Mumford v. Zieba

• Decision Date: 01 September 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-3430,92-3430
• Citation: 4 F.3d 429
• Parties: David M. MUMFORD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph ZIEBA, Judge, in his official and individual capacities; Lorain County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 429

4 F.3d 429

David M. MUMFORD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph ZIEBA, Judge, in his official and individual capacities; Lorain County Common Pleas Court Domestic Relations Division Defendants-Appellants.

No. 92-3430.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued March 23, 1993.

Decided Sept. 1, 1993.

Dennis J. Niermann (argued and briefed), Edward G. Kramer, Kramer & Tobocman, Cleveland, OH, for plaintiff-appellee.

John A. Fiocca, Jr. (briefed), Robert S. Dizenhuz, Lane, Alton & Horst, Columbus, OH, M. Robert Flanagan (argued and briefed), Office of the Pros. Atty., Elyria, OH, for defendants-appellants.

Mary Lee Leahy (briefed), Leahy Law Offices, Springfield, IL, for Nat. Employment Lawyers Assn. Amicus Curiae.

Before: NORRIS and SILER, Circuit Judges; and KRUPANSKY, Senior Circuit Judge.

KRUPANSKY, Senior Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellee, David Mumford (Mumford-plaintiff) filed a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action against the defendants, Judge Joseph Zieba (Zieba-defendant) and the Lorain County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division (Domestic Relations Court) charging that the defendants violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by not reappointing him to the position of chief referee of the Domestic Relations Court. The district court denied summary judgment for Judge Zieba concluding that material issues of fact existed concerning Judge Zieba's immunity from suit. 788 F.Supp. 987. The defendants filed the instant interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity.

Plaintiff served as a referee ¹ in the Domestic Relations Court from 1984 to January 2, 1989. ² In 1988, Mumford, a registered Democrat, assisted in the campaign to re-elect Democratic incumbent Judge Henry T. Webber (Webber), who ran against the Republican defendant Zieba in a non-partisan election for judge of the Domestic Relations Court. During the campaign, Judge Zieba advised Mumford, "don't get caught in the cross-fire." Subsequently, Zieba observed Mumford distributing campaign literature for Judge Webber in early November of 1988. Judge Zieba defeated Judge Webber in the November, 1988 election as Domestic Relations Court judge. His six-year term commenced on January 3, 1989. Beginning January 4, 1989, a second judge for the Domestic Relations Court began serving a six-year term. Oh.Rev.Code Ann. Sec. 2301.02(C). ³

On December 22, 1988, Judge Zieba notified Mumford by letter that his position as referee would terminate on January 3, 1989, when Judge Zieba assumed his office. Judge Zieba subsequently appointed two part-time referees, both Republicans, to hear domestic matters. ⁴

On December 17, 1990, plaintiff initiated this action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against defendant Zieba in his individual and official capacities and against the Domestic Relations Court seeking monetary damages, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. ⁵ Mumford charged that the defendants violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by refusing to reappoint him to the position of chief referee of the Domestic Relations Court on January 3, 1989. Specifically, plaintiff asserted that he was not reappointed by Judge Zieba because he supported Zieba's opponent, Judge Webber, during the judicial election campaign.

On August 30, 1990, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Mumford was not entitled to First and Fourteenth Amendment protection from patronage dismissal because political affiliation was an appropriate requirement for his position as chief referee. Moreover, Judge Zieba argued that he was protected from personal liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established on January 3, 1989 that a chief referee of a domestic relations court could not be discharged for reasons anchored in political patronage.

On January 28, 1991, defendant Domestic Relations Court filed a separate motion to dismiss asserting that the Lorain County Common Pleas Court was not a legal entity which may be sued under Sec. 1983. The district court denied the motion to dismiss in a marginal order dated May 10, 1991.

Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on August 30, 1991, charging that the evidence proved that he was discharged because of his political affiliations and that he was entitled to First and Fourteenth Amendment protection as a matter of law. Subsequently, both parties filed memoranda in opposition to the opposing motions for summary judgment, and the defendants then filed a reply brief support of their motion for summary judgment.

In its memorandum opinion filed March 31, 1992, the district court concluded that material issues of fact precluded summary judgment in favor of Judge Zieba on the issue of qualified immunity. The court first determined that the law was clearly established in 1989 that the position of court referee was protected by the First Amendment pursuant to the dictates of Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980) and Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). It further concluded that the question of political affiliation as a requirement for the effective performance of a particular position was an issue of fact, not law, which "relates to the objective reasonableness of Judge Zieba's dismissal of Mumford, and not to the question whether the law was clearly established." After examining the inherent duties of the position of a referee and the duties the incumbent performed, the court concluded that political party affiliation was not an appropriate requisite for serving as a Domestic Relations Court referee. It observed that the position of referee did not enjoy the policymaking or confidential status of a judge's bailiff, law clerk or private secretary. ⁶ It further determined that, in light of existing legal precedent, Judge Zieba could not have reasonably believed that political affiliation was an appropriate requirement for the office of referee of the Domestic Relations Court. Moreover, the court concluded that conflicting evidence existed concerning Zieba's political motivation for refusing to reappoint Mumford to his previous duties. Accordingly, the court decided that "material issues of fact precluded summary judgment for Judge Zieba on the issue of qualified immunity." ⁷

The defendants filed this interlocutory appeal which was limited to the single issue of Judge Zieba's qualified immunity. Since application of the doctrine of qualified immunity to a particular defendant is a question of law, this court reviews de novo the district court's disposition. Long v. Norris, 929 F.2d 1111, 1113 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Jones v. Long, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 187, 116 L.Ed.2d 148 (1991).

It is undisputed that a judicial officer performing administrative acts, like any governmental official, may assert the defense of qualified immunity. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988). Governmental officials who perform discretionary functions generally are shielded from personal liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights known to a reasonable person. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). "Using a fact-specific approach, the standard to be applied in resolving the 'clearly established law' predicate within the Harlow touchstone of 'objective reasonableness' is defined in Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 89 L.Ed.2d 271, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986): 'if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized.' " Cagle v. Gilley, 957 F.2d 1347, 1348 (6th Cir.1992).

Thus, the issue of confrontation in this appellate review is not whether Judge Zieba actually violated Mumford's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights--an issue of fact implicating the merits of plaintiff's claim and reserved for the trier of fact. Rather, the issue is whether plaintiff's rights were so clearly apparent when he was terminated that Judge Zieba should have understood that his conduct at the time he refused to reappoint the plaintiff as a chief referee of the Domestic Relations Court violated Mumford's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights--a purely legal question for the trial judge to determine prior to trial. ⁸ Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Guercio v. Brody, 911 F.2d 1179, 1183 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1681, 114 L.Ed.2d 76 (1991); Garvie v. Jackson, 845 F.2d 647, 649 (6th Cir.1988); Ramirez v. Webb, 835 F.2d 1153, 1156 (6th Cir.1987).

In this circuit, a finding of a clearly established constitutional right must generally be supported by precedent from the Supreme Court or this circuit, or in the alternative, by decisions from other circuits. Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Seiter, 858 F.2d 1171, 1177 (6th Cir.1988). "Although decisions of other courts can clearly establish the law, such decisions must both point unmistakably to the unconstitutionality of the conduct and be so clearly foreshadowed by applicable direct authority as to leave no doubt in the mind of a reasonable officer that his conduct was unconstitutional." Cagle, 957 F.2d at 1328.

In the instant action, the plaintiff and trial court relied solely on the Supreme Court decisions of Elrod and Branti to sustain their positions that existing precedent clearly established that a chief referee in a domestic relations court could not be denied reappointment to a vacant office for political reasons. Judge Zieba responded by asserting that at the time of Mumford's dismissal in early 1989, the law had not developed to notify a person of reasonable competence confronting similar circumstances that Judge Zieba's actions violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of a...