Muntz v. Com., Dept. of Transp.

• Decision Date: 03 May 1996
• Parties: Susan C. MUNTZ and Frederick F. Muntz, Appellants, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, William H. Williams, Paul D. Williams, Jim Wynn Volkswagen-Volvo, Lara Goldstein, AB Volvo, Volvo North American Corp., Michael Earl Eidle, Andrew Kositsky, and Laura Ann Semmelroth.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Page 328

674 A.2d 328

Susan C. MUNTZ and Frederick F. Muntz, Appellants, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION William H. Williams, Paul D. Williams, Jim Wynn Volkswagen-Volvo, Lara Goldstein, AB Volvo, Volvo North American Corp., Michael Earl Eidle, Andrew Kositsky, and Laura Ann Semmelroth.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Dec. 5, 1995.

Decided March 1, 1996.

Reargument Denied May 3, 1996.

David L. Grove, for Appellants.

James L. Griffith, for Appellees, Volvo North America Corporation, AB Volvo and Jim Wynn Volkswagen-Volvo.

Before PELLEGRINI and FRIEDMAN, JJ., and SILVESTRI, Senior Judge.

FRIEDMAN, Judge.

Susan C. Muntz and Frederick F. Muntz (Muntzes) appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County (trial court) granting Volvo North America Corporation's, Jim Wynn Volkswagen-Volvo's and AB Volvo's (collectively, Volvo) Motion for Summary Judgment.

On October 1, 1991, the Muntzes filed a Second Amended Complaint against Volvo and other parties arising out of an automobile accident which occurred on December 17, 1988. According to the complaint, Susan Muntz was operating a vehicle designed, manufactured and sold by Volvo when a truck struck the vehicle head-on, causing Susan Muntz to suffer serious, painful and permanent injuries. (R.R. at 26a-27a.) The complaint maintains that Volvo is liable for the injuries under theories of negligence, strict liability and breach of implied warranties. Specifically, the Muntzes claim that Volvo failed to design, manufacture and sell a vehicle which included effective and safe passive restraint systems, such as a driver's side air bag, a knee bolster, a safety belt pre-tension system and a safety belt tensioner. ¹ (R.R. at 36a-43a.)

Volvo filed answers to the complaint denying its material allegations. ² In New Matter, Volvo avers, inter alia, that the inclusion of seat belts and air bags in motor vehicles is governed by regulations promulgated under the National Highway and Traffic Safety Act (Safety Act), ³ that those regulations constitute federal preemption of the subject matter and that Volvo complied with the regulations at all times relevant hereto. (R.R. at 62a, 80a.) The Muntzes filed a Reply to New Matter denying that federal preemption exists here. (R.R. at 112a.)

On April 28, 1993, Volvo filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting that the Muntzes purchased a 1985 Volvo 240 station wagon on December 15, 1984, equipped with a 3-point manual lap and shoulder harness safety belt and a dash board warning light designed to encourage seat belt use. (R.R. at 126a-27a.) According to Volvo, this system met the requirements of applicable federal safety regulations, which preempt other standards requiring passive restraint systems. (R.R. at 127a-28a.) The Muntzes filed an answer to the motion, admitting that their vehicle contained such a system but also asserting that the system did not adequately protect Susan Muntz from injury. (R.R. at 776a.)

On April 15, 1994, the trial court granted Volvo's Motion for Summary Judgment, concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that, under Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853, 111 S.Ct. 147, 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990), the Muntzes' cause of action against Volvo was preempted by federal safety regulations as a matter of law.

On May 13, 1994, the Muntzes appealed to this court which, on August 1, 1994, quashed the appeal as interlocutory and not otherwise appealable as of right. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(c). However, the order stated that the Muntzes "may, within 30 days of the date of this order, seek certification of the order appealed pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341(c)." (Motion of Volvo to Quash, Exh. C.) On August 19, 1994, the Muntzes applied to the trial court for certification of the April 15, 1994 order as a final order. The trial court did not grant the application until December 5, 1994.

On appeal to this court, ⁴ the Muntzes argue that the trial court erred in relying on Pokorny and in concluding therefrom that federal safety regulations pertaining to seat belts and air bags preempt this common law action; instead, the Muntzes contend, the trial court was bound by our superior court's decision in Gingold v. Audi-NSU-Auto Union, A.G., 389 Pa.Superior Ct. 328, 567 A.2d 312 (1989).

Also before this court is Volvo's Motion to Quash the Muntzes' appeal. Volvo argues that Pa.R.A.P. 341(c) requires a trial court to act on an application for a determination of finality within 30 days of entry of the order and, because the trial court waited until December 5, 1994 to act on the Muntzes' application in this instance, the appeal should be quashed.

I. Motion to Quash

We first address Volvo's Motion to Quash the Muntzes' appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 341(c) (emphasis added), which provides in pertinent part:

(c) When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, ... or when multiple parties are involved, the trial court ... may enter a final order as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that an immediate appeal would facilitate resolution of the entire case. Such an order becomes appealable when entered. In the absence of such a determination and entry of a final order, any order ... that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or parties shall not constitute a final order.

(1) An order may be amended to include the determination of finality within 30 days of entry of the order. A notice of appeal or a petition for review may be filed within 30 days after entry of an order as amended....

(2) The trial court ... is required to act on an application for a determination of finality under subdivision (c) within 30 days of entry of the order.... Any denial of such an application shall be reviewable only for abuse of discretion pursuant to Chapter 15.

Here, this court, acting within its discretion, ⁵ disregarded the provisions of Pa.R.A.P. 341(c) and granted the Muntzes 30 days from the entry of its August 1, 1994 order to apply for a determination of finality. The Muntzes filed such an application on August 19, 1994, complying with this court's order. Because this court's order did not direct that the trial court act within 30 days of the Muntzes' application, we deny Volvo's Motion to Quash.

II. Federal Preemption

We next address whether the trial court erred in its reliance upon Pokorny in concluding that federal safety regulations preempted the Muntzes' common law action in tort. The Muntzes contend that the trial court should have relied, instead, on Gingold. Because we are not bound by decisions of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and because the preemption analysis of our superior court in Gingold is consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992), we adopt our superior court's analysis in Gingold. ⁶

Article VI of the United States Constitution provides that the laws of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Our consideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause starts with the assumption that the historic police powers of the states are not to be superseded by federal law unless that is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. Cipollone. Thus, the ultimate touchstone of preemption analysis is the intent of Congress, which may be explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose. Id.

Here, Congress has included in the Safety Act two provisions, a preemption clause and a savings clause, which explicitly address the issue of preemption. Section 1392(d) of the Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (emphasis added) (footnote added), ⁷ provides in pertinent part:

Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard ⁸ established under this subchapter is in effect, no State ... shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard.

In addition, section 1397(k) of the Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (emphasis added), ⁹ provides:

Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability under common law.

We believe that these provisions, when construed together ¹⁰ and in light of the presumption against preemption of state police power, provide a reliable indicium of congressional intent. Cipollone; Heiple v. C.R. Motors, 446 Pa.Superior Ct. 310, 666 A.2d 1066 (1995). Indeed, under section 1392(d) of the Safety Act, the minimum standards for motor vehicle safety promulgated by the federal government preempt only state safety standards governing the same item of equipment or aspect of vehicle performance. Section 1392(d) of the Safety Act does not provide for federal preemption of state common law tort actions. If that is not a clear enough statement of congressional intent, section 1397(k) of the Safety Act explicitly exempts state common law actions from federal preemption. ¹¹

Because the intent of Congress is manifest in sections 1392(d) and 1397(k) of the Safety Act, there is no need for us to perform an implied preemption analysis in order to infer that intent. ¹² Thus, we conclude that federal safety regulations promulgated pursuant to the Safety Act do not preempt state common law tort actions.

Accordingly, because Volvo is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 1st day of March, 1996, the Motion to Quash Plaintiff's Appeal filed by Volvo North America Corporation, Jim Wynn Volkswagen-Volvo a...