Sharafeldin v. Maryland, Dept. of Pub. Safety

• Decision Date: 10 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. CIV. H-99-2940.,CIV. H-99-2940.
• Citation: 94 F.Supp.2d 680
• Parties: Ibnomer M. SHARAFELDIN, Plaintiff, v. State of MARYLAND, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

94 F.Supp.2d 680

Ibnomer M. SHARAFELDIN, Plaintiff, v. State of MARYLAND, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, Defendant.

No. CIV. H-99-2940.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

April 10, 2000.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Fatai A. Suleman, Law Office, Hyattsville, MD, for plaintiff.

Scott S. Oakley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, MD, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ALEXANDER HARVEY, II, Senior District Judge.

In this civil action, plaintiff Ibnomer M. Sharafeldin ("Sharafeldin") has sued his former employer, asserting claims of (1) hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII"), (2) constructive discharge, and (3) breach of settlement agreement. Named as the sole defendant in the amended complaint is State of Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (the "Department").

Presently pending before the Court is defendant's motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Memoranda in support of and in opposition to the pending motion have been filed by the parties and reviewed by the Court. No hearing is necessary for a decision on the pending motion. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons stated herein, the pending motion to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part.

I Background Facts

Sharafeldin is a black male of Sudanese origin and is a practicing Muslim. From September 1991 through December 1998, Sharafeldin was employed full-time by the Department as an Islamic Chaplain at one of its correctional facilities located in Hagerstown, Maryland.

Between 1993 and 1998, Sharafeldin on at least five separate occasions filed charges of discrimination against the Department with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). These charges of discrimination were generally based on allegations of discriminatory harassment by the Department against Sharafeldin on account of his race, sex, religion and/or national origin. In February of 1995, the Department and Sharafeldin entered into a settlement agreement (the "Agreement") in which Sharafeldin dismissed all then pending charges of discrimination against the Department in exchange for, among other things, the Department's promise (1) that it would notify him of vacant chaplain positions in the Baltimore and Jessup regions and would interview him for consideration of those positions and (2) that it would not retaliate against or harass Sharafeldin.¹

On or about December 4, 1998, Sharafeldin filed with the EEOC his most recent charge of discrimination against the Department ("EEOC Charge"). This pending action is based on that EEOC Charge which arose out of an alleged physical altercation between Sharafeldin and two white non-Muslim employees of the Department. Sharafeldin alleged in his EEOC Charge that he was harassed by these two individuals on account of his religion, and further alleged that he had continually been harassed on the basis of his religion while working at the Department since 1993. Additionally, Sharafeldin there asserted that he was passed over for transfer and was denied accident leave in retaliation for having filed charges of discrimination against the Department in the past.

On or about July 9, 1999, the EEOC issued to Sharafeldin a "Right to Sue" letter. On September 27, 1999, Sharafeldin, proceeding pro se, filed in this Court a "Complaint for Employment Discrimination" (the "Pro Se Complaint"). Named as defendants were the Department and various Department officials. The Pro Se Complaint alleged in general terms employment discrimination on the basis of Sharafeldin's race, color, religion and national origin. Thirty-five exhibits were attached to the Pro Se Complaint.

In response to Sharafeldin's Pro Se Complaint, the Department and various individual defendants filed a motion to dismiss. While the Department's motion was pending, Sharafeldin obtained private counsel who has now entered his appearance in the case. At a status conference, the Court granted leave to Sharafeldin to file an amended complaint and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss as moot. Counsel for Sharafeldin filed an amended complaint on February 18, 2000. The pending motion seeks dismissal of the amended complaint.

The amended complaint contains three counts, all of which are brought against only the Department. Count I alleges hostile work environment harassment on the basis of Sharafeldin's race, color, religion and national origin. Count II asserts a claim of constructive discharge based on alleged hostile work environment harassment which allegedly caused Sharafeldin to suffer from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD") and which ultimately resulted in his inability to continue working in his position as Islamic Chaplain at the Department's Hagerstown facility. In Count III, Sherafeldin asserts a claim of breach of the Agreement by the Department based upon (1) the Department's alleged failure to inform Sharafeldin of certain chaplain vacancies at Department facilities, and (2) the Department's alleged retaliation against Sharafeldin for having filed charges of discrimination against the Department in the past. Plaintiff seeks $5 million as compensatory damages, $5 million as punitive damages and attorneys' fees and costs.

II The Parties' Contentions

In support of its pending motion to dismiss, defendant first argues that this Court is without subject matter jurisdiction to entertain certain claims asserted by plaintiff in the amended complaint because they were not within the scope of his EEOC Charge. Defendant also contends that some of plaintiff's claims are barred by limitations. According to defendant, any claims concerning incidents occurring prior to April 8, 1998 must be dismissed by the Court as untimely.

Defendant has also challenged plaintiff's hostile work environment claim on the ground that it is supported merely by conclusory allegations of harassment and discrimination which do not satisfy the burden assumed by plaintiff under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Finally, defendant maintains that plaintiff's breach of contract claim in Count III must be dismissed because defendant as a state agency enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court as to such a claim.

In opposing the pending motion, plaintiff argues that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider his claims because they were presented to the EEOC as a part of its investigation of his claims. Plaintiff relies on the so-called "continuing violation" theory in arguing that his claims are timely and not barred by limitations.

According to plaintiff, he has properly satisfied the requirements of Rule 8(a) as to each count of the amended complaint. Plaintiff further contends that Count III is cognizable by this Court under Title VII and not under state contract law and that the Eleventh Amendment is therefore inapplicable. Plaintiff also maintains that defendant has waived any possible Eleventh Amendment immunity as a result of the provision contained in the Agreement that it could "be specifically enforced in court ..."

III Applicable Principles of Law

Rule 8, F.R.Civ.P., establishes the general pleading rules which a plaintiff must follow in a suit filed in the federal court. Rule 8(a) states, in pertinent part, that:

[a] pleading which sets forth a claim for relief ... shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, ... (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.

A plaintiff has the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir.1991). When a defendant challenges subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), a district court should "regard the pleadings as mere evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment." Id. A district court should grant a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss "only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law." Id.

It is well established that a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), F.R.Civ.P., should be denied unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). In determining whether to dismiss a complaint, a court must view the material allegations in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, with the alleged facts accepted as true. 2A Moore's Federal Practice, 12.07 [2.-5] (2d ed.1987); 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357, at 304-21 (1990). Moreover, the allegations will be construed liberally in favor of the pleader. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). The issue in reviewing the sufficiency of the pleadings in a complaint is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Id.

Title VII creates a federal cause of action for employment discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Before a federal court may assume jurisdiction over an employment discrimination claim asserted under Title VII, an aggrieved person must have first timely filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Doski v. M. Goldseker Co., 539 F.2d 1326, 1329 (4th Cir. 1976). The complaint of a plaintiff in an employment discrimination case is limited by the scope of the investigation which could have reasonably been anticipated to have grown out of the charge filed with the EEOC. Chisholm v. United States Postal Svc., 665 F.2d 482, 491 (4th Cir.1981)....