Murphy v. Director of Revenue

• Decision Date: 21 June 2005
• Docket Number: No. WD 64266.,WD 64266.
• Citation: 170 S.W.3d 507
• Parties: Harold Ray MURPHY, Appellant, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, State of Missouri, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

170 S.W.3d 507

Harold Ray MURPHY, Appellant, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, State of Missouri, Respondent.

No. WD 64266.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

June 21, 2005.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied August 2, 2005.

Application for Transfer Denied September 20, 2005.

Patrick E. Richardson, Kirksville, MO, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, MO, Tracey A. Dujakovich, Assistant Attorney General, Kansas City, MO, for respondent.

Before ELLIS, P.J., SPINDEN and HOWARD, JJ.

VICTOR C. HOWARD, Judge.

After a trial de novo, the Circuit Court of Linn County entered a judgment sustaining the Director of Revenue's ("Director") revocation of Harold Murphy's ("Murphy") driver's license for excessive blood alcohol content. On appeal from that judgment, Murphy claims that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of toxicology test results based on the blood sample obtained from Murphy by the arresting officer after Murphy refused consent.

As set forth below, we hold that under the plain language of section 577.037, the results of the blood test taken by the arresting officer in violation of section 577.041,¹ were inadmissible in the license revocation proceeding under section 302.505.² The trial court's judgment is reversed.

Background

On the evening of July 25, 2003, Murphy was involved in a two-vehicle injury collision in Linneus, Missouri. When Trooper K.C. Kelly of the Missouri Highway Patrol arrived to investigate, he went to speak to Murphy, who was sitting in a yard next to the accident scene while emergency workers worked to free Murphy's passenger and the other driver from the vehicles. Trooper Kelly noticed that Murphy's breath smelled of alcohol, his eyes were bloodshot and glassy, his pupils appeared dilated, and his speech was slurred at times. Murphy admitted to drinking "one beer" prior to the accident. Due to Murphy's injuries to his left arm, Trooper Kelly asked him to perform only one field sobriety test, the results of which indicated Murphy was impaired.

Trooper Kelly placed Murphy under arrest for two counts of second-degree assault.³ After paramedics treated Murphy's injuries and placed him inside the ambulance, Trooper Kelly advised Murphy of his rights under the implied consent law, sections 577.020 to 577.041. Murphy refused to give a blood sample. Nevertheless, Trooper Kelly directed a paramedic to take a sample of Murphy's blood. The results of the toxicology test on Murphy's blood sample showed that his blood alcohol content (BAC) was .134%.

Pursuant to section 302.505.1, the Director revoked Murphy's license for one year for driving a motor vehicle while his BAC was over .08 percent. Following an administrative hearing that resulted in a determination adverse to Murphy, Murphy filed a petition for de novo review of all issues under section 302.535.

On February 24, 2004, the Circuit Court of Linn County conducted a trial de novo on Murphy's petition. No witnesses testified. The parties stipulated to admission of the certified Department of Revenue records under section 302.312, RSMo 2000, subject to Murphy's objection to the admissibility of the blood test results contained therein.⁴ The only issue at the trial de novo was whether the toxicology results of Murphy's blood tests were admissible to prove his BAC was over .08 percent for revocation of his license under section 302.505. The trial court entered judgment summarily sustaining the Director's revocation of Murphy's driver's license. This appeal follows.

Discussion

In order to make a prima facie case for the revocation of Murphy's license under section 302.505, the Director had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Murphy was: (1) arrested on probable cause to believe that he was driving (2) while the alcohol concentration in his blood, breath, or urine was .08 percent or more by weight. Lawson v. Dir. of Revenue, 145 S.W.3d 443, 445 (Mo.App. W.D.2004). Murphy claims that the blood test results were inadmissible to prove the second element of the Director's prima facie case because once he was arrested and refused to submit to the blood test, Trooper Kelly lacked authority under section 577.041 to order the paramedic to take a sample of his blood.

The Director concedes that Murphy refused consent, but she argues that Murphy improperly seeks exclusion of the toxicology test results by invocation of the exclusionary rule, a criminal law concept, in a civil proceeding. In Riche v. Director of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Mo. banc 1999), our supreme court examined the court-made exclusionary rule, which "requires that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of an illegal search and seizure." (Citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974)). Riche acknowledged the applicability of the exclusionary rule in criminal prosecutions for driving while intoxicated "to deter unlawful police conduct." Id. However, Riche also considered the fact that because "the exclusionary rule is prudential rather than constitutionally mandated, it will not be applied where its `substantial social costs' outweigh its deterrent benefits." Id. at 334. Riche concluded, "the costs of excluding unlawfully seized evidence in a proceeding pursuant to section 302.505 outweigh the potential benefits of applying the exclusionary rule. Neither the fourth amendment nor the Missouri Constitution requires that the exclusionary rule be applied to proceedings under section 302.505[.]" Id. at 336.

Riche differs factually from our case. In Riche, the driver urged the exclusion of evidence on constitutional grounds because he was stopped without probable cause. Murphy argues that his blood test was taken in violation of section 577.041, rendering it inadmissible in the license revocation proceeding because of the plain language of the applicable statutes.

Murphy does not dispute that the exclusionary rule would not be applicable in this civil proceeding to exclude the results of his blood test on constitutional grounds. However, the issue before us does not involve the consideration of a violation of Murphy's constitutional rights. Rather, our determination of whether the trial court erred in admitting the test results on Murphy's blood sample drawn despite his explicit refusal involves statutory interpretation.

As explained below, our legislature has promulgated statutes — sections 577.020 to 577.041—limiting the authority of law enforcement to request the taking of a blood sample to determine an arrested driver's BAC. Additionally, in section 577.037, our legislature specifically provided for the admissibility of test results obtained pursuant to exercise of that authority in a proceeding to suspend or revoke a driver's license under Chapter 302. Under these statutes, the issue is not viewed in the ordinary search and seizure context. The issue is viewed solely in terms of consent. We hold that under the plain language of the relevant statutes as applied to the facts of this case, Murphy's blood test results were inadmissible in the proceeding to revoke his license under section 302.505.

Under Missouri law, once an arrested driver explicitly negates or withdraws his implied consent to a blood test as provided for in section 577.020, then, pursuant to section 577.041.1, "none shall be given." In other words, once the driver refuses consent to a blood test, the law enforcement official lacks authority to authorize the withdrawal of blood to test for BAC. See Blanchard v. Dir. of Revenue, 844 S.W.2d 589, 590 (Mo.App. E.D.1993) (explaining that under section 577.041, "an officer is without authority to administer the test once it is refused").

In State v. Ikerman, 698 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Mo.App. E.D.1985), the Eastern District considered the State's contention on appeal in a criminal proceeding that law enforcement officers "had the right to take the blood sample from [the] defendant without his consent, a warrant, or an arrest." The court noted:

Schmerber [v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1836, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966)] supports the general principle that the warrantless extraction of a blood sample without consent but incident to a lawful arrest is not an unconstitutional search and seizure and that the results of a blood test performed thereon are admissible in evidence.

Id. at 905 (emphasis omitted). After recognizing this general principle and finding that the trial court had not erred in determining that the defendant had been arrested, Ikerman continued:

Accepting the trial court's view that defendant had been arrested, Schmerber, standing alone, would compel the conclusion that the warrantless search without consent comports with constitutional due process permitting the blood sample to be taken and to be admissible evidence where defendant has first been arrested. . . . [O]ur legislature responded to Schmerber by its enactment, like many other states, of an "implied consent" statute, § 577.020, which states in pertinent part:

"1. Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state shall be deemed to have given consent to, subject to the provisions of Sections 577.010 to 577.041, a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, saliva or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol or drug content of his blood if arrested for any offense arising out of acts which the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe were committed while the person was driving a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated or drugged condition. The test shall be administered at the direction of the arresting law enforcement officer whenever the person has been arrested for the offense."

Thus, under the aegis of Schmerber, the implied consent statute authorizing a "search," i.e., the extraction of blood for a blood alcohol test,...