Murphy v. Daytona Beach Humane Soc., Inc., G-256

• Citation: 176 So.2d 922
• Decision Date: 29 June 1965
• Docket Number: No. G-256,G-256
• Parties: George A. MURPHY, individually, and as Chairman of Taxpayers Dogwatch Committee, Appellant, v. DAYTONA BEACH HUMANE SOCIETY, INC., a non-profit corporation, Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Florida (US)

Page 922

176 So.2d 922

George A. MURPHY, individually, and as Chairman of Taxpayers Dogwatch Committee, Appellant, v. DAYTONA BEACH HUMANE SOCIETY, INC., a non-profit corporation, Appellee.

No. G-256.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

June 29, 1965.

Anthony J. Grezik, Daytona Beach, for appellant.

Thomas A. Koehler, Daytona Beach, for appellee.

RAWLS, Judge.

This is an interlocutory appeal by George A. Murphy from a temporary restraining order.

Daytona Beach Humane Society, Inc., a nonprofit corporation, filed its complaint against Murphy, individually and as Chairman of Taxpayers Dogwatch Committee, alleging that Murphy is attempting to hamper the operations of the society by approaching Society members and public officials and by certain correspondence and publications which falsely attack the management and officers of the Society and create the impression that the plaintiff organization is misusing municipal tax funds paid to the organization for certain services. It is alleged that all of these activities will cause irreparable harm by discouraging membership in the Society and by hampering its drive for contributions to the Society's building fund for the construction of a new animal shelter and administrative office on a parcel of land recently acquired from Volusia County. Attached to and made a part of the complaint are several letters and publications. The Society contends that the substance of these documents is that Murphy has charged the Society with mismanagement of its funds (52% of which are derived from taxes), with undemocratic and unbusinesslike manner of opeation, and with control in the hands of officers who are benefiting, directly, or indirectly, from Society funds. Since we must view the pleading in the light most favorable to the Appellee, we accept its view of these publications for the purposes of this appeal.

The chancellor's temporary restraining order reflects that hearing was held on February 16, 1965, that the case 'is a proper cause for the granting of a temporary restraining order' and that the defendants 'are hereby enjoined and restrained from the publishing of any further newspaper publications, correspondence or the circulation of further printed material attacking the management and character of the Officers and Directors of the Plaintiff corporation.'

The sole question presented by this interlocutory appeal is whether the chancellor erred in finding that this is a proper cause in which he may exercise his discretion in issuing the temporary injunction.

The arguments of the appellant are the same as those advanced many times during the past century for similar cases in numerous jurisdictions. He contends that the temporary injunction is a denial of his freedom of speech and press; that the seeking of an injunction does not confer equitable jurisdiction; that equity will not assume jurisdictions where there is an adequate remedy at law; and that according to the weight of authority and law of this State, equity will not enjoin the commission of a threatened libel or slander.

We would be remiss if we did not note at the outset that the essence of this complaint is that a former member, now expelled, has charged mismanagement of the funds of a nonprofit organization which derives its moneys from membership fees, public solicitations and tax funds. The complaint does not allege malice. It does allege that some of the statements in the attached publications are untrue but does not designate which statements. The attached documents do show concern for what they term the 'fiscal irresponsibility of the Society' in its use of tax funds. Matters of public interest are generally considered legitimate subjects of criticism, however severe, unless made maliciously. Private corporations which claim the confidence of the public and seek the possession of public funds are among the subjects that may be criticised in accordance with the rules of fair comment, and it has even been said that bona fide criticism of such corporations should be encouraged as a means of public security, rather than suppressed. ¹ However, this is not an action at law to recover damages for libel, and the subject matter of the alleged libel is not decisive of the issue here, not only because the parties failed to argue the point but also because the outcome of this appeal is squarely controlled by another rule of law.

Although courts of chancery may enjoin other types of wrongful acts, the general rule is that they cannot restrain an alleged libel or slander in the absence of some other independent ground for the invocation of equitable jurisdiction regardless of whether the defamation is personal or relates to one's property. The reason for the rule is threefold. 1. There is an adequate legal remedy, either by an action for damages or by criminal prosecution. 2. Equity jurisdiction is traditionally limited to the protection of property rights. 3. Injunctive relief inhibits the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press and the right to trial by jury on the question of truth or falsity of the alleged libel. ²

This rule has its origin in the infamous English Star Chamber which exercised, until its abolition, the power of cutting off ears, branding the foreheads and slitting the noses of the libellers of important persons. As an incident to this jurisdiction it also issued injunctions to restrain the publication of libels. The author of Brandreth v. Lance ³ stated,

'Since that court [Star Chamber] was abolished, however, I believe there is but one case upon record in which any court, either in this country or in England, has attempted, by an injunction or order of the court, to prohibit or restrain the publication of a libel, as such, in anticipation. In the case to which I allude, the notorious Scroggs, chief justice of the court of King's bench, and his associates, decided that they might be safely entrusted with the power of prohibiting and suppressing such publications as they might deem to be libellous. They accordingly made an order of the court prohibiting any person from printing or publishing a periodical, entitled 'The Weekly Packet of Advice from Rome, or the History of Popery.' The house of commons, however, considered this extraordinary exercise of power on the part of Scroggs as a proper subject of impeachment. (8 Howell's State Trials, 198.) And I believe no judge or chancellor from that time to the present, has attempted to follow that precedent.'

After the adoption of the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854 and the Judicature Act of 1873, English courts were given statutory jurisdiction to enjoin defamatory publications in proper cases, but both the English and Canadian courts have been extremely reluctant to exercise that power, except in the case of a trade libel, since it interfered with the right of free speech. ⁴

There is no necessity to delve into the profession of American cases ⁵ dealing with the effect the American constitutional guarantees have upon this question, for the general rule was adopted in 1895 in Florida. In Reyes v. Middleton ⁶ the defendants distributed and posted in public places in St. Augustine printed and written circulars stating that they own a one-half interest in plaintiffs' land, warning persons against buying said lands and offering to sell the same themselves. The Florida Supreme Court in reversing the chancellor's decree and dismissing the bill of complaint stated the rule thusly:

'It seems to be well settled that a court of equity will never lend its aid, by injunction, to restrain the libeling or slandering of title to property, where there is no breach of trust or contract involved, but that in such cases the remedy, if any, is at law, and that the alleged insolvency of the libelant, in such cases, will not, of itself, authorize the interference of the court of equity.'

The rule was again followed in Moore v. City Dry Cleaners & Laundry and restated in these words: ⁷

'Section 13 of the Declaration of Rights, Constitution of Florida, declares that 'every person may fully speak and write his sentiments on all subjects being responsible for the abuse of that right * * *.' In the absence of an express situation plainly requiring reasonable public regulation in the interest of human life and safety, the right may not be denied or abridged. * * * The fact that statements made under such circumstances may prove, after publication, to be in fact untruthful will not create an exception to the rule stated. Where, as in this State, a party is amenable to suit * * * and such party is made accountable under the fundamental law for an abuse of the right of free expression, a court of equity will not enjoin the commission of a threatened libel or slander; for the imposition of judicial restraints in such a case would clearly amount to prior censorship, a basic evil denounced by both the Federal and State...