Murphy v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 2000-SC-0015-MR.
| Decision Date | 12 June 2003 |
| Docket Number | 2000-SC-0015-MR. |
| Parties | MARVIN DALE MURPHY, APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, APPELLEE. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Karen Maurer, Assistant Public Advocate, Fraknfort, Kentucky, Counsel for appellant.
A. B. Chandler, III, Attorney General, and Dennis W. Shepherd, Frankfort, Kentucky, Counsel for appellee.
AFFIRMING
A McCracken Circuit Court jury found Appellant guilty but mentally ill of Murder and felony Theft by Unlawful Taking (TBUT) and recommended concurrent sentences of life imprisonment and one (1) year. The trial court entered judgment in accordance with the jury's recommendation, and Appellant appeals to this Court as a matter of right.1 After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the McCracken Circuit Court.
The McCracken County Grand Jury indicted Appellant for murder and felony TBUT after he bludgeoned Martin "Skeeter" Overby ("Overby") to death with a hammer and later fled the jurisdiction in a car that he stole from Overby. Appellant, who suffers from chronic paranoid schizophrenia, did not dispute the underlying facts that were alleged in the indictment and entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Accordingly, we will focus on the evidence as it relates to Appellant's defense.
In 1994, Appellant's grandmother, with whom he was apparently very close, died of an aneurysm. Appellant, however, allegedly became convinced that Overby had raped and murdered his grandmother, and Appellant's family members were unsuccessful in their attempts to dissuade him of this erroneous belief. At trial, Appellant entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and defended against the Commonwealth's allegations with evidence suggesting that delusions associated with his mental condition prevented him from appreciating the criminality of his actions.2
In 1996, Appellant located a hammer, traveled to Overby's apartment, and killed Overby by striking him fifteen (15) times with the hammer. Appellant then cleaned the hammer, wrapped it in a towel, and left it in a sink at Overby's home. A few hours later, Appellant returned to Overby's apartment, retrieved the hammer, and threw it and the towel into a river. Appellant then showered and cleaned some of his clothes with peroxide before again returning to Overby's apartment where he took Overby's car. Appellant was arrested the following day in Indiana and later confessed that he had killed Overby.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it failed to direct a verdict in his favor after the Commonwealth failed to introduce its own expert testimony or otherwise contest the testimony of the experts who testified on behalf of Appellant that he was unable to appreciate the criminality of his actions.
We review such alleged errors under the standard articulated by this Court in Commonwealth v. Benham:3
On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to such testimony.
On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.4
This Court has applied this "clearly unreasonable" standard when reviewing directed verdict denials in insanity cases:
The appellant does, however, raise an interesting question as to what is the required standard of measurement in determining whether the case should be submitted to the jury [or] whether the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict. The relevant determining factor is not whether there needed to be expert testimony presented in rebuttal. "It is not necessary that there be a battle between experts as to the sanity of the accused." Rather the issue we address is whether the evidence presented on the record, inclusive or exclusive of expert testimony, was sufficient to present a jury issue, thereby defeating appellant's directed verdict motion.
This Court has previously announced this standard in our opinion in Ice v. Commonwealth, where we stated when "[i]t would not be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find against the defendant on the issue of insanity," it may be submitted to the jury. The applicable standard in this case, therefore, is whether it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find against the defendant on the issue of insanity. . . .
At oral argument, the Commonwealth suggested that this Court's holding in Haves v. Commonwealth, enables the issue of insanity to be submitted to the jury because of our statement that "where there is any evidence indicative of his sanity, there is presented an issue of fact for a jury determination." In isolated context, this statement could mistakenly be interpreted to lessen the standard required, in this particular circumstance, to deny a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. . . . The use of "any" evidence refers to the acceptable usage of lay testimony to rebut the testimony of experts on the issue of insanity. The mere presence of any evidence does not necessarily enable the issue to be submitted for jury determination. At this point, the evidence that has been presented must still, "when taken as a whole," meet the sufficiency requirements set forth in Ice, Trowel, and Sawhill.5
In the case at bar, four (4) expert witnesses testified on Appellant's behalf: (1) Dr. Nicholas, a clinical psychologist, who testified that Appellant was suffering from schizophrenia and was unable to control his actions or understand that his actions were "over the edge"; (2) Dr. Dennis Wilson, also a clinical psychologist, who testified that Appellant committed his crimes at God's direction and that Appellant could not appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law; (3) Dr. Candace Walker, a psychiatrist at the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC), who testified that Appellant was "clearly psychotic" when she evaluated him in April of 1997 and that she believed Appellant was insane at the time of the crime; and (4) Dr. Walter Butler, Appellant's treating psychiatrist at Central State Hospital, who testified that Appellant was schizophrenic, but did not offer an opinion as to Appellant's mental condition at the time of the crime.
The Commonwealth did not present its own expert evidence on the question of Appellant's sanity, and instead relied upon its cross-examination of the experts who testified on Appellant's behalf. The Commonwealth attempted to impeach Appellant's experts on the basis of their previous hired testimony on behalf of criminal defendants and/or the limited extent of the testing that they personally conducted. The Commonwealth further questioned the credibility of Appellant's experts by confronting them with the known circumstances of this crime, as the following passage from the Commonwealth's cross-examination of Dr. Nicholas illustrates:
Comm.: And you would agree with me that wiping the prints off of a hammer shows that Mr. Murphy knew that his conduct was criminal?
Nicholas: It shows that Mr. Murphy was responding to a prompt — whether that prompt was, whether it was of delusional content or not — that he wipe the fingerprints off the hammer . . .
Comm.: Now, you would agree with me, wouldn't you, Dr. Nicholas, that throwing the murder weapon into Clark's river would show that he was aware of the criminality of his conduct?
Nicholas: He was aware of it, but I would also have to say that he may have been responding as well to a delusional or hallucinogenic event that prompted him to throw it into Clark's river.
Comm: You would agree with me that taking a bloody jacket and wiping it off with peroxide would show that he could appreciate, or was aware of, the criminality of his conduct?
Nicholas: Yes, but again I would question how he was aware.
Comm: And you would agree with me that taking his car because he knew — the victim's car — because he knew it couldn't be traced would show that he could appreciate what he did was criminal?
Nicholas: Yes, but — yes.
Comm: And you would agree with me that fleeing Paducah within hours of the murder would show that he could appreciate the criminality of his conduct?
Nicholas: Yes, but once again, I would question how he came to that appreciation.
Although disputes regarding a defendant's sanity typically pit expert testimony against that of lay persons and/or other experts,6 we have held that "the circumstances preceding the commission of the crime, the evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding its occurrence, and the activities of the accused thereafter when taken as a whole were sufficient to submit the issue of insanity to the jury."7 We empanel juries to assess witnesses' credibility, and the Commonwealth's cross-examination of Appellant's experts regarding the incongruity of their opinions with the circumstances of the crime,8 as well as Appellant's own detailed confession,9 reasonably permitted this jury to reach the verdict that it did — i.e., that that Appellant was mentally ill, but not legally insane, at the time he committed these offenses. Thus, 10 We hold that the trial court properly denied Appellant's ...
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