State v. LeBarron

• Decision Date: 18 January 1917
• Docket Number: 875
• Citation: 162 P. 265,24 Wyo. 519
• Parties: STATE v. LeBARRON
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

162 P. 265

24 Wyo. 519

STATE v. LeBARRON

No. 875

Supreme Court of Wyoming

January 18, 1917

HEARD on questions of law reserved and certified from the District Court of Laramie County arising on demurrer filed to an information charging William I. LeBarron with a violation of Chapter 45 of the Laws of 1915, limiting hours of labor for female employees; HON WM. C. MENTZER, Judge.

Reversed.

D. A Preston, Attorney General, for the State.

The provisions of Section 1 of Chapter 45, Laws 1915, are not unconstitutional. (People v. Elerding, 40 L. R. A (N. S.) 893; Ritchie v. Wyman, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 994; Muller v. Ore., 208 U.S. 412; Commonwealth v. Riley, 232 U.S. 671; State v. Dominion Hotel, 151 P. 958; Wenham v. State, 58 L. R. A 825; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373; Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385; State v. Buchanan, 29 Wash. 602; Ex parte Anna Hawley, 12 Ohio, N. P., 1, 232 U.S. 718.) The exemptions created by Section 2 of the same chapter are based upon substantial conditions existing between the classes of business exempt and the classes included in Section 1; the exemption as to telephone offices or exchanges is reasonable; the exception as to hotels and restaurants operated by railroad companies is a reasonable classification; the business of such hotels and restaurants differs from others owing to the time of arrival and departure of trains. (State v. Railroad Co., 33 L. R. A. N. S. 494.) If the classification is based on reasonable grounds, it does not offend against the constitutional provisions. (6 R. C. L. 374; State v. Currans, 56 L. R. A. (Wis.) 252; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373.) The classification is proper for it applies to all persons who bring themselves under its provisions. (Withey v. Bloem, 163 Mich. 419; L. & N. R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U.S. 36; Missouri Railway Co. v. Mackey, 127 U.S. 205; Hawthorn, et al., v. The People, 109 Ill. 302; Wenham v. State, 58 L. R. A. (Nebr.) 825.) The classification must be unreasonable and arbitrary to justify the courts in declaring the law unconstitutional. (State v. Sherman, 18 Wyo. 169.) All doubts must be resolved in favor of validity. (State v. Somerville, 67 Wash. 638; State v. Bunting, 139 P. 731 (Ore.) .) A legislative declaration that conditions exist calling for distinction will be given weight. People v. Elerding, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) (Ill.) 893; Munn v. People, 69 Ill. 80; Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267.) The court will take cognizance of all matters of general knowledge and of the conditions under which work is performed in hotels and restaurants operated by railroads as distinguished from hotels and restaurants not operated by railroads. (State v. Somerville, 67 Wash, 638; P. Ft. W. & C. Ry Co. v. Callaghan, 50 Ill.App. 676.) It is our contention that the law is a general law, operating alike on all persons similarly situated. The act under consideration is not class legislation. (Dawson Soap Co. v. City of Chicago, 234 Ill. 314; St. John v. Andrews Institute, 191 N.Y. 254; Allen v. Pioneer Press Co., 3 L. R. A. 532.) The questions should be answered in the negative.

Donzelmann & Mentzer, for defendant.

The statute is unconstitutional in that it unjustly discriminates between citizens of the state, who stand in the same relation to the object of the statute; it is also discriminatory because it includes a part and excludes a part of the class it was evidently intended to protect. To be valid a statute must bring within its provisions all who are under and subject to similar and like conditions and exclude none. (Johnson v. Railroad Company, 43 Minn. 224, 45 N.W. 156; Ex parte Shonke, 82 P. 956; State v. McCue, 51 N.W. 112.) Classifications must be based upon some reason existing in the condition and circumstances of the subjects placed in different classes, showing a necessity for different legislation in respect to them. (State v. Donaldson, 42 Minn. 781; Randolph v. Wood, 49 N. J. Law 88; Chicago v. Runff, 45 Ill. 90; May v. People, 27 P. 1010; McQuillan Municipal Ordinances, 193; Tugman v. Chicago, 78 Ill. 485.) The classification undertaken by Section 2 is discriminatory. (State v. Wagner, 72 N.W. 67; State v. Sheriff, 51 N.W. 112.) The law must include within its operation all who stand in the same relation to its purpose. (State v. Boscowitz, 156 N.W. 945; 35 A. & E. A. C. 1915 A. 477; 26 S.Ct. 554; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 6 S.Ct. Rpt. 1964; Covington v. Dalhein, 102 S.W. 829; Constitutional Limitations, pgs. 483-486; Nichols v. Walter, 33 N.W. 800.) The difference on which the classification is based must be such as in some reasonable degree will account for or justify the peculiar legislation. (Pasadena v. Stimson, 27 P. 604; Bloss v. Louis, 41 P. 1081; Ex parte Jentzseh, 112 Cal. 474; 32 L. R. A. 644; Ex parte Shoncke, 82 P. 596; 2 L. R. A. N. S. 813.) An arbitrary distinction will invalidate the statute. (Pratt v. Brown, 67 P. 1082; State v. Hammer, 42 N. J. Law, 435; Budd v. Hancock, 66 N. J. Law, 133; 27 Amer. & Eng. Enc. of Law, 2nd Ed., 683.) The statute violates Art. 2, Section 34, of the State Constitution requiring general laws to have a uniform operation. (Ex parte Miller, 124 P. 427.) The statute seems to designate a class and then to except from the operation of the law a part of the same class without any justifiable basis. It is therefore a special law and invalid under the Constitution. (Y. M. C. A. v. Parish, 154 P. 785; 4 Words & Phrases (2nd Series) 635; Budd v. Hancock, 66 N. J. Law, 133; 48 A. 1023; State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Miller, 100 Mo. 439; 13 S.W. 677; Southerland Stat. Constr. No. 121.) A law is general and uniform in its operation, if it applies to all persons in the same circumstances. (Coal Co. v. Pollard, 62 N.E. 492, 158 Ind. 607.) And when in its operation it applies to all persons in a like situation. (Land Co. v. Soper, 39 Ia. 112; Arms v. Ayer, 61 N.E. 851, 58 L. R. A. 277.) The statute is invalid under Section 27 of Art. 3, State Constitution, providing that where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted. A law which fixes a class as a whole is a general law. (Brooks v. Hyde, 37 Cal. 366; Clark v. Finley, 54 S.W. 343; Hamman v. Coal Co., 56 S.W. 1091, 150 Mo. 232; Van Riper v. Parsons, 40 N. H. Law, 8; Sawyer v. Dooley, 21 Nev. 309, 32 P. 437; Railroad Co. v. Board, 48 N. J. Law, 1, 57 Am. Rpt. 516; Coal Co. v. Pollard, 62 N.E. 492, 158 Ind. 607.) A general law must include all and exclude none whose wants and conditions render such legislation equally necessary or appropriate to them as a class. (Helfer v. Sinon, 53 N. J. Law, 550, 22 A. 120; Warner v. Hoggland, 51 N. J. Law, 66; Dexheimer v. City, 36 A. 706, 60 N. J. Law, 111; Robinson v. Southern P. R. Co., 38 P. 94, 22 L. R. A. 773.) A law which applies to only a part of a class is a special law. (Inv. Co. v. School Dist., 19 F. 359; People v. Central P. R. Co., 83 Cal. 393, 23 P. 303.) To avoid a conflict with the Constitution a statute must be general in its application to the class and all of the class coming within its operation. (Daily Leader v. Cammeron, 41 P. 635; Gay v. Thomas, 46 P. 378, 14 Utah 383; State v. Mining Co., 15 Nev. 234-249; State v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 11; Ex parte Spinney, 10 Nev. 391.) The rule was observed and discussed in McGarvey v. Swan, 17 Wyo. 120, and stated in Land Co. v. Soper, 38 Ia. 112. (Arms v. Ayer, supra.) General and special laws are distinguished in Y. M. C. A. v. Parish, 154 P. 785. The statute excludes a part of the citizens of the state and includes a part of the same class and is therefore unconstitutional and void. If Section 2 of the act be found void the first section cannot stand. (State v. Robinson, 146 P. 628.)

BEARD, JUSTICE. POTTER, C. J., concurs. SCOTT, J., did not participate in the decision.

OPINION

BEARD, JUSTICE.

A criminal information was filed in the district court of Laramie county by the county and prosecuting attorney, charging the defendant, William I. LeBarron, with having on the 12th day of October, A. D. 1915, at the county of Laramie, in the state of Wyoming, unlawfully employed one Zella Michaels, a female, to work in a restaurant conducted by him, for more than ten hours in one day, contrary to the statute, &c.

The defendant demurred to the information on the ground that the statute (Chapter 45 of the Session Laws of Wyoming for the year 1915) is unconstitutional and void.

The matter coming on for hearing, the district court found that the issues of law arising on said demurrer involved important and difficult constitutional questions, a decision of which were necessary in said action, reserved and certified to this court the following questions for its decision:

"1st. Is Chapter 45 of the Session Laws of Wyoming for the year 1915, being 'An Act to limit the hours of labor for females, and providing penalties for violation thereof,' unconstitutional as being class legislation?"

"2nd. Is the said chapter unconstitutional and in contravention of Section 34, of Article 1, of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming, in that said act is a law of general nature and does not have a uniform operation?"

"3rd. Did the Legislature of the State of Wyoming in the passing of said act, contravene Section 27, of Article 3, of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming, which provides that in all cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted?"

The said Chapter 45, S. L. 1915, is as follows:

"Section 1. No female shall be employed, or suffered or permitted to work in any manufacturing, mechanical, printing baking, laundering, or canning establishment, or hotel, or telephone exchange, restaurant, theater or place of public amusement, more than fifty-six hours in any one week, nor more than ten hours in any one...