Murchison v. Plyler
| Decision Date | 31 October 1882 |
| Citation | 87 N.C. 79 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | A. K. MURCHISON and wife v. JOHN C. PLYLER. |
CIVIL ACTION tried at Fall Term, 1881, of IREDELL Superior Court, before Seymour, J.
The plaintiffs intermarried in the year 1870, and have infant children now living. In 1872, John A. Murchison, the father of the male plaintiff, died leaving a will in which he devised the land in controversy to his widow, Barbara, for life, with remainder in fee to his said son.
In 1875, the plaintiff, A. K. Murchison, executed a mortgage whereby he conveyed the said land to one Blackmer, as security for a debt--his wife however not joining in the same.
In 1876, Blackmer sold under the mortgage to one Summers, who on the 1st day of January, 1877, sold and conveyed the same to the defendant.
On the 10th day of March, 1877, the life tenant, Barbara Murchison, died. The plaintiffs, nor either of them, owned any other land than that in controversy, at the date of the execution of the mortgage to Blackmer, nor have they since acquired any, and their prayer is to have that instrument declared inoperative because of its non-execution by the feme plaintiff, and to have a homestead allotted to them in the premises.
His Honor, being of the opinion that there could be no homestead in a remainder sold during the pendency of the life estate, non-suited the plaintiffs, and they appealed.Mr. J. M. Clement, for plaintiffs .
Mr. D. M. Furches, for defendant .
A careful examination of the law in relation to homestead exemptions, as written in the constitution and the statute, and expounded by the courts, seems to lead necessarily to the conclusion, that land held in remainder dependent upon a life estate in another, is not susceptible of that immediate occupancy, which is contemplated by law, in order to constitute a homestead.
While it may not be necessary, and as declared by the courts, is not necessary in order to bring it within the purview of the law, that the land to be exempt should be actually occupied by the claimant of the exemption, it must still be so circumstanced with reference to his estate and interest therein, as to be presently subject to such occupancy.
According to the express provisions of both the statute and the constitution, it is the actual homestead and the dwelling and other buildings used therewith, or in lieu thereof, such portion of the owner's real estate as he may elect, and as is occupied by him, that is declared to be exempt from sale under execution.
Another provision is that the land shall be set apart by metes and bounds, and in case of the debtor's death, leaving a wife and no children, that the rents and profits thereof shall inure to the widow during her widowhood.
With every disposition liberally to construe the law, and to give the fullest effect to its beneficent intentions in behalf of the debtor, we cannot perceive how these provisions can be made to apply to a mere remainder in lands dependent upon a life estate. It could never have been, nor can it presently become the dwelling of the party. In no mode possible to conceive of, can a present interest therein, to the exact value of a thousand dollars, be defined by metes and bounds; nor, in the event of the owner's death, can the rents and profits inure to his widow.
The policy of the law is to provide a shelter for the...
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Scanland v. Walters
... ... have estates of homestead therein." Cases cited and to ... [324 Mo. 1094] the foregoing effect are Brokaw v ... Ogle, 170 Ill. 115; Murchison v. Plyler, 87 ... N.C. 79; Cornish v. Frees, 74 Wis. 490; ... Merrifield v. Merrifield, 82 Ky. 526; also Green ... v. Griffis-Newbern Co., ... ...
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Stern v. Lee
...in another is not susceptible of that immediate occupancy which is contemplated by law in order to constitute a homestead." Murchison v. Plyler, 87 N. C. 79. Hence, while the estate of the judgment debtor, Lee, in the land mentioned in the pleadings, was only an estate in remainder after th......
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Stern v. Lee
...in another is not susceptible of that immediate occupancy which is contemplated by law in order to constitute a homestead." Murchison v. Plyler, 87 N.C. 79. Hence, while estate of the judgment debtor, Lee, in the land mentioned in the pleadings, was only an estate in remainder after the lif......
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Brokaw v. Ogle
...set off. But two separate homesteads, thus laid off and described, cannot exist in the same land at one and the same time. Murchison v. Plyler, 87 N. C. 79. Moreover, homestead involves a present right of occupancy. As Mrs. Ogle was a life tenant, she was entitled to the present right of oc......