Murdock v. Montgomery Cnty.

• Decision Date: 17 September 2021
• Docket Number: 2:16-cv-444-RAH (WO)
• Parties: CARL M. MURDOCK, JR., Plaintiff, v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, ALABAMA, et al, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

CARL M. MURDOCK, JR., Plaintiff, v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, ALABAMA, et al, Defendants.

No. 2:16-cv-444-RAH (WO)

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division

September 17, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

R. AUSTIN HUFFAKER, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

I. INTRODUCTION

This lawsuit arose following a series of troubling events that resulted in Plaintiff Carl M. Murdock, Jr.'s prolonged detention in the Montgomery County Detention Facility. After his arrest on an outstanding, four-year-old warrant, Murdock was placed into custody and-despite numerous written and verbal complaints to detention facility staff-was denied a court appearance until his 48th day in custody.^[1] When Murdock finally appeared before a Montgomery County circuit court judge, the judge explained that the warrant had been mistakenly issued due to a “clerical error” and ordered Murdock's immediate release. In this 42 U.S.C § 1983 action, Murdock contends that his 48-day detention violated his civil rights.

Murdock names as defendants: the City of Montgomery; former Montgomery Police Department (MPD) Chief Kevin Murphy;^[2] MPD Officers Jeremy Lewis and Nickie Givan; Montgomery County; former Montgomery County Chief Deputy Sheriff Derrick Cunningham;^[3] Montgomery County Detention Facility Director of Detention Colonel Wanda Robinson; and Montgomery County Detention Facility Assistant Director of Detention Major Barbara Palmer. (Doc. 32.)

In his First Amended Complaint, the operative one here, Murdock asserts both federal constitutional and state law claims against the Defendants. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he asserts the following constitutional claims:

(1) All Defendants deprived Murdock of his constitutionally protected rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, including the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and the right not to be deprived of liberty or property without due process of law. (Doc. 32 at 10-11 (Count I).)

(2) Montgomery County, Cunningham, Robinson, and Palmer along with the City of Montgomery and Murphy, acted with deliberate indifference by promulgating a custom or policy of inadequate training and supervision, thereby causing Murdock's wrongful arrest and 48-day detention without a court appearance, in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 11-12 (Count II).)

(3) Montgomery County, Cunningham, City of Montgomery, and Murphy failed to implement and/or use appropriate policies, customs, and practices in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 12-13 (Count III).)

(4) Robinson and Palmer failed to implement or use appropriate policies, customs, and practices in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 14 (Count IV).)

(5) Montgomery County acted with deliberate indifference to Murdock's constitutional rights by failing to fund and provide appropriate equipment to ensure proper functioning of the jail, timely release of prisoners, timely criminal procedure, and adequate functioning of the Montgomery County Detention Facility. (Id. at 14-16 (Count V).)

With respect to the § 1983 claims, Murdock seeks injunctive relief against the individual Defendants in their official capacities and monetary relief in their individual capacities. He also seeks monetary relief against the City of Montgomery and Montgomery County.

In addition to his federal constitutional claims, Murdock advances the following state law claims:

(1) Montgomery County negligently breached its statutory duties by failing to fund adequate equipment for the detention facility and failing to “ensure the circuit court system was adequate and commodious, ” thereby causing Murdock's wrongful imprisonment and prolonged detention. (Id. at 16-17 (Count VI).)

(2) Cunningham, Robinson, Palmer, Murphy, Lewis, and Givan all subjected Murdock to false imprisonment. (Doc. 32 at 17-18 (Count VII).)

(3) Lewis and Givan engaged in an abuse of process. (Id. at 18 (Count VIII).)

(4) Lewis and Givan maliciously prosecuted Murdock. (Id. at 19 (Count IX).)

(5) Cunningham, Murphy, Lewis, and Givan engaged in a conspiracy to arrest Murdock and deprive him of due process. (Id. at 19-20 (Count X).)

(6) The City of Montgomery is responsible for the negligence of its agents, including Cunningham, Robinson, Palmer, Murphy, Lewis, and Givan pursuant to § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975. (Id. at 20 (Count XI).)

With respect to the state law claims, Murdock seeks injunctive relief against the Defendants in their official capacities, and monetary relief against them in their individual capacities.

Pending before the court are two motions for summary judgment. Defendants City of Montgomery, Murphy, Lewis, and Givan (collectively, the City Defendants) filed a motion for summary judgment on June 16, 2017. (Doc. 46.) Defendants Montgomery County, Cunningham, Robinson, and Palmer (collectively, the County Defendants) filed a motion for summary judgment on June 19, 2017. (Doc. 48.) Both motions have been fully briefed by the parties and are ripe for review. (Docs. 47, 50, 53, 54, 55, 57.)

For the reasons that follow, the City Defendants' motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED as to the federal claims. The County Defendants' motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

II. JURISDICTION

The court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367. Personal jurisdiction and venue are uncontested.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is proper if the evidence shows ‘that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'” Hornsby-Culpepper v. Ware, 906 F.3d 1302, 1311 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)). “[A] court generally must view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Fla. Int'l Univ. Bd. Of Trs. v. Fla. Nat'l Univ., Inc., 830 F.3d 1242, 1252 (11th Cir. 2016). However, “conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value.” Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 981 F.3d 911, 924-25 (11th Cir. 2018). If the record, taken as a whole, “could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, ” then there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Hornsby-Culpepper, 906 F.3d at 1311 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the movant must identify the portions of the record which support this proposition. Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). Moreover, the movant may carry this burden “by demonstrating that the nonmoving party has failed to present sufficient evidence to support an essential element of the case.” Id. The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to establish, by going beyond the pleadings, that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. at 1311-12.

A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the plaintiff produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in his favor such that summary judgment is not warranted. Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007); Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cnty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). However, disputes involving material facts are relevant and materiality is determined by the substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “[T]here must exist a conflict in substantial evidence to pose a jury question.” Hall v. Sunjoy Indus. Group, Inc., 764 F.Supp.2d 1297, 1301 (M.D. Fla. 2011).

“[T]he judge's function [at the summary judgment stage] is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine [dispute] for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. In addition, when determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the law requires a court to accept as true “statements in [the plaintiff's] verified complaint, sworn response to the officers' motion for summary judgment, and sworn affidavit attached to that response.” Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2019); see also United States v. Stein, 881 F.3d 853, 857 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that a plaintiff's purely self-serving and uncorroborated statements “based on personal knowledge or observation” set forth in a verified complaint or affidavit may create an issue of material fact which precludes summary judgment).

“As a general principle, a plaintiff's testimony cannot be discounted on summary judgment unless it is blatantly contradicted by the record, blatantly inconsistent, or incredible as a matter of law, meaning it relates facts that could not have possibly been observed or events that are contrary to the laws of nature.” Sears, 922 F.3d at 1208 (quoting Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir. 2019)).

IV. BACKGROUND

The facts, taken in the light most favorable to Murdock as the non-movant, are as follows:

A. Murdock's Arrest

On May 4, 2006, Murdock pleaded guilty in the Montgomery County Circuit Court to second-degree theft of property and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment, followed by three years of probation. (Doc. 49-5 at 2, 39.) Upon his release from Kilby Correctional Facility in January 2010, the circuit court placed...