Murdock v. Reynolds

• Decision Date: 23 December 1929
• Docket Number: 64
• Parties: MURDOCK v. REYNOLDS
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

22 S.W.2d 1007

180 Ark. 729

MURDOCK v. REYNOLDS

No. 64

Supreme Court of Arkansas

December 23, 1929

Appeal from Union Circuit Court, Second Division; W. A. Speer Judge; reversed.

STATEMENT BY THE COURT.

Appellee brought this suit upon a written contract providing for his drilling a test oil well in wild-cat territory belonging to appellant, for the value of extra casing alleged to have been required put into the well by appellant, for which he was bound to pay, and for damages resulting from delay in the furnishing of the casing. A copy of the contract was exhibited with the complaint.

The answer admitted the execution of the contract, denied the allegations of the complaint, denied that the casing had been required to be furnished by him, and any obligation under the contract to pay for it, denied that he was indebted in any manner or sum to the plaintiff as alleged, having paid the entire contract price specified on completion of the well and alleged that any damage caused from delay in the drilling resulted from appellee's own negligence and carelessness in not carrying on the work in a workmanlike manner, and in accordance with the contract. An amendment to the answer was filed, alleging that the two strings of extra casing were used at the depth alleged in order to shut out the artesian water encountered, and that the necessity for doing this was brought about by plaintiff failing to use proper equipment to drill the well, according to the terms of the contract, and negligently failing to continue to operate the drill, keeping in circulation the mixture of mud in the well, and also to keep the well filled with a proper mixture of mud to protect the walls against water flows, and that if plaintiff found it necessary to use the oxide of iron the necessity arose through his negligence, as alleged, and that defendant was in no wise liable for the two strings of extra casing, and the use and handling of the oxide of iron therein; also denied any liability for damages alleged to have resulted from shutting down the operation of the rig while waiting for the purchase and setting of the extra casing; denied authorizing the plaintiff to pull the 10- and 12-inch extra casing out of the well and stack it on the location site.

The contract provides that the well should be drilled to a depth of 3,000 feet, unless oil producing sand was sooner found that it was to be drilled in a certain dimension in a workmanlike manner to the first casing seat, or depth of 2,300 feet. It was agreed that, if the well was completed as a producer of oil or gas in commercial quantities, at a depth of 2,500 feet or less, the consideration to be paid was$ 7,500, and, if completed at 3,000 feet, or a point beyond 2,500, the price was$ 9,000; the driller or contractor to furnish all labor and materials necessary for the drilling and completion of the well. The contract provides, relative to the casing, as follows: "Should, and when, the owner requires a test and the setting of casing, exclusive of surface casing, which the contractor agrees to buy and set at his own expense, the owner hereby agrees to purchase and furnish the contractor with the casing required by the owner to be set by the contractor, and all labor and fuel incident to the setting of said casing at any given point shall be borne by the contractor, and is included in the contract price mentioned herein."

The contractor procured and furnished the casing to shut out the artesian water, protesting that it was not his own but the duty of the owner to supply it, and the well came in a dry hole, with no test made at its completion, and the contractor was paid the amount specified in the contract for its completion, bringing suit for the price of the casing and the damages resulting from delay in its being furnished.

The court refused to allow certain oral testimony explaining the terms of the contract to be introduced, and gave certain instructions over appellant's objections and exceptions, and from the judgment against him the appeal is prosecuted.

Cause reversed, and remanded.

Jno. E. Harris and Compere & Compere, for appellant.

Gaughan, Sifford, Godwin & Gaughan, for appellee.

OPINION

KIRBY, J., (after stating the facts).

It is insisted for reversal that the court erred in refusing to allow the parol evidence introduced, explaining the terms of "a turnkey job" under the provisions of the contract, and in giving instructions Nos. 1, 2 and 3 for the plaintiff, and refusing to give requested instructions Nos. 8 and 10 for the appellant.

Instruction No. 3, complained of, told the jury that, "under the terms of the contract and under the evidence herein," that the plaintiff was required to drill the well under the direction and supervision of the Lion Oil and Refining Company, as well as the defendant, and the defendant was bound by any requirements made by a duly authorized representative of the Lion Oil and Refining Company. This instruction was a...