Murphy v. Davis

• Decision Date: 23 January 2017
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:10-CV-163-N
• Parties: JEDIDIAH ISAAC MURPHY, Petitioner, v. LORIE DAVIS, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

JEDIDIAH ISAAC MURPHY, Petitioner, v. LORIE DAVIS, Respondent.

Civil Action No. 3:10-CV-163-N

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

January 23, 2017

(Death Penalty Case)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING RELIEF

Jedidiah Isaac Murphy petitions the Court for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that his conviction and death sentence are unconstitutional because the prosecution suppressed exculpatory evidence regarding an extraneous offense, because Murphy received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, because the trial court improperly excused a potential juror for cause and improperly prohibited Murphy from asking potential jurors about victim impact and character evidence. Following an agreed abeyance to exhaust claims in state court, and due to the allegations raising a potential conflict under Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), the matter was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge and independent counsel was appointed to investigate the issue affecting Murphy's representation before this Court. Having reviewed the record and the report of independent counsel, the Court adopts the recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge and denies the requested relief.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Murphy was convicted and sentenced to death for the capital murder of eighty-year-old Bertie Cunningham, who had given him a ride in her car. State v. Murphy, Cause No. F-00-02424-NM (194th Jud. Dist. Ct., Dallas Cnty., Tex. June 30, 2001). Sitting en banc, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ("CCA") unanimously affirmed the conviction and death sentence. Murphy v. State, 112 S.W.3d 592 (Tex. Crim. App. June 25, 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 940 (2004). During the pendency of his direct appeal, Murphy filed his first postconviction application for a writ of habeas corpus in the state trial court in cause number W-00-02424-A on May 12, 2003. (State Habeas Clerk's Record, "SHCR," at 2). The CCA adopted the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law to deny relief. Ex parte Murphy, No. WR-70,832-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 25, 2009).

Murphy filed his original petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court on January 28, 2010, which included a request to stay these proceedings to exhaust his claims of (1) suppression of evidence and use of false testimony by the prosecution, (2) ineffective assistance of counsel at the punishment stage, and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt-innocence stage. (Pet., doc. 1; Pet. Br., doc. 3.) Respondent filed his "Non-Opposition to Petitioner Murphy's Motion to Stay and Abate Proceedings" (doc. 9). The Court found that this agreement complied with Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), and stayed these proceedings to allow Murphy to exhaust these claims. (Order, doc. 10.) Following abeyance, Murphy filed a subsequent state habeas application which was dismissed by the CCA as an abuse of the writ following a remand and evidentiary hearing, and Murphy returned to this Court. Ex parte Murphy, No. WR-70832-02, 2012 WL 982945 (Tex. Crim. App. March 21, 2012) (per curiam).

The day before the CCA dismissed the subsequent state habeas application, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), creating an exception to procedural bar for claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that were not presented to the statecourt in the initial-review collateral proceedings because of the ineffective assistance of state habeas counsel. The following year, this exception was applied to Texas cases in Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013). Because Murphy's current counsel allege that they represented Murphy before the CCA in the original state habeas proceedings and such allegation has support in the record, this case was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for hearing, if necessary, and recommendation or determination to this Court on the question of whether Murphy desires the appointment of new, independent counsel to investigate whether any claims were not presented to the state court under Martinez v. Ryan because of the ineffective assistance of any attorney representing Murphy in this Court. (Mem. Op. & Order, doc. 24.) After Murphy and his counsel filed their notice of non-opposition (doc. 26), the Magistrate Judge appointed Don Vernay as independent counsel. (Order, doc. 30.)

Vernay investigated this case, consulted with Murphy regarding the results of his investigation, and made a report to the Court.¹ (Report, doc. 34.) In his report, Vernay concluded that (1) "trial counsel conducted a vigorous, thorough and extremely competent pretrial investigation, voir dire and defense at trial in both the guilt and punishment phases," (2) "federal habeas counsel also investigated the Petitioner's case thoroughly and competently" and raised the ineffective assistance of counsel claims considered meritorious, (3) Murphy "is completely satisfied with the performance of his current counsel" and wishes to keep them as his attorneys of record, and (4) independent counsel could "find no additional cognizable claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that could or should have been raised by current habeas counsel in a state successor petition for habeas corpus or an amended federal petition for habeas corpus." (Report at 9-10.) TheMagistrate Judge reviewed that report and recommended that it be accepted by this Court. (Recommendation, doc. 35.) No objections have been made to the findings and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

This Court has reviewed the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (doc. 35) and the report of independent counsel (doc. 34), and ADOPTS the recommendation to accept the report of independent counsel.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The state court described the facts of the offense as follows:

During the afternoon hours of Wednesday, October 4, 2000, Murphy kidnapped, robbed, and murdered 80-year-old Bertie Cunningham while Ms. Cunningham was on her way home from shopping at the Collin Creek Mall in Plano. Murphy forced Ms. Cunningham into the trunk of her car and shot her in the head. (RR47: 23-31, 44-47; RR49: 42-44). The medical examiner testified that although Ms. Cunningham's wound was fatal, her death was not instantaneous; she may have lived for several minutes or longer in a comatose state. (RR49: S0-51, 58-59).

Immediately after the shooting, Murphy repeatedly attempted to withdraw money from Ms. Cunningham's bank account using her ATM card. These attempts failed, but over the next two days, Murphy successfully used Ms. Cunningham's credit cards at various retail and restaurant locations. (RR47: 150-52, 156-61).

Shortly after shooting Ms. Cunningham and while she was still in the trunk, Murphy picked up his niece and two of her teenage friends and drove them around in Ms. Cunningham's car. He purchased beer for himself, then he purchased the two teenage boys motorized scooters from a Richardson sporting goods shop using Ms. Cunningham's credit card. (RR47: 89-99). The next day, Murphy drove to Van Zandt County to visit his friend Treshod Tarrant, and bought dinner, beer, and liquor. The police discovered Murphy at Tarrant's grandmother's house early the next morning and arrested him. (RR47: 202-211, 242-48; RR48: 78-80). Ms. Cunningham's vehicle was parked near the house.

Upon his arrest, Murphy admitted he had dumped Ms. Cunningham's body in a creek. (RR48: 84-90). He led police to the location of the body and subsequently executed a written statement in which he claimed he accidentally shot Ms. Cunningham while forcing her into the trunk. (RR48: 175-84; State's Exhibit 47).

(Subsequent State Habeas Record ("SSHR") at 20-22.) These findings are entitled to deference. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

III. CLAIMS

Murphy presents five claims for relief, arguing:

1. The prosecution suppressed evidence that the victim of an extraneous offense admitted at the punishment stage she was uncertain regarding Murphy's identity, and presented false evidence that she was certain (Am. Pet. Br. at 28-36);

2. Murphy was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at the punishment phase of his trial (Am. Pet. Br. at 36-58);

3. Murphy was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at the guilt/innocense phase of his trial (Am. Pet. Br. at 58-64);

4. The trial court violated Murphy's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment when it excused venireperson Treat for cause (Am. Pet. Br. at 65-70); and

5. Murphy's counsel was prohibited from asking proper questions regarding victim impact and character evidence during the voir dire examination (Am. Pet. Br. at 70-74).

Murphy also requests an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims (Am. Pet. Br. at 26-27, 75). Respondent asserts that the first three claims are defaulted and procedurally barred and in the alternative that they lack merit. (Ans. at 22-63, 72-75, 82-84, 87-88, 90-92, 96, 98.) Respondent also asserts that the fourth and fifth claims lack merit and were properly denied by the state court. (Ans. at 103-114.)

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal habeas review of these claims is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). This statute sets forth the preliminary requirements that must be satisfied before reaching the merits of a claim made in afederal habeas proceeding.

A. Exhaustion

Under this statute, a federal court may not grant habeas relief on any claim that the state prisoner has not first exhausted in the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). However, the federal court may deny relief on the merits notwithstanding any failure to exhaust. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2); Miller v. Dretke, 431 F.3d 241, 245 (5th Cir. 2005).

B. State-Court Procedural Determinations

If the state court denies a claim on state procedural grounds, a federal court will not reach the...