Stagway v. Riker

• Decision Date: 28 February 1913
• Citation: 84 N.J.L. 201,86 A. 440
• Parties: STAGWAY v. RIKER et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

86 A. 440

84 N.J.L. 201

STAGWAY

v. RIKER et al.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Feb., 1913.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Certiorari by Robert Stagway removing resolution of the Commissioners of the New Jersey Reformatory. Writ dismissed.

Argued November term, 1912, before TRENCHARD and MINTURN, JJ.

Theodore Strong, of New Brunswick, for prosecutor.

Edmund Wilson, Atty. Gen., opposed.

MINTURN, J. The prosecutor, an inmate of the state reformatory, under an indeterminate sentence imposed by the court of general sessions of the county of Middlesex, upon an indictment for highway robbery, was ordered by the commissioners of the reformatory by resolution to be transferred to the state prison, where he was received on the 18th of March, 1911, and where he is now detained serving out the remainder of his term. The legality of his transfer to the prison was reviewed by Mr. Justice Voorhees upon a writ of habeas corpus, with the result that the prosecutor's discharge was refused. A writ of certiorari, however, was then allowed to review the legality of the prosecutor's transfer to the prison.

The prosecutor rests his claim in effect upon two reasons: First, that the title of the act under the authority of which this order of removal was made is insufficient, thereby rendering the act unconstitutional.

The act is entitled "An act relating to the management of the New Jersey reformatory." P. L. 1901, p. 231. The twelfth section, conferring the power of removal, reads as follows: "12. The commissioners, with the consent of the Governor, may transfer to the state prison any prisoner commuted to the reformatory; they may, with like consent, require the return to the reformatory of any prisoner who may have been transferred from there to the state prison; every prisoner so transferred to the state prison shall be held therein, subject to all the rules and the discipline of such prison, for the full maximum term provided by law, less commutation earned for good behavior, unless returned to the reformatory as herein provided."

The insistment is that the title of the act is not sufficiently broad to include the power thus vested by the twelfth section in the commissioners, and exercised by them in this instance. It is said that since the title contains no reference to the power to transfer to the prison, and since the section in effect relates as much to the management of the prison as it does to the management of the reformatory, without indicating that fact by any collocation of words from which this legislative purpose may be reasonably inferred, the section in question is thereby rendered nugatory.

We think the words "management of the New Jersey reformatory" are sufficiently comprehensive to convey to the mind a legislative intent to deal with the general subject of the reformatory in all of its details of management and control, and that any one interested in the subject would by force of this legislative notice have his mind directed to the fact that by this measure the Legislature proposed to deal with any conceivable practical phase of reformatory management and control.

The legislative inhibition requiring an act to express its object in its title was intended to subserve that practical purpose, and in this instance we are unable to perceive that the Legislature has failed to comply with the constitutional mandate.

Under the word "management" as we have intimated, the general administration, including the discipline of the institution, were proper subjects for legislative action. "Words," says Blackstone, "are generally to be understood in their usual and most known signification; not so much regarding the propriety of grammar, as their general and popular use." Volume 1, p. 59.

The general and usual signification of the word "management" as defined by Webster is "conduct," "administration," "guidance," "control," "judicious use of means to accomplish an end." Measured by these definitions, we think the title of the act sub judice sufficiently comprehensive to inform the public and the legislative members that the discipline of the inmates of the reformatory was or might be the subject-matter of the act, and that result under our decisions is made the test of compliance with the requirement of the organic law. Ryno v. State, 58 N. J. Law, 239, 33 Atl. 219; Falkner v. Dorland, 54 N. J. Law, 410, 24 Atl. 403; Rader v. Township of Union, 39 N. J. Law, 512.

Acts with titles much less specific than the one in question have been held to comply with the legislative mandate. Coward v. North Plainfield, 63 N. J. Law, 61, 42 Atl. 805; State v. Twining, 73 N. J. Law, 683, 64 Atl. 1073, 1135; State v. Corson, 67 N. J. Law, 178, 50 Atl. 780; Seaside Realty Co. v. Atlantic City, 74 N. J. Law, 178, 64 Atl. 1081.

If the title be expressive of the legislative intent, even though the language be of a generic character, but sufficiently plain and comprehensive to convey the general purpose or...