Murphy v. George Brown & Co.

• Decision Date: 18 February 1918
• Parties: MURPHY v. GEORGE BROWN & CO.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

103 A. 28

91 N.J.Law 412

MURPHY

v. GEORGE BROWN & CO.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Feb. 18, 1918.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Proceeding by Nora Murphy, widow of Dennis Murphy, deceased, by the Workmen's Compensation Aid Bureau, against George Brown & Co., a corporation of the State of New Jersey. Judgment for petitioner, and the Company prosecutes a writ of certiorari. Judgment affirmed.

Argued November term, 1917, before SWAYZE, TRENCHARD, and MINTURN, JJ.

M. Casewell Heine, of Newark, for prosecutor. Runyon Colie, of Newark, for defendant.

TRENCHARD, J. Whilst at work for George Brown & Co. on December 9, 1916, Dennis Murphy received an acid burn on his fingers. An infection later developed, as a result of which he died.

No petition for compensation being filed by his widow or dependents, the workmen's compensation aid bureau certified a state of facts to the judge of the Essex county common pleas court pursuant to chapter 54, P. L. 1916, p. 97. The judge thereupon, after assigning counsel to the petitioner, and fixing a time and place for hearing, heard the same and rendered judgment for the petitioner and against the company, including therein §150 for the petitioner's legal expenses. The company then sued out this writ. We are of the opinion that the judgment must be affirmed.

The prosecutor's first point is that chapter 54 of P. L. 1916, p. 97, entitled "An act creating a workmen's compensation aid bureau in the department of labor," is unconstitutional because not in compliance with article 4, § 7, par. 4, of the Constitution of New Jersey, requiring that "every law shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title." We think the point not well taken. By force of that constitutional provision the object of every law must be single and be expressed in the title of the law; the product may be as diverse as the object requires and finds its expression in the terms of the enactment only. In fine, the title of an act is a label, not an index. Moore v. Burdett, 62 N. J. Law, 163, 40 Atl. 631.

The act in question creates a bureau and empowers it to investigate the operation of the Workmen's Compensation Act and similar legislation in other states, and report thereon to the Legislature. It further empowers the bureau to investigate any particular accident, to supervise agreements of settlement between employer and employe, and to endeavor to bring about such settlements, and in the event of the employer's undue delay or failure to pay compensation, to certify the facts on behalf of the employe to the court of common pleas, which certified facts are to act as a petition filed on behalf of the employe. The act then directs, if no counsel is engaged by the employe, the appointment of counsel by the court, and that the matter shall thereupon be governed by the procedure outlined in the Workmen's Compensation Act. It further directs that, if the court finds that the employer is without reasonable excuse for undue delay or failure to pay compensation, then the reasonable expenses of the employe, by reason of such delay, including medical and legal services, and loss of time, are to be paid by the employer.

It thus appears that the sole object of the act is the establishment of a workmen's compensation aid bureau; and this is exactly what is expressed in the title. The incidental matters, or product, are cognate to the object and necesary for the proper and efficient operation of the workmen's compensation aid bureau, and need not, and could not properly, be set out in the title. It is erroneous to consider that the so-called change in the procedure in the court of common pleas (if indeed it is of sufficient consequence to be called a change in procedure) is an object of the act under consideration, and hence to be expressed in the title. It is not an object of the act, but is a reasonable product of the creation of the bureau, or, as frequently stated, a matter cognate to the object of the act as expressed in the title. That such cognate matters, particularly when they are matters of procedure, do not have to be expressed in the title of the act, is clearly indicated by a most cursory examination of statutes which have received judicial sanction. State Board of Health v. Diamond Mills, 63 N. J. Eq. 111, 51 Atl. 1019; Hickman v. State, 62 N. J. Law, 499, 41 Atl. 942, affirmed 63 N. J. Law, 666, 44 Atl. 1099; Coward v. North Plainfield, 63 N. J. Law 61, 42 Atl. 805; Stagway v. Riker, 84 N. J. Law, 201, 86 Atl. 440; Wittingham v. Milburn, 100 Atl. 854.

The next point is that the act under consideration impairs the obligation of contract, contrary to article 4, § 7, par. 3, of the Constitution. We think it does not. The act took effect July 4, 1916. We think the admission of the answer in the present case, and the "determination" of the trial judge, show in effect that the contract of hiring in this case was entered into after the act took effect, in which case, of course, the act could not impair the obligation of the contract, since the contract must be presumed to have been made in view of and subject to the pat the contract was entered into before therovisions of the act. Assuming, however, th passage of the act, still the act would not impair its...