension and set a new deadline for June 15, 2015. [Case No. 14-10211, Dkt. No. 32]. On July 16, 2015, Plaintiff filed the captioned complaint one month after the deadline. [Dkt. No. 1].
On August 4, 2015, Plaintiff filed its Motion for an Extension of Time to File Objection to Discharge pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4004(b)(2) [Case No. 14-10211, Dkt. No. 76]. On August 11, 2015, the Defendant filed an objection to Plaintiff's aforementioned request, [Case No. 14-10211, Dkt. No. 77], and filed a Motion to Dismiss this adversary proceeding [Dkt. No. 11]. On August 12, 2015, this Court ordered that Plaintiff's request for an extension pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4004(b)(2) and the Defendant's objection would be considered together with the Defendant's motion to dismiss. [Case No. 14-10211, Dkt. No. 78].
On March 10, 2016, this Court granted the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. No. 11] and held that the standard set forth under Rule 4004(b)(2) had not been met. [Dkt. No. 47]. Shortly thereafter, on March 24, 2016, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. [Dkt. No. 51].
Rule 9023 of the Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure provides in part as follows: "[a] motion for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment shall be filed, and a court may on its own order a new trial, no later than 14 days after entry of judgment." Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9023. Accordingly, the 28-day period to file a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 is reduced to 14 days, as per Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9023. Id. This 14-day time period is jurisdictional and may not be extended. 10 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 9023.07 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.). In fact, Rule 9006(b)(2) prohibits the enlargement of any of the time periods established by Rule 9023. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006.
The Plaintiff filed its Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment within fourteen (14) days of the entry of the order granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. No. 47]. Thus, Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) is applicable to this adversary proceeding. To succeed in a motion to alter or amend judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) the movant must demonstrate that there was either (1) a manifest error of law or fact, (2) that there was newly discovered information, (3) that the decision would lead to manifest injustice, (4) or that there was intervening change in controlling law. In re Vazquez, 471 B.R. 752, 757 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2012); Rosario-Mendez v. Hewlett Packard Caribe, 660 F. Supp. 2d 229, 233 (D.P.R. 2009)
The First Circuit Court of Appeals holds that "[a] motion for reconsideration does not provide a vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural failures and it certainly does not allow a party to introduce new evidence or advance new arguments that could or should have been presented to the district court prior to judgment." Marks 2-Zet-Ernst Marks GMBH & Co. KG v. Presstek, Inc., 455 F.2d 7, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2006). A motion for reconsideration must not be usedas a vehicle to re-litigate matters already litigated and decided by the court. See Standard Quimica de Venezuela v. Central Hispano Int'lnc., 989 F. Supp. 74 (D.P.R. 1997). Furthermore a motion for reconsideration is unavailable if said request simply brings a point of disagreement between the court and litigant, or re-argues theories already properly disposed of by the court. See, e.g. Wayne v. First Citizen's National Bank, 846 F. Supp. 310, 314 n. 3 (M.D.Pa 1994); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Holmes, 846 F. Supp. 1310, 1316 (S.D. Tex.1994). Rule 59(e) is not "intended to give an unhappy litigant one additional chance to sway the judge." Durkin v. Taylor, 444 F. Supp. 879, 889 (E.D.Va.1977). In essence, a motion for reconsideration must set forth the following: "(1) genuine reasons why the court should revisit the prior order; and (2) compelling facts or law in support of reversing the prior decision." In re Quesada, No. 13-02057 BKT, 2013 WL 5945801, at 1 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2013).
Plaintiff maintains in its Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment that the complaint filed on July 16, 2016, one month after the official deadline to object to a discharge, complies with Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4004(b)(2). It is the Plaintiff's belief that the court should have granted the extension of time. The court has previously made its determination regarding whether the complaint met the standard outlined in Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4004(b)(2), which would warrant an extension of time to file a motion objecting to discharge. The Plaintiff alleges that the court's decision contained manifest errors of law, and would result in manifest injustice. Additionally, the Plaintiff claims that newly discovered and previously unavailable evidence, as well as an intervening change of law, warrant reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
The Plaintiff claims: (1) the court did not address the allegations presented in the complaint; (2) that the motion to dismiss contains elements of a summary judgment; and (3) that the court erred in dismissing the complaint. Despite such claims, this Court finds that there was no manifest error of law.
A manifest error of law is "'[a]n error that is plain and indisputable, and that amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling law,'" and case facts. Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 195 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary p. 593 (7th ed. 1999)). It is important to reiterate, as stated above, that a motion for reconsideration must not be utilized to re-litigate matters already litigated and decided by the court. See Standard Quimica de Venezuela v. Central Hispano Int'lnc., 989 F. Supp. 74 (D.P.R. 1997). When seeking reconsideration of a court order, one cannot re-argue theories already properly disposed of by the court or present new arguments for the first time. Wayne v. First Citizen's National Bank, 846 F. Supp. 310, 314 n. 3 (M.D.Pa 1994).
The Plaintiff repeatedly states that the court did not address or contemplate the allegations of fraud and embezzlement presented in the complaint. However, the court did address the allegations, but found that Plaintiff did not present sufficient "facts to satisfy the standard 'that movant did not have knowledge of those facts in time to permit an objection'" [Dkt. No. 47]. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4004(b)(2) sates:
A motion to extend the time to object to discharge may be filed after the time for objection has expired and before discharge is granted if (A) the objection is based on facts that, if learned after the discharge, would provide a basis for revocation under § 727(d) of the Code, and (B) the movant did not have knowledge of those facts in time to permit an objection. The motion shall be filed promptly after themovant discovers the facts on which the objection is based.
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4004(b)(2). As previously determined by this Court, the Plaintiff failed to appropriately demonstrate that the alleged new facts were discovered during the gap period between the deadline to object to a discharge and the submission of the complaint on July 16, 2016. Without such facts the standard to fulfill 4004(b)(2) cannot be met. The Court has already determined the matter. The Plaintiff has not presented a clear error or disregard of law, but merely attempts to restate a previously disposed argument.
The Plaintiff additionally alleges that the motion to dismiss should have been treated as a motion for summary judgment, making dismissal inappropriate. This is the first time the Plaintiff brings forth this argument. New arguments that could have or should have been presented prior to judgment are not to be entertained under a Rule 59(e) motion. Soto-Padró v. Public Buildings Authority, 675 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012). Thus, this argument shall not be discussed further.
The motion for reconsideration extensively discusses the plausibility requirement applicable to a timely filed complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). "A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 663. Plaintiff asserts that its complaint was compliant with the plausibility requirement. In support it references Tirado Laureano v. Asociacion de Residentes Fuente Royal e Imperial, Inc., Opinion and Order Denying...
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