Munoz v. Baltimore Cnty.
| Decision Date | 25 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO.: RDB-11-02693 |
| Parties | JOSE G. MUNOZ, PLAINTIFF, v. BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND, KEVIN KAMENETZ, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS BALTIMORE COUNTY EXECUTIVE, GEORGE E. GAY, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF BALTIMORE COUNTY OFFICE OF HUMAN RESOURCES, BALTIMORE COUNTY FIRE DEPARTMENT, AND JOHN J. HOHMAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS FIRE CHIEF, BALTIMORE COUNTY FIRE DEPARTMENT, DEFENDANTS. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
This action arises out of a complaint filed by Jose G. Munoz ("Plaintiff" or "Munoz") against Defendants Baltimore County, Maryland ("the County"); Kevin Kamenetz ("Kamenetz"), individually and in his official capacity as Baltimore County Executive; George E. Gay ("Gay"), individually and in his official capacity as Director of the BaltimoreCounty Office of Human Resources; the Baltimore County Fire Department ("BCFD") and John J. Hohman ("Hohman"), individually and in his official capacity as Fire Chief of the Baltimore County Fire Department. The Plaintiff sues Defendants for (1) disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq., and retaliation under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (Count I); (2) disability discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (Count II); and (3) wrongful discharge in violation of public policy under Maryland state law (Count III).
Pending before this Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (ECF No. 6). Upon review, the Court finds that no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Specifically, the Motion is GRANTED as to the disability discrimination claims in Counts I and II, as to the retaliation claim under the ADA against the Baltimore County Fire Department and all individually named Defendants in Count I, and as to the wrongful discharge claim against the Baltimore County Fire Department and all individually named Defendants in Count III; and is DENIED as to the retaliation claim under the ADA against Baltimore County in Count I and as to the wrongful discharge claim against Baltimore County in Count III. Moreover, Plaintiff's claims against the Baltimory County Fire Department and all individually named Defendants are DISMISSED WITHPREJUDICE. Finally, Plaintiff's disability discrimination claims against Baltimore County are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the factual allegations in the plaintiff's complaint must be accepted as true and those facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Ko/on Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011).
On or about August 30, 2010, the Plaintiff, who was then an Emergency Medical Technician and Firefighter employed by the Baltimore County Fire Department ("BCFD"), hyper-extended his right knee during an official training exercise. Compl. ¶ 10. On September 28 and 30, 2010, Plaintiff visited Dr. Deniece Barnett-Scott to address his "continuing pain," and she told him that "there was some bruising and swelling around his knee, but that he could return to work without treatment." Id. ¶ 12. When the Plaintiff's pain was still continuing sometime later, he consulted Dr. Craig Matthews, an orthopedic surgeon, and submitted the bill to the County for payment under Maryland Workers' Compensation. Id. ¶ 13.
The County arranged for the Plaintiff to receive an independent medical examination, which Dr. Kenneth Tepper provided on November 2, 2010. Id. ¶ 14. Dr. Tepper stated that the "pain and buckling of [Plaintiff's] knee was a result of a preexisting injury due to degenerative arthritic changes and prior injury to his medial meniscus." Id. As a result, in a letter dated November 18, 2010, the County denied Plaintiff workers' compensation coverage and refused to pay for his previous visit to Dr. Matthews . Id. ¶¶ 14—15.
On November 22, 2010, Plaintiff returned to Dr. Matthews. Compl. ¶ 15. He paid for his previous visit using his own insurance and sought further medical evaluation. Id. Dr. Matthews stated that "Plaintiff required surgery to repair a torn medial meniscus." Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff obtained approval for his Family and Medical Leave Act request for January 21, 2011 through February 14, 2011 and had surgery on January 21, 2011. Id. ¶¶ 16—17. After his surgery, Plaintiff was cleared for light duty on January 26, 2011 and for full duty on February 9, 2011. Id. ¶ 17. He returned to work "early from his medical leave." Id.
Around that time, Plaintiff also retained counsel to contest the County's refusal to grant him workers' compensation. Id. ¶ 18. Through counsel, Plaintiff requested a hearing with the Maryland Workers' Compensation Commission ("the Commission") "with respect to the causal relationship [between] Plaintiff's knee problems [and] his injuries sustained while engaged in the training exercise." Id. ¶ 18. On February 3, 2011, Plaintiff attended a hearing before the Commission. Id. ¶ 19. On cross-examination, counsel for the County asked Plaintiff about his "past medical history," and Plaintiff testified that he had had surgery to repair his lateral meniscus in 1994. Id. ¶¶ 19—20. Counsel then asked Plaintiff why he had failed to disclose that surgery on his job application, which had "asked if he had [had] any prior surgeries." Id. ¶¶ 19—20. Plaintiff testified that he had forgotten about that surgery, as it had happened fifteen years before he was filling out the application for employment. Compl. ¶ 20, 22.
On February 24, 2011, the Maryland Workers' Compensation Commissioner concluded that Plaintiff's injury was work-related and ordered the County to pay for Plaintiff's medical bills. Id. ¶ 23. Approximately one week later, on or about March 3, 2011, Assistant Fire Chief Mark Weir ("Weir") met with the Plaintiff and ordered him to resign or be terminated for "falsifying his employment application." Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiff insisted that he had made an honest mistake, and he refused to resign. Id. Weir then terminated Plaintiff, stating that Plaintiff "should have 'known better' than to have filed a Workers Compensation claim." Id.
After he was terminated, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging retaliation and disability discrimination on the basis of a perceived disability in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the ADA. Compl. ¶ 7. On June 29, 2011, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a right-to-sue notice after rejecting his claim. Id. ¶ 8.
On September 19, 2011, Plaintiff filed the timely Complaint in this case, alleging disability discrimination under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, retaliation under the ADA, and a claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy under Maryland state law. Defendants have filed the subject Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment, in which they maintain that (1) the Baltimore County Fire Department is not a legal entity subject to suit, (2) none of the individually named Defendants is individually liable, and (3) the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defs.' Mot. ¶¶ 1—3.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction challenges a court's authority to hear the matter broughtby a complaint. See Davis v. Thompson, 367 F. Supp. 2d 792, 799 (D. Md. 2005). Under Rule 12(b)(1), a party may advance a facial challenge, asserting that the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to establish subject-matter jurisdiction, or a factual challenge, asserting "that the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint [are] not true." Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). With respect to a facial challenge, the court will grant a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction "where a claim fails to allege facts upon which the court may base jurisdiction." Davis, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 799 (citations omitted). Where the challenge is factual, "the district court is entitled to decide disputed issues of fact with respect to subject matter jurisdiction." Kerns, 585 F3d at 192. "[T]he court may look beyond the pleadings and 'the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists.'" Khoury v. Meserve, 268 F. Supp. 2d 600, 606 (D. Md. 2003) (citation omitted). The court "may regard the pleadings as mere evidence on the issue and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment." Velasco v. Gov't of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2004); see also Sharafeldin v. Maryland Dept. of Public Safety & Correctional Services, 94 F. Supp. 2d 680, 684-85 (D. Md. 2000). The plaintiff carries the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the dismissal of a complaint if it fails to statea claim upon which relief can be granted; therefore, "the purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Presley v. City of Charlottesville...
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