Munoz v. Kaiser Steel Corp.
Decision Date | 04 June 1984 |
Citation | 203 Cal.Rptr. 345,156 Cal.App.3d 965 |
Parties | Anthony MUNOZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. KAISER STEEL CORPORATION, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 29347. |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Anthony Munoz (plaintiff) filed an amended complaint against Kaiser Steel Corporation (Kaiser or defendant) alleging one cause of action for breach of an oral employment contract for a minimum of three years and another cause of action for fraud and deceit based on the oral promise of three years' employment without intention to perform. Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted as to the cause of action for breach of contract on the basis of the statute of frauds. A second motion for summary judgment on the fraud count was denied. However, a nonsuit was entered on the fraud count following plaintiff's opening statement.
Plaintiff appeals contending that the trial court erred in granting defendant's motions for summary judgment and nonsuit. 1
The motion for summary judgment on the first cause of action was submitted on materials filed by defendant, primarily the transcript of plaintiff's deposition, a copy of plaintiff's employment application and a copy of a letter dated November 26, 1980, written by plaintiff to the president of Kaiser Steel Corporation after he was discharged. The motion for nonsuit was submitted on plaintiff's opening statement together with certain evidentiary exhibits whose admission into evidence had been stipulated to by the parties even before plaintiff commenced his opening statement. These exhibits included, inter alia, a copy of plaintiff's letter of November 26, 1980, a copy of a letter dated November 9, 1979, to plaintiff from W.H. Steritz, the superintendent of the coke plant at Kaiser Steel Corporation who had hired plaintiff, and a copy of an agreement referred to as a "patent agreement" signed by plaintiff at or about the time he was employed by Kaiser. In addition, both parties and the court appear to have treated the testimony of plaintiff in his deposition as being in evidence for purposes of the nonsuit motion. Thus, the facts to be considered in our review of the summary judgment and the nonsuit are the same except that so far as the record indicates Mr. Steritz's letter to plaintiff dated November 9, 1979, and the "patent agreement" were not before the court on the motion for summary judgment. While we shall consider and discuss the facts shown by the last-mentioned documents only in connection with our review of the nonsuit, we find nothing in either document of such overriding significance as to affect the disposition of the appeal as to either of the court's rulings. With this background, we proceed to recite the facts.
In March 1979 plaintiff was living in the State of Texas with his wife and two children. In a period of about six months plaintiff had been laid off from two separate jobs, the last of which he had held for about five months. Plaintiff had decided to seek more stable employment in the Southern California area. He had been born in California and raised in Redlands and his parents and a brother were living in that area.
Plaintiff came to Southern California and sought job interviews. On March 14, 1979, unsolicited, he dropped into the personnel department at Kaiser Steel Corporation in Fontana, explained his qualifications and asked whether a job might be available. He was informed by the personnel department that there was. He was given an interview with Mr. Steritz, the coke plant superintendent, following which he was tentatively hired as a labor foreman at a salary of $1,800 per month pending management confirmation. Although Mr. Steritz made no specific statement concerning the duration of employment and did not tell plaintiff his employment would last three years or any other specific time, Mr. Steritz stated to plaintiff that he "would be trained for at least three years." Assertedly, plaintiff understood this statement to mean that he was assured employment with defendant for a minimum of three years.
Plaintiff returned to Texas and on or about May 1, 1979, was informed by telephone that his employment was confirmed. He commenced work for Kaiser on May 7, 1979. Then, in the words of counsel: Plaintiff's Texas home had been purchased for approximately $27,500 and was sold for approximately $57,000. The purchase price of the house in Highland, California, was approximately $60,000, and the down payment of approximately $5,000 came from the proceeds of sale of the house in Texas. Plaintiff's monthly mortgage payments in Texas had been approximately $267; his monthly mortgage payments on the Highland house were approximately $607 exclusive of taxes and insurance. Counsel's opening statement indicated that some months after his discharge from employment at Kaiser, plaintiff was unable to pay the mortgage payments on the Highland house and "lost it."
Plaintiff received approximately three weeks of on the job training in the position as labor foreman. Although plaintiff was apparently not informed of it, his supervisor expressed some dissatisfaction with his performance and he was soon transferred to another job known as "top foreman." Plaintiff continued in that job until he was discharged on or about October 31, 1979. On November 9, 1979, Mr. Steritz wrote a letter to plaintiff explaining the reason for his termination and providing him a reference for use in seeking other employment. The letter read in part:
After being terminated at Kaiser, plaintiff diligently sought other employment. Although he obtained some part-time, temporary work at odd jobs, he was not successful in securing full-time employment until about June 1981 when he went to work as a state police officer at Chico State University. He commenced this action March 10, 1980.
As previously indicated, the summary judgment motion as to count one was submitted on the moving papers of defendant, and points and authorities in opposition filed by plaintiff which asserted primarily a triable issue of fact as to whether defendant was estopped from asserting the statute of frauds. Plaintiff's deposition was before the court, but no declaration in opposition to the motion was filed on the part of plaintiff.
If plaintiff's alleged cause of action for breach of contract is barred by the statute of frauds, the summary judgment was properly granted; otherwise not. We conclude it was.
Civil Code section 1624 provides in pertinent part:
Plaintiff alleged and asserted both in his deposition and in counsel's opening statement an oral employment contract for a minimum of three years. Thus, by its terms, the employment contract claimed by plaintiff was not to be performed within a year from its making and comes within the purview of section 1624, subdivision 1, of the Civil Code. (See Ruinello v. Murray (1951) 36 Cal.2d 687, 688-689, 227 P.2d 251; Tomlins v. American Ins. Co. (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 525, 527, 66 Cal.Rptr. 92; Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 640, 14 Cal.Rptr. 496.)
The only remaining question in review of the summary judgment is whether or not there existed a triable issue of fact as to defendant's being estopped to assert the statute of frauds. While in most instances the existence of an estoppel is a question of fact, summary judgment is appropriate if no estoppel could exist as a matter of law. (State of California v. Haslett Co. (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 252, 256, 119 Cal.Rptr. 78.)
The law governing the existence of an estoppel to assert the statute of frauds is succinctly and accurately summarized in Ruinello v. Murray (1951) 36 Cal.2d 687, 689, 227 P.2d 251: "Plaintiff contends that he has alleged sufficient facts to estop defendant from relying on the statute of frauds. There can be no estoppel unless plaintiff will suffer unconscionable injury or defendant will be unjustly enriched if the oral contract is not enforced. (Monarco v. Lo Greco, [1950] 35 Cal.2d 621, 623-624 [220 P.2d 737] and cases there cited.) Plaintiff has not alleged facts that meet either of these conditions.
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