Multiple Injury Trust Fund v. Coburn

Citation386 P.3d 628,2016 OK 120
Decision Date06 December 2016
Docket Number115,153,115,154,115,155,115,152
Parties Multiple Injury Trust Fund, Petitioner, v. Willie A. Coburn and The Workers' Compensation Court of Existing Claims, Respondents. Multiple Injury Trust Fund, Petitioner, v. Billie H. Sturdivant and The Workers' Compensation Court of Existing Claims, Respondents. Multiple Injury Trust Fund, Petitioner, v. Charles E. Crosslin and The Workers' Compensation Court of Existing Claims, Respondents. Multiple Injury Trust Fund, Petitioner, v. Lymon Williams and The Workers' Compensation Court of Existing Claims, Respondents.
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma

Douglas B. Cubberley, Philip Redwine, Redwine and Cubberly, Norman, Oklahoma, for Petitioner.

Bob Burke, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and Richard A. Bell, Norman Oklahoma, for Respondents.

EDMONDSON, J.

¶ 1 The parties disagree on which statute controls the controversy. The Multiple Injury Trust Fund (Fund) argues 85 O.S.Supp.2005 § 30(D) controls the rights of the lawyers to an attorney's fee. The claimants' lawyers argue 85 O.S.Supp.2005 § 172 controls the rights of the lawyers to an attorney's fee, and the Workers' Compensation Court of Existing Claims agreed § 172 controlled the controversy. We agree with the Workers' Compensation Court of Existing Claims. We do not consolidate these four review proceedings, but treat them as companion cases and adjudicate them simultaneously by a single opinion.1

I. Jurisdiction

¶ 2 This Court has an affirmative duty to inquire into its jurisdiction in every matter before it.2 Jurisdictional issues concerning the Workers' Compensation Court of Existing Claims are reviewed de novo by this Court.3 Section 400 of Title 85A provides the Workers' Compensation Court of Existing Claims hears disputes relating to claims that arose before February 1, 2014, and all benefits and procedures to obtain benefits are determined by the workers' compensation law in effect on the date of the injury.4 However, § 400 in paragraph "J" provides an "appeal" from the Workers' Compensation Court of Existing Claims shall be heard by the Commission en banc , Executive department officials, before a party seeks review in this Court.5 The Workers' Compensation Court of Existing Claims is a court of record.6 The language in paragraph "J" does not apply to these proceedings, as we now explain.

¶ 3 When a strict, literal interpretation of the statute would lead to inconsistent or incongruent results between the enactment's different parts, judicial interpretation becomes necessary to reconcile the discord.7 In Carlock v. Workers' Compensation Commission , this Court explained: "All aspects of the adjudication of claims for injuries occurring prior to February 1, 2014, are governed by the law in effect at the time of the injury, ... including the rights of the parties to seek review of an order or award (1) before a three-judge panel of the Court of Existing Claims, as successor to the Workers' Compensation Court, ... (2) before the Supreme Court, either directly from an order or award of a trial judge, or after review by a three-judge panel ...."8

¶ 4 Our conclusion was based upon additional language in § 400, an opinion of this Court explaining substantive rights are fixed on the date of injury and may not be altered by subsequent amendment, and a provision of the Oklahoma Constitution.9 We construe our statutes and constitution as a consistent whole in harmony with common sense and reason,10 and we concluded in Carlock a person aggrieved by a decision of the Workers' Compensation Court of Existing Claims may seek review before a three-judge panel of that court and a petition for review filed in this Court as provided by law prior to February 1, 2014. The review of the three judge panel is statutorily limited to the records made before the trial judge, and the panel's orders must be based upon an examination of those trial court records.11

¶ 5 We hold this Court has jurisdiction to review a decision of the Workers' Compensation Court of Existing Claims when a party aggrieved by that decision has filed a timely petition for review in this Court in accordance with the law in effect prior to February 1, 2014.12 The petitions for review filed in these four cases were timely and in compliance with the law in effect prior to February 1, 2014. This Court has jurisdiction to hear these review proceedings.

II. No. 115,152Willie A. Coburn

¶ 6 The Workers' Compensation Court issued an order in January 2009. The order stated in part:

THAT due to the claimant's most recent injury ... [he] is due compensation at the rate of $289.00 per week from the date of this order and continuing for a period of fifteen years or until the claimant ... reaches the age of 65 years, whichever shall come later....

The order directed the Fund to pay this compensation to the claimant less the amount of the attorney's fee which it directed payment by the following method.

That payment of every 5th weekly check is a reasonable attorney fee not exceeding the maximum amount allowed by statute and same is hereby vested at the time this Order becomes final. Claimant's attorney, Nicole Bell, shall receive said vested attorney fee at the periodic method and rate of every 5th weekly payment of $289.00 made under this Order to the claimant until said attorney fee is satisfied.

Claimant died in February 2013. Payments to claimant's lawyer were made pursuant to this order through May 2015, and then in June 2015 the Fund tendered a check to the lawyer in the amount of $4,046 representing payments for an additional fourteen weeks. The Fund argued that it had paid claimant's lawyer an amount equaling eighty (80) weekly payments and need not make further payments pursuant to application of 85 O.S.Supp.2005 § 30(D).

¶ 7 The trial judge, Honorable, Owen T. Evans, Judge, directed the Fund to pay additional attorney's fees. The court determined the fee awarded in 2009 amounted to $45,084, and payable every fifth week at the rate of $289.00 until paid pursuant to 85 O.S. § 172(H). The court gave credit for amounts previously paid to the lawyer. The Fund sought review of this order before a three-judge panel of the Workers' Compensation Court of Existing Claims. The panel determined the order of the trial judge "was not against the clear weight of the evidence nor contrary to law," and affirmed the trial judge's order.

III. No. 115,153Billie H. Sturdivant

¶ 8 The Workers' Compensation Court issued an order in September 2008. The order awarded an attorney's fee to Richard Bell, and approximately one week later issued an order nunc pro tunc requiring the payment of a fee by every fifth weekly check: "That payment of every 5th weekly check is a reasonable attorney fee not exceeding the maximum amount allowed by statute and the same is hereby vested at the time this order becomes final."

¶ 9 Claimant died in July 2012. The Fund had paid $11,560 of the attorney's fee award and continued to make payments until June 2015. The Fund tendered a check to Bell in amount of $2,890 to satisfy 85 O.S. § 30(D), and Bell returned this check to the Fund.

¶ 10 In December, 2015, the Honorable, Owen T. Evans, Judge, determined the amount of the fee awarded in 2009 was $45,084 payable every fifth week at the rate of $289.00 per week pursuant to 85 O.S. § 172(H). The court gave credit for amounts previously paid to the lawyer pursuant to the 2009 order. The Fund sought review of this order before a three-judge panel of the Workers' Compensation Court of Existing Claims. The panel determined the order of the trial judge "was not against the clear weight of the evidence nor contrary to law," and affirmed the trial judge's order. The Fund sought review in this Court.

IV. No. 115,154Charles E. Crosslin

¶ 11 The Workers' Compensation Court issued an order in December 2008. The order awarded an attorney's fee to Richard Bell. The order stated: "Payment of every 5th weekly check is a reasonable attorney fee not exceeding the maximum amount allowed by statute and the same is hereby vested at the time this order becomes final."

¶ 12 Claimant died in November 2013. The Fund had paid $15,028 (52 weeks) of the attorney's fee award and continued to make payments until May 2015. The Fund tendered a check to Bell in amount of $3,757 (13 additional weeks) to satisfy 85 O.S. § 30(D), and Bell returned this check to the Fund. The Fund paid $23,120 to Bell for the attorney's fee award. The Fund argues this represents eighty (80) weekly payments in accord with 85 O.S. § 30(D).

¶ 13 In December, 2015, the Honorable, Owen T. Evans, Judge, determined the amount of the fee awarded in 2008 was $45,084 payable every fifth week at the rate of $289.00 per week pursuant to 85 O.S. § 172(H). The court gave credit for amounts previously paid to the lawyer pursuant to the 2009 order. The Fund sought review of this order before a three-judge panel of the Workers' Compensation Court of Existing Claims. The panel determined the order of the trial judge "was not against the clear weight of the evidence nor contrary to law," and affirmed the trial judge's order.

V. No. 115,155Lymon Williams

¶ 14 The Workers' Compensation Court issued an order in March 2009. The order awarded an attorney's fee to Richard Bell. The order stated: "Payment of every 5th weekly check is a reasonable attorney fee not exceeding the maximum amount allowed by statute and the same is hereby vested at the time this order becomes final."

¶ 15 Claimant died in December 2013, and the Fund continued to make the attorney's fee payments until May 2015. The Fund tendered a check to Bell in amount of $4,335 (15 additional weeks) to satisfy 85 O.S. § 30(D), and Bell returned this check to the Fund. The Fund argues the amounts it paid and tendered to Bell represent eighty (80) weekly payments in accord with 85 O.S. § 30(D).

¶ 16 In December, 2015, the Honorable, Owen T. Evans, Judge, determined the amount of the fee awarded in 2009 was $47,453 payable every fifth week at...

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