Mundy v. City of Pittsburgh

• Decision Date: 08 June 2022
• Docket Number: 2:22-cv-31
• Parties: SHARON MUNDY, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PITTSBURGH, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

SHARON MUNDY, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PITTSBURGH, Defendant.

No. 2:22-cv-31

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

June 8, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MARILYN J. MORATY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Sharon Mundy, filed suit against Defendant, City of Pittsburgh, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 4, at 2). Presently, before the Court, is the City's Motion to Dismiss Ms. Mundy's Complaint. (ECF No. 8). The Motion to Dismiss has been fully briefed and is now ripe for decision. For the reasons that follow, the City's Motion to Dismiss will be granted.

I. Facts

Ms. Mundy was an employee of the City's Department of Public Works since June 2008. (ECF No. 4, H 8-9). Ms. Mundy worked in the traffic division and the Department of Public Works' graffiti removal program. (ECF No. 4, ¶¶ 10-11). Ms. Mundy is a member of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), Local 2037, which represents workers in the City's Department of Public Works. (ECF No. 4, at | 12; ECF No. 9, at 3 n. 1).

The Complaint alleges that Ms. Mundy filed “many” requests for reasonable accommodations to enforce the “no smoking policy and mask protection due to her asthma issues.” (ECF No. 4, | 13). The Complaint further alleges that due to the City's failure to provide a reasonable accommodation for her asthma, her “respiratory injury increased, ” and she began “taking FMLA leave and utilizing other vacation days to accommodate her asthma illness.” (ECF No. 4, | 14). The Complaint alleges that Ms. Mundy was reprimanded by a verbal warning for calling off work. (ECF No. 4, | 15).

Ms. Mundy's FMLA leave was set to expire on June 23, 2020. (ECF No. 4, | 18). The City gave Ms. Mundy a deadline of July 9, 2020 to return to work. (ECF No. 4, | 18). The Complaint alleges that Ms. Mundy broke her toe before July 9, 2020 and received a work restriction letter from an urgent care physician stating that she could not return to full duty until July 13, 2020. (ECF No. 4, | 19). The Complaint alleges that the City did not consider Ms. Mundy's letter from her doctor and that she was suspended “for five days pending termination.” (ECF No. 4, ¶¶ 18-20).

According to the September 29, 2020 letter from Janet Manuel, the Director of Human Resources for the City, to Philip Ameris, Jr., the Union representative, Ms. Mundy was suspended on July 10, 2020. (ECF No. 4-2, at 4). According to the letter, “Ms. Mundy was terminated for absenteeism, being AWOL and failure to report these absences to The Standard, a contracted City provider, where she had an open and approved intermittent FMLA leave account. And by her own admission she was aware of her FMLA leave account.” (ECF No. 4-2, at 2). The letter further states that the Department of Public Works Director, Michael Gable, offered Ms. Mundy a chance to return to work on August 4, 2020, subject to a number of probationary conditions, including that she sign a Last Chance Agreement. (ECF No. 4-2, at 3). The letter describes that Ms. Mundy specifically rejected a provision of the Last Chance Agreement that she could not test positive for marijuana, or she would face immediate five-day suspension pending termination. (ECF No. 4-2, at 3-4). The letter continues to explain that Ms. Mundy “rejected this LCA condition because she says she does not have a drug or alcohol problem, just chronic asthma and a concern about cigarette smoke at work.” (ECF No. 4-2, at 3). Ms. Mundy refused to sign the Last Chance Agreement, and Mr. Gable terminated her employment with the City on August 10, 2020. (ECF No. 4-2, at 3). The letter further describes that on August 28, 2020, Assistant Department of Public Works Director, Marcelle Newman, denied Ms. Mundy's grievance at Step II after offering Ms. Mundy the same Last Chance Agreement Terms for her to return to work. (ECF No. 4-2, at 3). The letter further describes that Ms. Mundy, the City, and the Union had a Step III phone conference, where Ms. Mundy indicated that she would consider signing the Last Chance Agreement. (ECF No. 4-2, at 3). The Complaint alleges, and the exhibits attached to the Complaint support, that pursuant to subsequent negotiations between the City, Union and Ms. Mundy, Ms. Mundy agreed upon acceptable terms for a Last Chance Agreement. (ECF No. 4, | 21, Exhibit A). Following execution of the Last Chance Agreement, Ms. Mundy was reinstated and returned to work. (See ECF No. 9, at 6-7; ECF No. 4-4, at 2).

The Last Chance Agreement included a provision that if Ms. Mundy tested positive for marijuana, she would be immediately terminated. (ECF No. 4, Exhibits A & C). The Last Chance Agreement also contained a provision whereby Ms. Mundy waived her right to “appeal or grieve any of this discipline any further in any forum.”^[1] (ECF No. 4-2, at 4 & 6; ECF No. 4-4, at 2).

After signing the Last Chance Agreement and returning to work, Ms. Mundy later tested positive for marijuana, and the City terminated her employment on November 5, 2020. (ECF No. 4, at ¶¶ 21, 38, Exhibits A & C). A second letter was attached to Ms. Mundy's Complaint, which was addressed to Ms. Mundy from Mr. Gable, and was dated November 5, 2020. (ECF No. 4-4, at 2). This letter explains that Ms. Mundy was suspended without pay for five workdays, from October 29, 2020 through November 4, 2020. (ECF No. 4-4, at 2). The letter continues to explain that Ms. Mundy had until the end of the business on November 4, 2020 to “satisfactorily respond to these charges or be discharged.” (ECF No. 4-4, at 2). The letter further explains that rather than responding to Mr. Gable, as required by the City's notice, Ms. Mundy responded to her Union Representative. (ECF No. 4-4, at 2). Nevertheless, the letter states that, even if Ms. Mundy had followed the proper procedures and responded to Mr. Gable rather than her Union Representative, that she still would be discharged from her employment with the City because she tested positive for marijuana, which was prohibited by the Last Chance Agreement. (ECF No. 4-4, at 2). The letter explains that Ms. Mundy was discharged from employment with the City as of November 5, 2020, pursuant to the marijuana provision in her Last Chance Agreement. (ECF No. 4-4, at 2).

II. Standard of Review

When reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Eid v. Thompson, 740 F.3d 118, 122 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Supreme Court clarified that this plausibility standard should not be conflated with a higher probability standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Factual allegations of a complaint must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

A pleading party need not establish the elements of a prima facie case at this stage; the party must only “put forth allegations that ‘raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s].'” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Graff v. Subbiah Cardiology Assocs., Ltd., 2008 WL 2312671 (W.D. Pa. June 4, 2008)); see also Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 790 (3d Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, a court need not credit bald assertions, unwarranted inferences, or legal conclusions cast in the form of factual averments. Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 n.8 (3d Cir. 1997). The primary question in deciding a motion to dismiss is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but rather whether he or she is entitled to offer evidence to establish the facts alleged in the complaint. Maio v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir. 2000). The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to “streamline[] litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and factfinding.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989).

Furthermore, “in evaluating a motion to dismiss, courts are not limited to the complaint, but may also consider evidence integral to or explicitly relied upon therein.” Tanksley v. Daniels, 902 F.3d 165, 172 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotations omitted). “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

When a court grants a motion to dismiss, the court “must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Great W. Mining &amp Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 174 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted)....