Murdock v. Castigliola
| Decision Date | 15 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION Docket No.: CV-13-534 |
| Parties | ARTHUR MURDOCK, Plaintiff, v. ANGELO CASTIGLIOLA, III et al, Defendants |
| Court | Maine Superior Court |
STATE OF MAINE
CUMBERLAND, ss
ORDER GRANTING CERTIFICATION OF THE COURT'S ORDER DATED JANUARY 22, 2015 AS A FINAL JUDGEMENT UNDER M.R. CIV.P.54 (B)(1)
Plaintiff Arthur Murdock has moved for an order certifying the court's January 22, 2015 Order as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b)(1) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, the Court grants Murdock's motion.
This case stems from a motor vehicle collision in which Murdock's vehicle was struck by a vehicle driven by defendant Angelo Castigliola. In its January 22 Order the court dismissed Murdock's uninsured motorist claim against Murdock's employer, the Maine Department of Public Safety, on the grounds that, as a matter of law, the State is exempt from the requirements of Maine's uninsured motorist statute. The court also dismissed Murdock's claim against defendant Martin Thorne in light of Murdock's testimony that he knew he could not and did not rely on Thorne's signaling to assume that he had a safe passage across the next lane of traffic.
Under Rule 54(b)(1), the Court "may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay." In deciding whether to certify a partial judgment, the Court considers several factors, including: (1) the relationship between the adjudicated and the unadjudicated claims; (2) the possibility that the need for review may be mooted by future developments; (3) the likelihood that the appellate court will face the same issues more than once; (4) the extent to which an immediate appeal might expedite or delay the trial court proceedings; (5) the nature of the legal questions presented as clear or difficult; (6) the economic effect of the appeal and any associated delay on all parties; (7) other factors such as solvency considerations and res judicata or collateral estoppel effects. Marquis v Town of Kennebunk, 2011 ME 128 ¶13, 36 A.3d 861.
Most of those factors support Rule 54 (b) certification in this case.
First, none of the rulings made by the court in its January 22 order will be mooted by proceeding with the trial of the only remaining claims - Murdock's claims against Castigliola and Patrons Oxford Insurance Co.1 If an appeal from the dismissal of the claims against Thorne and the Department of Public Safety is taken now, the court sees no possibility that the same issues would be presented to the Law Court a second time. The Law Court has not ruled on the issue of whether and under what circumstances a driver who signals that another driver can make a left turn can be found negligent if there is a subsequent collision with a third vehicle.2
Allowing an appeal will delay adjudication of the claim against Castigliola but Murdock, who is seeking to appeal, is willing to accept that delay. Counsel for Castigliola did not object to Murdock's Rule 54(b) motion. In addition, if the claims against Castigliola proceeded to trial and the Law Court subsequently reversed the dismissal of Murdock's claim against Thorne, therewould be a distinct possibility that the same evidence would be offered at the trial against Castigliola and the trial against Thorne.
Practical considerations also strongly favor an appeal. Counsel has advised the Court that the worker's compensation lien in this case is sufficiently large - compared to the limited insurance coverage available on the claims against Castigliola and Patrons Oxford - that it would not make economic sense to proceed on the claims against Castigliola and Patrons Oxford alone. The dismissal of the claims against Thorne and the Department of Public Safety therefore should be addressed by the Law Court before the parties proceed to trial to trial on the remaining claims.
The entry shall be:
The Court finds that there is no just reason for delay and directs that final judgment be entered on the January 22, 2015 order dismissing counts I and II of the complaint for the purpose of allowing immediate appeal.
The clerk is instructed to incorporate this order by reference.
/s/_________
Thomas D. Warren
Justice, Superior Court
JAMES BOWIE ESQ
THOMPSON & BOWIE
PO BOX 4630
PORTLAND ME 04112-4630
CHRISTOPHER DINAN ESQ
MONAGHAN LEAHY LLP
PO BOX 7046
PORTLAND ME 04112-7046
PHILIP MANCINI ESQ
DRUMMOND & DRUMMOND LLP
ONE MONUMENT WAY
PORTLAND ME 04101
THOMAS KNOWLTON AAG
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
AUGUSTA ME 04333-0006
ELIZABETH GERMANI ESQ
GERMANI MARTEMUCCI & HILL
Before the court is a motion for summary judgment filed by defendant Angelo Castigliola. The court has previously ruled on motions for summary judgment filed by defendants Martin Thorne and Maine Department of Public Safety in a January 22, 2015 order.
As noted in the January 22, 2015 order, summary judgment should be granted if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to consider only the portions of the record referred to and the material facts set forth in the parties' Rule 56(h) statements. E.g., Johnson v. McNeil, 2002 ME 99 ¶ 8, 800 A.2d 702. The facts must be considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. Thus, for purposes of summary judgment, any factual disputes must be resolved against the movant. Nevertheless, when the facts offered by a party in opposition to summary judgment would not, if offered attrial, be sufficient to withstand a motion for judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment should be granted. Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 1997 ME 99 ¶ 8, 694 A.2d 924.
Certain facts are undisputed. To the extent that there is any difference between the version of the facts presented by Castigliola and that presented by Murdock, the court will rely on Murdock's version of events because the record on summary judgment must be considered in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.
Castigliola was the driver of a vehicle that collided with Murdock's vehicle on Skyway Drive in Portland on January 26, 2010. At the time of the accident Murdock was a Lieutenant in the State Police driving a state police cruiser.
Before the collision Murdock was traveling westbound on Skyway Drive preparing to turn left across Skyway Drive into the entrance of the State Police Barracks. His lights and siren were not activated. There are two eastbound lanes on Skyway Drive at that location. Castigliola SMF ¶ 2, as qualified in Murdock's opposing SMF.
Martin Thorne was traveling in the innermost of the two eastbound lanes, approaching the location where Murdock was preparing to turn. Thorne stopped and, after checking his side view mirror to ascertain whether the outside eastbound lane was clear, gestured to Murdock that Murdock could turn in front of Thorne. Castigliola SMF ¶¶ 3-4, as qualified in Murdock's SMF.
Murdock, in response to Thorne's gesture, inched forward to see if the outside lane was clear. Murdock had a clear line of sight for about 100 feet down Skyway Drive. Determining that the outside lane was clear, he proceeded across Skyway Drive. Castigliola SMF ¶¶ 5-7 (admitted).
Murdock's vehicle collided with Castigliola's vehicle, travelling in the outer eastbound lane, after Murdock had proceeded across less than the width of that lane. Before Murdock had begun crossing into the outer eastbound lane, Thorne saw the Castigliola vehicle approaching in the outer eastbound lane. Castigliola SMF ¶¶ 8-9 (admitted). Specifically, Thorne had previously seen a clear lane but just as Murdock's vehicle started to proceed, Thorne saw movement in his right hand side mirror. Thorne Dep. 14 and Thorne Interrogatory Answer 7, cited in Murdock SAMF ¶ 1.
On the existing record, the court finds that there are factual disputes that preclude summary judgment for Castigliola. First, the summary judgment record does not rule out that excessive speed by Castigliola caused or contributed to the collision. Although Castigliola's past driving record may not be admissible, a jury would not be obliged to accept Castigliola's testimony that he was driving within the speed limit, particularly if it accepted Murdock's testimony that he looked to see if the outside lane was clear and saw nothing before he proceeded. A jury would not be compelled to find that Murdock negligently failed to see "what was there to be seen" -Castigliola's oncoming vehicle - if Castigliola was approaching at an unsafe speed.
Moreover, while the court agrees with Castigliola that under the rules of the road, his vehicle had the right of way, 29-A M.R.S. § 2053(5), a violation of the rules of the road is evidence of negligence but is not conclusive. Even if Castigliola was not speeding, a jury could find that Castigliola was negligent if he had the opportunity to stop in time or otherwise avoid a collision with Murdock and negligently failed to do so. This would be true even thoughCastigliola had the right of way. In fact, one of the cases relied upon by Castigliola also states that a driver who has the right of way may assume that other drivers will yield "until circumstances develop which show that assumption to be unwarranted." Blaisdell v. Reid, 352 A.2d 756, 758 (Me. 1976) (emphasis in original).
Under the principle that a driver is not required to anticipate negligence by another driver until a contrary situation becomes apparent, the summary judgment record does not foreclose the possibility that a contrary situation became apparent here in time for Castigliola to avoid the collision, that Castigliola was negligent if failing to do so, and that such negligence caused or...
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