Munn v. People of State

• Decision Date: 30 September 1873
• Citation: 69 Ill. 80,1873 WL 8416
• Parties: IRA Y. MUNN et al.v.THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

69 Ill. 80

1873 WL 8416 (Ill.)

IRA Y. MUNN et al.

v.THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1873.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

WRIT OF ERROR to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. WILLIAM W. FARWELL, Judge, presiding.

This was a proceeding by information, filed by the State's Attorney, on behalf of the people, against Ira Y. Munn and George L. Scott, for a violation of the 2d, 3d, 4th and 5th sections of what is commonly called “the Warehouse Law,” approved April 25, 1871.

The information, after the caption, is as follows:

“Now, on this day, comes into open court, in his own proper person, Charles H. Reed, State's Attorney in and for said county, in the name and by the authority of the people of the said State of Illinois, and prosecutes in this behalf, for and on behalf of said people, and informs said court that Ira Y. Munn and George L. Scott, on the 28th day of June, A. D. 1872, at and within the city of Chicago, in said county of Cook, in the State of Illinois aforesaid, were the managers of a certain public warehouse located in said city of Chicago, known as ‘The Northwestern Elevator,’ and that the said Ira Y. Munn and George L. Scott did then and there store grain in bulk in said warehouse, and did then and there mix the grain of different owners together in said warehouse, and that the said city of Chicago did then and there contain more than 100,000 inhabitants, and that they, the said Ira Y. Munn and George L, Scott, did then and there unlawfully transact the business of public warehousemen in said warehouse, in the manner and form aforesaid; and that they, the said Ira Y. Munn and George L. Scott, did not procure a license from the circuit court of said county, permitting them to transact business as public warehousemen in said warehouse, in manner and form as aforesaid, under the laws of said State of Illinois, before transacting the business aforesaid of public warehousemen as aforesaid, contrary to the statute and against the peace and dignity of the same people of the State of Illinois.”

The second count is precisely like the first, except that the defendants are charged as lessees of the public warehouse, and that they transacted business therein as warehousemen, without having taken out a license therefor, as charged in the first count.

The defendants entered a motion to quash the information, which the court overruled. The defendants then entered the plea of not guilty, a jury was waived, and the cause tried by the court upon an agreed statement of facts. The court found the defendants guilty, and, overruling motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, rendered judgment on the finding for $100 fine and costs of the proceeding.

Mr. JOHN N. JEWETT, Mr. W. C. GOUDY, and Messrs. MCCAGG, FULLER & CULVER, for the plaintiffs in error.

Mr. JAMES K. EDSALL, Attorney General, Mr. C. H. REED, State's Attorney, Mr. R. M. BENJAMIN, and Messrs. HITCHCOCK, DUPEE & EVARTS, for the People. Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE BREESE delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was a proceeding by information in the Criminal Court of Cook county, on behalf of the people, against Ira Y. Munn and George L. Scott, for a violation of the 3d and 4th sections of an act of the General Assembly of this State, entitled “An act to regulate public warehouses, and the warehousing and inspection of grain, and to give effect to article 13 of the constitution of the State,” approved April 25, 1871.

The information was filed by the State's Attorney at the July term, 1872. A motion to quash having been overruled. the defendants pleaded not guilty, waived a trial by jury, and submitted the case to the court.

The court found the defendants guilty, and, overruling a motion for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, adjudged against them a fine of one hundred dollars and the costs.

To reverse this judgment the defendants bring the record here by writ of error, assigning various errors, one of which raises the question of the constitutionality of the act under which the proceedings were had, and is the only important question in the case.

This is the second argument of the cause. On the first argument, at the last term, the court, after much deliberation, were unable to reach a satisfactory conclusion. In the meantime, the court had undergone a change by the election of two new members, and it was deemed expedient and proper that they should take part in the decision, and, to enable them to participate, a reargument was directed, and the questions have again been fully, elaborately and ably discussed.

A case of so much importance demanded and has received our most careful consideration, and we are prepared to state the conclusions which a majority of the court has reached.

We do not deem it necessary to take up seriatim, and discuss the various propositions presented by counsel, or go over the field of argument they have so fully explored, but, in what we shall say, it will be found they have all been considered.

Plaintiffs in error insist the statute in question is repugnant to this provision of our constitution found in the “Bill of Rights” as clause 2 of article 2: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,” and to this other provision in clause 13 of the same article: “Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.”

One of the counsel for plaintiffs in error makes these points in addition: That the act is repugnant to the 14th amendment of the constitution of the United States; and further, if its provisions can be construed as an inhibition of the warehousing business, except under special conditions, and as conferring the privilege of doing that kind of business upon persons able or willing to comply, and actually complying with these conditions, then, in so far as it is not based upon article 13 of the State constitution, it is repugnant to section 22 of article 4, which prohibits the General Assembly from passing any local or special law “granting to any corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive privilege or immunity whatever.”

We will consider these propositions first, as they appear to be thrown into the controversy as mere make-weights, the real merits resting in the two first.

As to the repugnancy of the Warehouse act to the first clause of the 14th amendment of the constitution of the United States, a slight consideration of that amendment, and judicial decisions upon it, will be sufficient to satisfy any one it has no application to this case. That amendment is as follows: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, or subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.”

It is well known the amendment in question was incorporated into the federal constitution to shield a certain class, who had been born and reared in slavery, from pernicious legislation, by which their newly acquired rights by their emancipation might be so crippled as to render them wholly worthless.

In the discussions upon the effect of this amendment, in the slaughter house cases from New Orleans, and the case of Myra Bradwell, plaintiff in error, taken up from this court, it was not intimated by the Supreme Court of the United States that a regulation by a State legislature of a pursuit or profession, or a regulation of the use of property, abridged in any manner the liberty of the citizen, white or black.

Upon the other proposition, we can not perceive that the statute can receive the construction contended for. The section relied on is in these words: “The General Assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say--” then follows a large number of specified subjects, the last of which is this: “Granting to any corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever.”

The inhibition extends only to passing special laws for such purpose. But the law in question is general in its objects, operative throughout the State, and confers no immunity or special or exclusive privilege or franchise upon any individual, association or corporation. It deals with an existing business closely associated with the great agricultural interests of the State, and seeks to regulate it by law. This is the whole scope of the act.

But the important question remains, as presented in the first two points made by plaintiffs in error, and argued with great ability. Does the act in question deprive the owners or managers of this warehouse of their property, in the sense of the constitution? If it does, it is void, and must be so declared.

This view of plaintiffs in error seems to be based, in a great degree, on the fact that they had constructed their warehouse and established their business long anterior to the enactment of this law. It was established while there was free trade in the business, and their charges were subject to regulation only by competition and agreement, and they now claim a right to continue such use without legislative restraint.

They further say they have complied with all the provisions of the act except the one requiring them to take out a license and enter into bond. The argument is, by this legislative interference, they are deprived of the use of their property, and so depriving them of its free and untrammelled use, they are deprived of their property in the sense of this clause of the Bill of Rights.

Much ingenious argument has been employed to establish this proposition, and the case of Wynehamer v. The People, 3 Kernan, (N. Y.) 378, cited as 13 N....