Murphy v. Fedex Nat'l Ltl Inc

• Decision Date: 26 August 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09-3473,09-3518.,09-3473
• Citation: 618 F.3d 893
• Parties: Susan A. MURPHY, Appellee/Cross-Appellant,v.FEDEX NATIONAL LTL, INC., Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

618 F.3d 893

Susan A. MURPHY, Appellee/Cross-Appellant,v.FEDEX NATIONAL LTL, INC., Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Nos. 09-3473, 09-3518.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: June 15, 2010.

Filed: Aug. 26, 2010.

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William E. Grob, argued, Tampa, FL, Benjamin R. Welling, Phoenix, AR, on the brief, for appellant/cross-appellee.

John Lynn, argued, St. Louis, MO, for appellee/cross-appellant.

Before MELLOY, HANSEN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Susan Murphy sued her former employer, FedEx National LTL, Inc. (“FedEx”), claiming that FedEx violated the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., when it fired her after representing to her that it had granted her leave. The district court submitted Murphy's FMLA claim to a jury on an estoppel theory, and the jury returned a verdict for Murphy. The district court then denied FedEx's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial based on erroneous jury instructions. FedEx appeals and Murphy cross appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background

We begin by discussing the background of this case, doing so in the light most favorable to Murphy, the prevailing party in the court below. Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 394 F.3d 594, 598 (8th Cir.2005). Murphy and her husband began employment as truck drivers with FedEx in September 2006 after FedEx acquired their previous employer, Watkins Motor Lines.¹ Shortly before this, Murphy's husband was hospitalized. Accordingly, he sought and was granted FMLA leave. Murphy then sought FMLA leave from her immediate supervisor, Jeff Karnes, in order to care for her husband. Karnes told Murphy that she needed to speak with a Human Resources (“HR”) representative to make those arrangements. In accordance with the HR representative's instructions, Murphy sought and received medical certification from her husband's doctor confirming her need for leave. On August 31, 2006, FedEx granted Murphy FMLA leave to care for her ailing husband.

On September 7, 2006, Murphy's husband died unexpectedly. That same day, Murphy called Karnes to notify him that her husband had died and to ask him about employee benefits related to funeral and burial expenses. Murphy was noticeably distraught over the death of her husband, so Karnes offered to obtain information regarding these benefits. Murphy then took three days of bereavement leave issued by FedEx.

On September 11, Karnes initiated another conversation with Murphy. He told her that her FMLA leave had ended on September 7th and asked her how much more time she needed before returning to work. Murphy said that she needed thirty days “to take care of things.” Karnes responded by saying “okay, cool, not a problem, I'll let HR know.” He did not indicate whether Murphy needed approval from HR to take this leave. Murphy did not seek any additional approval from FedEx and did not seek medical certification. She testified that she would have sought medical certification had she not believed that Karnes had approved her leave request. Although she testified at trial that after the death of her husband, she was crying all the time, could not sleep, and had difficulty functioning, she did not tell Karnes or any other employee at FedEx about these symptoms.

On September 12, Karnes contacted an HR representative to inform her that Murphy had requested thirty days' leave to “put her affairs in order.” HR denied that request. On September 15, Karnes called Murphy to inform her that FedEx had decided to terminate her.

Murphy then filed suit against FedEx, alleging, among other things, that FedEx interfered with her rights under the FMLA by denying her leave and terminating her employment. At the conclusion of Murphy's evidence at trial, FedEx moved for judgment as a matter of law. The district court denied FedEx's motion, but noted that the evidence in Murphy's case was premised on an unpleaded FMLA-estoppel theory, rather than a traditional FMLA claim. At that time, the district court also denied Murphy's offer of proof with respect to two doctors whose testimony the district court had previously excluded in an order granting FedEx's motion in limine. The two doctors sought to testify that they would have given Murphy leave certification if she had requested it at the relevant time.

At the conclusion of FedEx's evidence, the district court submitted the case to the jury with an estoppel-based verdict director. In formulating the instructions, the district court rejected FedEx's proposed instruction that would have required a verdict in FedEx's favor unless the jury found that Murphy placed FedEx on notice that she may have needed FMLA leave and that she actually suffered from an FMLA-qualifying serious health condition. The district court also rejected Murphy's proposed instruction that, if the jury found that FedEx failed to request medical certification, it must find that FedEx waived its right to argue that Murphy did not suffer a serious health condition.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Murphy. FedEx then filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and, alternatively, a new trial based on the district court's erroneous verdict director. The district court denied the motion, and FedEx appealed. Murphy filed a conditional cross-appeal challenging the district court's denial of her waiver instruction and exclusion of her proffered experts.

II. Discussion

The FMLA provides eligible employees “up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave during a twelve-month period ‘[b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee.’ ” Rask v. Fresenius Med. Care N. Am., 509 F.3d 466, 471 (8th Cir.2007) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D)). The statute defines “serious health condition” as any “illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves (A) inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility; or (B) continuing treatment by a health care provider.” 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11). One way for an employee to succeed in an FMLA claim is to prove that her employer interfered with her substantive FMLA rights. Phillips v. Mathews, 547 F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir.2008). Here, the jury found FedEx liable for interference on an estoppel theory-i.e., that FedEx interfered with Murphy's substantive rights by representing that it had granted her leave, inducing reasonable reliance on this representation, and later terminating her. Three issues arise out of this verdict. We consider whether the district court erred: (1) in its formulation of the jury instructions; (2) by denying FedEx's motion for judgment as a matter of law; and (3) by excluding Murphy's proffered experts.

A. Jury Instructions

“We review a district court's jury instructions for an abuse of discretion.” McCoy v. Augusta Fiberglass Coatings, Inc., 593 F.3d 737, 744 (8th Cir.2010). “Our review is limited to whether the jury instructions, taken as a whole, fairly and adequately represent the evidence and applicable law in light of the issues presented in a particular case.” Id. at 744 (quotation omitted). The issues with respect to the jury instructions in this case are twofold: First, whether the district court's formulation of the estoppel instruction constituted an abuse of discretion; and second, whether the district court erred in rejecting Murphy's proposed waiver instruction. We consider these issues in turn.

1. Estoppel

With respect to the estoppel issue,² the verdict director instructed the jury that it must find for Murphy if, in relevant part:

(1) Murphy was employed by FedEx;

(2) Murphy requested thirty days' leave from FedEx;

(3) FedEx represented to Murphy it approved the request for leave, with reason to believe that Murphy would rely upon FedEx's representation; and

(4) Murphy reasonably relied upon FedEx's representation to her detriment.

“Equitable estoppel is available to prevent a company from contesting an employee's right to assert a claim under the FMLA.” Reed v. Lear Corp., 556 F.3d 674, 678 (8th Cir.2009). FedEx acknowledges this, but argues the parameters of the doctrine do not embrace the district court's instruction. It argues that the court abused its discretion by failing to require the jury to find that: (1) Murphy actually needed FMLA leave because of a serious health condition; (2) even if proof of a serious health condition is not required, Murphy notified FedEx that she potentially had such a condition and may have needed FMLA leave; and (3) Murphy believed FedEx had granted her FMLA leave, rather than some other type of leave.

On the first issue, our decision in Duty v. Norton-Alcoa Proppants, 293 F.3d 481 (8th Cir.2002), is instructive. In Duty, an employer terminated an employee after he failed to come to work following twelve weeks of FMLA leave. Id. at 487. Earlier, however, the employer had told the employee that his entire thirty-four weeks of leave, far more than the twelve-week statutory maximum, qualified as FMLA leave. Id. at 486-87. When the employee filed an FMLA claim against his employer, the employer asserted as an affirmative defense that the employee's FMLA leave had expired at the time of the termination. Id. at 493. We rejected this argument and held that even though the FMLA only authorizes twelve weeks' leave, the employer could be estopped from asserting this as an affirmative defense because of its prior representations and the employee's reasonable and detrimental reliance on those representations. Id. at 493-94. Duty is analytically similar to Murphy's case. Just as the FMLA only qualifies employees for twelve weeks' leave, as was the case in Duty, it only qualifies employees, as relevant here, for leave due to serious health conditions. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). But, as D...