Municipal Elec. Auth. v. Gold-Arrow Farms
| Decision Date | 29 November 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. A05A1401.,No. A05A1402.,No. A05A1400.,A05A1400.,A05A1401.,A05A1402. |
| Citation | 625 S.E.2d 57,276 Ga. App. 862 |
| Parties | MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA et al. v. GOLD-ARROW FARMS, INC. et al. Georgia Power Company v. Gold-Arrow Farms, Inc. et al. Interstate Fibernet, Inc. v. Gold-Arrow Farms, Inc. et al. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Alston & Bird, Peter M. Degnan, David M. Meezan, King & Spalding, Nolan C. Leake, John S. Darden, Atlanta, Troutman Sanders, Daniel S. Reinhard, Scott A. Farrow, Michael E. Johnson, Thomas E. Reilly, Floyd & Lambert, George C. Floyd, Bainbridge, McNatt & Greene, Hugh B. McNatt, Atlanta, Friend, Hudak & Harris, William D. Friend, Charles A. Hudak, Bouhan, Williams & Levy, Roy E. Paul, Leamon R. Holliday III, Savannah, for appellants.
Kirbo & Kendrick, Bruce W. Kirbo, Jr., David A. Kendrick, Bainbridge, for appellees.
Minor, Bell & Neal, Charles J. Bethel, Mark M. Middleton, amici curiae.
These appeals concern whether express easements originally granted to Georgia Power Company (GPC) to construct and operate "electric transmission, distribution and communication lines" not only permit the electric transmission and distribution lines constructed across the easements, but also permit a fiber optic communication line constructed across the easements and used for the purpose of general telecommunications. The owners of land traversed by the easements, Gold-Arrow Farms, Inc., Sugar Plum Properties Associates, Ltd., A.E. Hester, and Jerry L. Jones (the plaintiffs), filed an action against GPC, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia (MEAG), Georgia Public Web, Inc. (GPW), and Interstate Fibernet, Inc. (IFN) (the defendants). GPC and MEAG are the electric power companies which currently own the easements. IFN contracted with GPC to construct, operate, and share a fiber optic communication line across the GPC-owned easements, and GPW contracted with MEAG to lease a fiber optic communication line constructed by MEAG across the easements currently owned by MEAG. Under the contracts, IFN and GPW offered telecommunications services by selling, leasing, or licensing communication capacity in the fiber optic line to third-party telecommunication companies for the purpose of transmitting general telecommunications. The plaintiffs concede that the easements permit the fiber optic line to the extent it is used for the purpose of transmitting internal communications by GPC and MEAG necessary for operation of their electric transmission and distribution lines. But the plaintiffs allege that the defendants exceeded the scope of the easements when communication capacity in the fiber optic line in excess of that used internally by GPC and MEAG was either used, or was sold, leased or licensed to telecommunication companies, for the purpose of general telecommunications. In addition to seeking class action certification to represent similarly situated landowners, the plaintiffs seek the award of actual and punitive damages based on claims for trespass on the easements, breach of the easement agreements, malicious interference with the easements, unjust enrichment, estoppel, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The plaintiffs also seek injunctive and declaratory relief.
The plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on the declaratory relief sought in count six of their amended complaint in which they asked the trial court to declare that the easements limit use of the fiber optic line to internal communications by GPC and MEAG related to their transmission and distribution of electricity, and that use of the line for general telecommunications, or the sale, lease or license of the line to others for general telecommunications, exceeds the scope of the easements. The defendants responded and filed cross-motions for summary judgment on all of the plaintiffs' claims contending that use of, or sale, lease or license of the fiber optic line for the purpose of general telecommunications is within the scope of the easements. The trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and denied the defendants' cross-motions for summary judgment. In the three appeals consolidated for this opinion, all the defendants (MEAG and GPW in Case No. A05A1400; GPC in Case No. A05A1401, and IFN in Case No. A05A1402) claim that the trial court erred by granting partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs and by denying their cross-motions for summary judgment.
GPC originally acquired the eight easements at issue by express grant from the plaintiffs or their predecessors in title. The easements were conveyed by virtually identical form instruments dating from 1953 to 1981, which granted GPC and its successors and assigns easements to construct and operate "electric transmission, distribution and communication lines..." Pursuant to the rights granted in the easements, GPC and MEAG (which currently owns three of the easements) constructed and operate electric transmission and distribution lines suspended overhead on a system of towers, poles, lines, and other structures spanning across the easements. The fiber optic communication line was subsequently placed across the easements by GPC, IFN, and MEAG in the mid to late 1990s. To accomplish this, the fiber optic line was placed inside the existing static wire which was part of and ran across the top of the electric transmission and distribution system. The line consists of a bundle of hair-thin optical glass fibers, each fiber having the capacity to communicate large amounts of information by transmitting audio, video, or data signals along the length of the fiber in the form of light pulses. Because of the large communication capacity in the fiber optic line, it serves a dual communication purpose: a small part of the communication capacity in the line provides GPC and MEAG with internal communications necessary for the operation of their electric transmission and distribution systems, and the remaining communication capacity in excess of that used internally by GPC and MEAG is sold, leased or licensed under the agreements with IFN and GPW for the purpose of general telecommunications.
The parties and the trial court agreed, and we concur, that the language in the easements granting the right to construct "electric transmission, distribution and communication lines..." grants the right to construct electric transmission lines, electric distribution lines, and electric communication lines. Accordingly, the meaning of the grant to construct "electric communication lines" across the easements was the central issue before the trial court on summary judgment. In moving for partial summary judgment, the plaintiffs argued that, in a definitional sense, a fiber optic communication line cannot be an electric communication line because a fiber optic line uses glass fibers to transmit light pulses and the glass does not conduct electricity. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs argued that, in another sense, a fiber optic communication line qualifies as an electric communication line under the easement if it is used only for internal communications by GPC and MEAG related to their operation of the electric transmission and distribution system. Based on these arguments, the plaintiffs contended that, to the extent the fiber optic communication line is used for purposes of general telecommunications unrelated to the electric system, it is not an electric communication line and it exceeds the scope of the easements. The plaintiffs argued that the language of the easements unambiguously supports their contentions, but if the trial court found the easements were ambiguous, that the court should resolve the ambiguity in their favor by considering matters outside the easements showing that, when the easements were granted to GPC, there was no intent to grant a general telecommunication easement because GPC was in the electric power business, not the general telecommunication business.
In opposition to these arguments, the defendants contended that, by granting the right to construct electric communication lines, the easements unambiguously granted, without limitation, the right to construct lines over which communications are transmitted by electricity, for example, a telephone line. The defendants further contended that, because the easements were unambiguous, matters outside the easements could not be used to explain their meaning. The defendants argued that the fiber optic communication line was an advance in communication technology over an electric communication line with no change in the physical use of the easements or additional burden on the servient estates. Accordingly, the defendants contended that, whether used for general telecommunications or for internal communications, use of the fiber optic communication line instead of an electric communication line is merely a change in the manner or degree of the granted use to accommodate a new technology and is within the scope of the easements. Finally, the defendants contended that, as exclusive easements in gross, the easements were divisible, and that the sale, lease, or license of communication capacity in the fiber optic line to third-party telecommunication companies was done within the scope of the easements and without imposing any unreasonable burden on the servient estates.
The trial court agreed with the defendants to the extent it found that a fiber optic communication line was the technologically advanced equivalent of an electric communication line within the meaning of the easements. However, after finding that the easements permitted the construction of a fiber optic communication line in the place of an electric communication line, the trial court considered whether the easements permitted use of the line for general telecommunications and concluded that "the meaning of the easements on this point cannot be...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Properties v. Nichols
...the language of an express easement, we apply the rules of contract construction. See Municipal Elec. Auth. of Ga. v. Gold-Arrow Farms, Inc., 276 Ga.App. 862, 866(1), 625 S.E.2d 57 (2005). The cardinal rule of contract construction is to ascertain the parties' intent, and “[w]here the contr......
-
Pottayil v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corp.
...561 (1983) ), and the goal of contract construction is to ascertain the intent of the parties. See Municipal Elec. Auth. of Ga. v. Gold–Arrow Farms, 276 Ga.App. 862, 625 S.E.2d 57 (2005). "To determine the intent of the parties, all the contract terms must be considered together in arriving......
-
Mattson v. Montana Power Co.
...v. Heublein, 246 Conn. 815, 717 A.2d 1232, 1240-41 (1998) (citing § 4.10 as persuasive authority); Municipal Electric Auth. v. Gold-Arrow Farms, 276 Ga.App. 862, 625 S.E.2d 57, 63 (2005) (applying § 4.10); Anne Arundel County v. Litz, 45 Md.App. 186, 412 A.2d 1256, 1260 (1980) ("`An easemen......
-
Flynt v. Life of the South Ins. Co.
...and the cardinal rule of contract construction is to determine the intent of the parties. See Municipal Elec. Auth. of Ga. v. Gold–Arrow Farms, 276 Ga.App. 862, 866(1), 625 S.E.2d 57 (2005). “To determine the intent of the parties, all the contract terms must be considered together in arriv......
-
Zoning and Land Use Law - Dennis J. Webb, Jr., Marcia Mccrory Ernst, Victor A. Ellis, Amitabha Bose, and Joseph L. Cooley
...64. 212 Ga. 310, 92 S.E.2d 1 (1956). 65. Meadow Trace, 280 Ga. at 722, 631 S.E.2d at 361-62. 66. Id. at 722-23, 631 S.E.2d at 362. 67. 276 Ga. App. 862, 625 S.E.2d 57 (2005). 68. Id. at 862, 872, 625 S.E.2d at 58, 65. 69. Id. at 862-63, 625 S.E.2d at 58-59. 70. Id. at 864, 625 S.E.2d at 60.......