Murphy v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 27 January 1977
• Parties: Gerard R. MURPHY, Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 24

391 N.Y.S.2d 24

55 A.D.2d 486

Gerard R. MURPHY, Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

Jan. 27, 1977.

Vibbard, Donaghy & Wright, Schoharie (Charles M. Wright, Schoharie, of counsel), for appellant.

Carter, Conboy, Bardwell, Case & Blackmore, Albany (Forrest N. Case, Jr., Albany, of counsel), for respondent.

Before GREENBLOTT, J.P., and SWEENEY, MAIN, LARKIN and HERLIHY, JJ.

LARKIN, Justice.

Plaintiff was severely injured on August 14, 1971, when his 1967 Chevrolet Impala left the road and struck a telephone pole. His complaint set forth two causes of action, the first for breach of warranty and the second for negligence in the manufacture of the car. At the trial plaintiff introduced the testimony of two experts who attributed the cause of the accident to improperly manufactured engine mounts and, in addition, produced a March, 1972 letter from the Chevrolet Division of General Motors warning the owners of certain 1967 model Chevrolet passenger cars of the possible danger of the separation of the engine mounts and advising the immediate servicing of the vehicles by Chevrolet dealers. Defendant relied primarily upon two experts who testified that under the circumstances the motor mounts could not have separated and this was not the cause of the accident.

At the conclusion of his case, plaintiff moved to amend his complaint, to conform to the proof, by adding a cause of action for strict liability. The defendant moved to dismiss the two causes of action. The court reserved decision on both motions. After the parties rested, the motions were renewed. Trial Term dismissed the first cause of action, based on breach of warranty, as barred by the applicable statute of limitations (Uniform Commercial Code, § 2--725) and refused to charge strict liability in tort. We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court erred in refusing to charge strict liability and, accordingly, the judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered (Jerry v. Borden Co., 45 A.D.2d 344, 358 N.Y.S.2d 426).

The CPLR evidences a strong policy towards liberal pleading requirements. Pleadings are sufficient if they notify the court and the parties of the transactions and occurrences intended to be proved and the material elements of each cause of action (CPLR 3013). Pleadings are to be liberally construed and amendments are to be freely allowed (CPLR 3025, subd. (b); Princiotto v. Materdomini, 45 A.D.2d 883, 358 N.Y.S.2d 13) and '(t)he court may permit pleadings to be amended before or after judgment to conform them to the evidence' (CPLR 3025, subd. (c)). Applying such standards, the Appellate Division, Second Department has ruled that a complaint alleging negligent manufacture of a product and breach of warranty gave notice of the transactions and occurrences underlying a cause of action for strict liability. The judgment of the trial court dismissing, at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the two causes of action pleaded therein was reversed and a new trial was ordered at which the case was to be presented to the jury on the theory of strict liability in tort (Jerry v. Borden Co., supra).

Similarly, in Velez v. Craine & Clark Lbr. Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617, 305 N.E.2d 750, the Court of Appeals ruled that a case tried before the strict products liability rule was enunciated in Colding v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 298 N.E.2d 622, should be 'remitted for a new trial because the charge to the jury was erroneous under Codling, when viewed with the benefit of hindsight' (Velez v. Craine & Clark Lbr. Corp., supra, 33 N.Y.2d p. 121, 350 N.Y.S.2d p. 620, 305 N.E.2d p. 752). In Velez, as in the instant case and Jerry v. Borden...